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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 12, 2015 9:27:50 GMT -6
I want to point out something about the environment that the development of the all big gun ship i.e. battleships and large armored cruisers, occurred in. These new technological innovations did not occur alone, they were a part of a naval revolution. Fisher's revolution was in five parts: Training , recruitment, the nucleus crew system, redistribution of British Naval Forces which also included the retirement of obsolescent ships. The new strategic deployment would be more of a rapid reaction force and less of a forward deployment force. Finally, the development and building of the new all big gun ships. We have technological innovation and organizational innovation occurring together. As I stated in an earlier post, as the cost of these changes to the ships and organization occurred, it reduced the number of ships deployable due to the rising cost per unit. This reduction left open the door for other nations to begin to build their own navies and make changes. Germany is an example. This reduction in numbers also led to the alliances with Japan and France. France would cover the Mediterranean, eventually with Italy, Japan would cover the Far East and the Royal Navy would cover the North Sea, Norway and the Channel, eventually extending that coverage to the North Atlantic.
The large armored cruiser's development was just a part of this whole scheme to change the battlefield dynamics. It was not an end in itself, just part of it. It's history was short due to the introduction of the aircraft, carrier, torpedo, submarine and mines. Even the eventual introduction of the task force system would eventually replace the old scouting force and battle line system. This started during the 1920's with the Fleet Problems of the US Navy.
I don't know how much this affects the play of RTW, but never isolate technological innovation from the environment that it was borne it. All technology, sits within the economic, political and organizational environment that created it.
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Post by RNRobert on Sept 12, 2015 13:00:04 GMT -6
The battlecruiser seemed to me to be sort of an anomaly in naval warfare. Historically, warships fought other warships of the same size. For example, in the era of fighting sail, ships-of-the-line fought other ships-of-the-line, frigates fought frigates, and so on. In the late 19th century, this was still the case. Battleships were designed to slug it out with other battleships, and cruisers were designed with an eye toward potential enemies (for instance, the British Powerful class cruisers were built to counter the Russian Rurik). The torpedo boat and its replacement, the torpedo boat destroyer, bucked this trend as it was a vessel designed to take on larger vessels (however, it was small and cheap, which meant you could built a lot of them, and they were expendable). However, the battlecruiser was not designed to fight other battlecruisers- it was basically an uber-cruiser designed to kill enemy cruisers- as thecarthaginian pointed out a few replies back, the only time these ships were used in their proper role was at the Falklands. At Jutland, when used as part of the battle line, they suffered dearly (while the Germans only lost one BC to Britain's three, the survivors were heavily damaged, and had British AP shells worked like they were supposed to, they might have lost more). John Keegan in his book on World War 1 argued that the Royal Navy should have used the resources used to build the battlecruisers to build a larger number of smaller cruisers instead.
It could be that the desire for speed, plus the realization that better protection was needed, that led to the development of the fast battleship.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 12, 2015 14:38:31 GMT -6
You should not define the value of a technological innovation from one battle. The battlecruisers were exactly where they were designed to be, in the scouting force. They were designed to locate the enemy, hold on to him and allow the battlefleet enough time to come up and destroy the enemy force. The force that Beatty met was the German scouting force consisting of battlecruisers. The battleships of the High Seas Fleet were 50 miles behind, with Jellicoe about 65 miles behind Beatty. Beatty essentially did exactly what he was expected to do, engage them and hold on to them. The loss of the three battlecruisers was due to A. Poor ammunition handling i.e. training B. Poor ammunition C. Poor gunnery procedures and equipment Lion was hit just as bad, but her superior training kept her afloat. Neither set of battlecruisers were part of the battleline except the 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron which was temporarily attached to the battlefleet. This was not part of SOP for the Grand Fleet. All three battlecruisers lost were sunk by German battlecruisers, all were doing exactly what they were designed to do as per Royal Navy and Grand Fleet doctrine.
One point to make, Beatty is reported by his flag Captain Chatfield as saying " something is wrong with our damn bloody ships and our damn bloody system." Beatty understood the problem and it wasn't the armor on the turret tops, it was down in the magazines where the procedures carefully laid out were not followed. The Admiralty reacted within days of the battle to remedy the faults. Inspectors found magazine doors were left open, lids off powder cases and all the turret cages had propellant charges and shells in them. The myth of the inadequate armor was initiated to protect the reputation of the Royal Navy in the war. This myth was not discovered and unraveled until the 1980's by men like Sumida, Lambert and David K. Brown.
All weapons are compromises in design as should your ships be when you design them in RTW. You must balance lethality, speed and survivability in the limited hull space available to you. This is exactly what the designers of the large armored cruisers did.
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Post by thecarthaginian on Sept 12, 2015 15:40:19 GMT -6
Oldpop... You seem to have an inordinate affection for the battlecruiser. I understand the compromises inherent in a complex weapon system, and I understand that a weapon is seldom if ever employed in exactly the manner intended. You seem to be on an 'absorb and deflect' mission regarding the fatal mistake that the overall set of compromises created when battlecruisers were placed in a role they were poorly-suited to handle (facing capital-scale naval guns). The handling techniques in the British magazines on the BCs were the same as in the battleships... but none of those simply ceased to exist.
EDIT: sorry, I intended to return to this yesterday, but I was rear-ended in traffic on the way home, and the driver of the other car had what we in the US lovingly term an 'open beverage container' in his vehicle... so the afternoon got real and I forgot. Edited to fix typos I knew were there but didn't have a chance to fix.
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Post by dickturpin on Sept 12, 2015 16:29:08 GMT -6
I would like to add a few notes and a clarification: - - My previous comments regarding the pre-Washington vessels; the three main naval powers were all increasing emphasis on Battlecruiser construction (following lessons from WW1) and thus were clearly not of the opinion that this was a dead end as a design. The G3 and Amagi were however becoming more like fast Battleships and the fast Battleship Nagato was becoming more Battlecruiser like; thus moving toward the fusing of the types.
- The British term Battlecruiser appears to be closely linked to the "Two Power Standard" (a 10% margin over the next two strongest powers) and the replacement "One Power Standard" (a 60 % over the second strongest power). These standards applied to Battleships and Armored Cruisers had not been included. A change in the method of calculation resulted in the big gun armored cruiser being included in the calculation and this appears to be linked to the term Battlecruiser, thus increasing the identification with their role in the line of battle.
- The big gun armored cruiser was introduced at a time of financial restriction in the naval budget. Whilst the unit cost was higher than previous classes of Battleship and Cruiser, there were fewer units built; they represent a cost saving as they were capable of fulfilling both tactical roles. The introduction of such radical ship design that rendered the ships being constructed by other nations obsolescent, would be hoped to cause disruption and confusion in their procurement strategies and act as a form of break to the naval arms race.
- As oldpop2000 points out, the Armored Cruiser formed part of a revolutionary strategy of centralization of deployment in home waters replacing the old station fleets. They could be deployed rapidly as needed and thus represent an economy of force. In addition to the points raised in his most recent post was the development of a sophisticated intelligence operation and a revolutionary communication network. Also to be factored into the equation is the potential strategy of flotilla defense using submarines and torpedo craft to control coastal waters and thus protect Britain from the potential of invasion.
- The term "plunging fire" is generally understood to mean the steep angle of impact at near maximum range. This was considered to be a significant threat post WW1 as improved shells with effective delayed action fuses and improved armor piercing properties were expected to represent a significant risk to the old form of deck protection. This took the form of a thin burster deck and a second splinter deck; such improved shells hitting at steep angles may be expected to defeat this protective system and burst in the vital areas of the target ship. This was one of the main driving forces toward more extensive horizontal protection in later capital ships. HMS Hood was sunk at a range of circa 18,000 yards and this is not extreme range for Bismarck's 15" guns. William J Jurens in The Loss of Hood a Re-Examination concludes that the thickness of deck armor that Hood possessed was approximately ideal protection at the range and angle of impact pertinent to her engagement with Bismarck..
- When considering the unit cost of Armored Cruisers, the larger crew size and additional length (requiring larger docks) needs to be factored into any assessment of comparable cost.
- In order to achieve high speeds, there is inevitably a compromise in some other feature of either protection of armament. In order to achieve the dual role function, the designer of the Armored Cruiser/Battlecruiser must take careful consideration of the likely tactical constraints in order to identify the appropriate compromise to be made. With the example of the Cressy and Drake classes, the compromise is heavy guns; this may be viewed as a sensible decision in the context of the prevailing conditions of the time. Their strong medium batteries (in period context) could shoot faster and more accurately than heavy Battleship guns. Thus with their strong armor protection, they may be expected to prevail 1:1 against a Battleship providing they kept the range long and did not receive an unlucky hit from a heavy shell in the wrong place. The Battleship heavy guns being close range weapons at this time. The Invincible compromised light armor and the secondary battery. This may be considered sensible as their big gun battery would be larger and more accurate than a contemporary Battleship at long range (also in period context). Whilst her armor may be considered inadequate for close range fighting, it was probably adequate (in period context) in a long range engagement.
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Post by dickturpin on Sept 12, 2015 16:48:33 GMT -6
The handling techniques in the British magazines on the BCs were the same as in the battleships... but none of those simply ceased to exist. This is possibly true to some extent (there appears to have been significant ship to ship variation but this is not category specific). The Battleships generally had thicker turret armor (13" QE v 9" Lion v 7" I) they absorbed fewer hits, and the Battleships that did absorb punishment were the largest, most modern and best protected examples in the fleet.
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Post by sabratha on Sept 13, 2015 5:19:31 GMT -6
I think 12"+ main gun and uparmored supercrusiers would be out of the question for Japan. They would have a cost nearly approaching a fast battleship and given the Japanese Mahanian doctrine, the'd rather build the latter. I think a 20 000-something 11inch gunned crusier would be the top of what the'd consider cost-effective. Of course that's speculation and it could change if the US would decide to build several Dunkuerque-look-alikes... Let me start by saying that I crossed up my prewar Japanese ship studies, mea maxima culpa. When I said A-120 I should have said B-65. That ship was the reason I said that Japan would have went on to the 12" cruiser. The B-65 would have fielded an entirely new 310mm/L50 main gun. The design study was completed in 1940, but due to the war no prototypes of the gun were constructed and the ships were probably never even approved for construction. It does, however, show us where Japan was thinking about going if it had been at liberty to replace all its older battlecruisers with more modern vessels. Also, bear in mind that the study was completed before the USN fully considered the Alaska class... so the Japanese were developing the concept independently of the influence of the USN. Indeed, the USN developed the concept of the 12" cruiser in a reaction to Japanese development of such a ship, rather than vice versa. Ah ok, now I get it. That might have been an indication how would the IJN react had the US built some sort of Dunkerque or Alaska look-alikes early on without the WNT. Still, the B65 from what I know was a specific design with a very narrow "tactical role" to play. The key element was the speed of 34knots, as it was supposed to keep up with destroyers. This was made possible only with 1930s engines and I still think a 34knot speed with a full displacement of just 35 000 trons and that armament was somewhat optimistic in 1939. My best guess is that after 1940 changes in AA armament etc, the design would have ended up as an even larger ship and thus in my best guess it would have been deemed as unfeasible either way. And I'm certain this design would not be possible in the 1920s or even early 1930s... it was a very ambitious project even in 1939 to begin with. I'm also not knowledgable how far was the design of the new 310mm guns was completed at the time. One thing I'd like to point out was that the British alliance system (save the one with Japan) was still rather sketchy at the time and the RN and the MN were especially poorly informed and unconvinced about it. Both the RN and MN had very serious and advanced operational plans in case they would face the Germans alone. As far as early August 1914, the French were preparing rather desperate contingency efforts in case they have to block the English channel alone, with the UK staying out of the war. (Halpern in "A naval history of ww1" make a good account of how uncoordinated the UK and French efforts were at first).
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Post by thecarthaginian on Sept 13, 2015 6:46:18 GMT -6
You should not define the value of a technological innovation from one battle. The battlecruisers were exactly where they were designed to be, in the scouting force. They were designed to locate the enemy, hold on to him and allow the battlefleet enough time to come up and destroy the enemy force. The force that Beatty met was the German scouting force consisting of battlecruisers. The battleships of the High Seas Fleet were 50 miles behind, with Jellicoe about 65 miles behind Beatty. Beatty essentially did exactly what he was expected to do, engage them and hold on to them. The loss of the three battlecruisers was due to A. Poor ammunition handling i.e. training B. Poor ammunition C. Poor gunnery procedures and equipment Lion was hit just as bad, but her superior training kept her afloat. Neither set of battlecruisers were part of the battleline except the 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron which was temporarily attached to the battlefleet. This was not part of SOP for the Grand Fleet. All three battlecruisers lost were sunk by German battlecruisers, all were doing exactly what they were designed to do as per Royal Navy and Grand Fleet doctrine. One point to make, Beatty is reported by his flag Captain Chatfield as saying " something is wrong with our damn bloody ships and our damn bloody system." Beatty understood the problem and it wasn't the armor on the turret tops, it was down in the magazines where the procedures carefully laid out were not followed. The Admiralty reacted within days of the battle to remedy the faults. Inspectors found magazine doors were left open, lids off powder cases and all the turret cages had propellant charges and shells in them. The myth of the inadequate armor was initiated to protect the reputation of the Royal Navy in the war. This myth was not discovered and unraveled until the 1980's by men like Sumida, Lambert and David K. Brown. All weapons are compromises in design as should your ships be when you design them in RTW. You must balance lethality, speed and survivability in the limited hull space available to you. This is exactly what the designers of the large armored cruisers did. The loss of three battlecruisers was due to 1.) poor design of a ship by placing guns from a battleship on hull with a cruiser's armor, 2.) the REMF's who didn't understand what the ships were designed for, but rather thought "they looked a lot like a battleship and cost more than a battleship" (on occasion) and so they sent them to fight battleships*, 3.) the combination of bed institutional procedures for handling ammunition and powder within the barbette, 4.) commanders that overestimated the 'sufficient armor protection' of their ships in a long-range gunnery duel against similarly armed vessels, 5.) poor shell design and lack of accurate information being disseminated to field commanders regarding potential problems. Does that just about cover everything... not just the powder-handling and flashback issues? There is no 'myth of inadequate armor' - the battlecruiser undeniably had inefficient and impractical armor for fighting capital ships. What they were supposed to do was use their speed advantage to 'engage to disengage'... this is the cardinal premise of a scouting force. Battlecruisers were supposed to be able to fight the smaller, less powerful ships of another fleet's screening ships OR outrun the battlefleet while using the threat of similar firepower to deter their opposite numbers from following too closely. Engaging in a 'holding action' was never included in this, but was rather only added after Germany started building battlecruisers to counter British battlecruisers. Of course, the British didn't look at this change in tactical situation and make the proper adjustment... they continued to build larger numbers of bigger, faster and more powerful battlecruisers in the mistaken belief that 'bigger, better, faster, more' would mean success. It did not; it merely lead to more dangerous situations because ships with armor that was becoming less and less effective due to the increase in gun size carried and speed demanded were facing other ships, which were themselves now carrying bigger guns and fast enough to negate their commanding speed advantage, thus preventing the tactical withdrawal that was initially the foundation of the battlecruiser theory! Why were those battlecruisers lost? A combination of idiotic insistence upon a single isolated theory in an unacknowledged, yet rapidly changing, tactical situation. The British admirals, as you say we are doing, looked at the battlecruiser in a vacuum... ignoring its flaws, willfully ignorant of the changes in strategic implications that their 'revolution' had caused. Other navies weren't supposed to react to their awesome new plan that quickly, dammit! They were supposed to keep building inferior armored cruisers while the Royal Navy built better, stronger, faster and more modern ones. Once the battlecruiser captured the imagination of a generation, however, they became blind to its flaws. They built vessels that had no place in the rapidly changing landscape of the war - heinously expensive vessels, which later forced uses to be invented for them because they were too expensive to simply scrap after the uses they had been invented for vanished.
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Post by thecarthaginian on Sept 13, 2015 6:56:09 GMT -6
I'm also not knowledgable how far was the design of the new 310mm guns was completed at the time. One thing I'd like to point out was that the British alliance system (save the one with Japan) was still rather sketchy at the time and the RN and the MN were especially poorly informed and unconvinced about it. Both the RN and MN had very serious and advanced operational plans in case they would face the Germans alone. As far as early August 1914, the French were preparing rather desperate contingency efforts in case they have to block the English channel alone, with the UK staying out of the war. (Halpern in "A naval history of ww1" make a good account of how uncoordinated the UK and French efforts were at first). The 310mm gun was a paper-only project... and no one knows how developed that they were except to know that none were built or tested. Unfortunately, our Grandfathers were very thorough in their attempt to keep Halsey's promise that "the Japanese language will only be spoken in hell." So much information on the Japanese war machine and their intended plans were destroyed before an American ever set foot on the mainland (either by our direct actions, or by the actions of Japanese commanders who didn't want us to capitalize on their work) that we really have no idea what the state of their arms industry was by war's end. We do know that two 510mm/L45's were under construction in Japan (at Kure) at the time... so if the theory was sound, the capability to have built them was still there. And you're very correct about the disorganization of the British/Allied naval coordination... The British didn't understand how to operate with allies; but they can't really be blamed for that, as they had never actually operated with an allied fleet for an extended period of time. They had 'played alone' for so long that they had simply forgotten how to be good sports. Thanks for the reading suggestion; maybe I can locate a copy.
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Post by sabratha on Sept 13, 2015 8:15:55 GMT -6
Glad to be of service. Its one of the books that goes some way not to limit itself to the North Sea end of things, but dedicates a fair amount of space to other theathres. As for Jutland BC losses - I'm quite unimpressed by the British leadership in this battle and with some crew practices, but in the wider scope of things I would give more leeway to the British decision to use the BCs in the North Sea war. One of the things that is often overlooked is that military forces (and navies in particular) end up having to fight the war that comes about, rather than the war that they planned to fight. Same thing occurs with the ships you have on hand. Admirals of various nations often found themselves having ships that were built for a specific doctrine and to fulfill a specific combat role. But then for whatever reason the doctrine proves unfeasible because the circumstances or the technological advances made it so. So even if the ships are unable to fulfiull their designed role, you already ahve them and you need to make the best use of them. The British BC use is an example of such a situation - HSF bottled up, the BCs have little ocean lanes hunting to do, so then they end up in a major battle "flanking" (hardy har har) or acting as support for the main battle line. That's probably an example of a poor use of such ships, but then again there was little other role for them available in the conflict. Then the possible consequences of the RN battleships alone facing the German battleships and german BCs togeather... nobody was willing to risk it given the political climate in Britain. Another historical example of "we have a lot of ships designed for an unfeasible combat role" were the Japanese "fleet subs" of ww2. Originally the JP doctrine called for them to be fast enough to pursue and attack an enemy capital ship groups on the move. In practice that proved to be impossible and by the late 1930s the Japanese were well aware of it (through very thorough huge scale naval exercises with their own capital ships). So they ended up with submarines that were fast, yet not in any way optimized for long-distance commerce warfare. Thus in many cases the vessels were used to patrol beyond USN bases in hope of an ambush strike on USN ships, or were concentrated at vital crossroad areas which would see a lot of warship traffic (SW of Guadalcanal during the campaign for instance). This resulted in some spectacular attacks (loss of the USS Wasp etc), but in the end it was nevertheless a case of "let's make the best out of the ships we have even if they are no good for the task we designed them to fulfill".
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Post by thecarthaginian on Sept 13, 2015 10:25:57 GMT -6
Glad to be of service. Its one of the books that goes some way not to limit itself to the North Sea end of things, but dedicates a fair amount of space to other theathres. As for Jutland BC losses - I'm quite unimpressed by the British leadership in this battle and with some crew practices, but in the wider scope of things I would give more leeway to the British decision to use the BCs in the North Sea war. One of the things that is often overlooked is that military forces (and navies in particular) end up having to fight the war that comes about, rather than the war that they planned to fight. Same thing occurs with the ships you have on hand. Admirals of various nations often found themselves having ships that were built for a specific doctrine and to fulfill a specific combat role. But then for whatever reason the doctrine proves unfeasible because the circumstances or the technological advances made it so. So even if the ships are unable to fulfiull their designed role, you already ahve them and you need to make the best use of them. The British BC use is an example of such a situation - HSF bottled up, the BCs have little ocean lanes hunting to do, so then they end up in a major battle "flanking" (hardy har har) or acting as support for the main battle line. That's probably an example of a poor use of such ships, but then again there was little other role for them available in the conflict. Then the possible consequences of the RN battleships alone facing the German battleships and german BCs togeather... nobody was willing to risk it given the political climate in Britain. Another historical example of "we have a lot of ships designed for an unfeasible combat role" were the Japanese "fleet subs" of ww2. Originally the JP doctrine called for them to be fast enough to pursue and attack an enemy capital ship groups on the move. In practice that proved to be impossible and by the late 1930s the Japanese were well aware of it (through very thorough huge scale naval exercises with their own capital ships). So they ended up with submarines that were fast, yet not in any way optimized for long-distance commerce warfare. Thus in many cases the vessels were used to patrol beyond USN bases in hope of an ambush strike on USN ships, or were concentrated at vital crossroad areas which would see a lot of warship traffic (SW of Guadalcanal during the campaign for instance). This resulted in some spectacular attacks (loss of the USS Wasp etc), but in the end it was nevertheless a case of "let's make the best out of the ships we have even if they are no good for the task we designed them to fulfill". LOL - you're talking to a guy that spent the first 7 months an Iraq tour (MAR03-APR04) escorting convoys around in an M1026 Humvee... you know, the one that had removable fiberglass doors with plastic windows and a metal skin any angry toddler with a sufficiently sharp screwdriver could punch holes through. It is most decidedly NOT proof against mines (or their bastard cousins, IEDs). Wanna guess what our primary threat was? Thus, I'm well aware of the fun and games that ensues when you're fighting tomorrows war with yesterday's equipment. This 'might' be a bit of why I'm so critical of the British Admiralty for not paying closer attention to the signs of the times. They built the first two generations of battlecruisers with a clear-cut task... but then the Germans copied the template, and suddenly the battlecruiser was obsolete. Instead of trying to build a counter to the battlecruiser immediately, however (the fast battleship, i.e. the Queen Elizabeth-class), they continued to push the concept of a cruiser-killer to kill something that was no longer a cruiser. They then staffed it with men who had aspired to command battleships, but didn't especially train them in the strengths and weaknesses of their new ship type. They neglected to mention to them that some of the things that a battleship could get away with might be fatal to these very similar-looking ships. [1]Only Fisher's cult and inertia kept people at higher echelons from admitting that any conflict with the HSF would be largely local and largely unsuited for a high-speed cruiser killer design. Smaller (but not too small, them North Sea gales need a fairly large ship to keep making way) vessels not armed with huge battleship guns - and thus not able to tempt their use against battleship guns - would have permitted a more economical and appropriate vessel. But instead of laying those ships down, you see Fisher pushing for bigger ships with bigger engines and bigger guns... but retaining only the most marginal armor protection, even though it was becoming rather clear to anyone looking [2] that a ship that depended on speed and maneuvering room was likely to be bottled up in the rather cramped North Sea. This left only guns and armor for the BC to defend herself with - one she had, the other she would wish she did. And why fear a battlecruiser force 'encountered alone' in a battleship? Generally speaking, the British guns were a generation ahead of their German counterparts on battleships - on German battlecruisers, this became a two generation advantage. Should a British battleship force have encountered a mixed force of BB's and BC's in the numbers which they would have had without building BC's the Germans wouldn't have enjoyed any real advantage except that the BC's could have escaped with (hopefully) minimum damage. Had the battle been pressed, you'd still see the same or a larger number of gun tubes directed at the enemy, but this time on ships that had better odds of not exploding. Basically, the outcome would have been the same - the HSF would have remained bottled by a numerically superior Royal Navy force, no matter what either side built. I mean, really, the Queen Elizabeth was 4 knots slower than the Mackensen... but the massive difference in firepower and protection provided relative to an opponent's firepower meant that Mackensen essentially was left with one, or maybe two, choices: flee and survive (if not damaged in flight to such a degree that it became impossible) or stand and fight facing almost certain doom. And the Japanese submarine force was horribly mismanaged from the word 'Tora.' All but the most odd could have been used to attack the long supply lines of the USN across the Pacific, but the insistence on attacking warships crippled an otherwise innovative and interesting fleet. Submarine No.71 and the resultand Sentaka-Dai type submarine could have been a major blow to the Allies in the Pacific, had Japan invested more focus on their underwater forces. After all, it was Submarine No.71 and not the Electroboot that first heralded the postwar philosophy of a vessel designed for high underwater performance at the expense of surface characteristics. [1] MODERN COUNTERPOINT: The F4 Phantom was a poor weapon system when it was first introduced... because you had a massively expensive aircraft designed to 'do everything' 1.) in the hands of men that were not accustomed to a true multi-role aircraft, and therefore couldn't exploit the technology and 2.) compromised on so many issues that it was ideal for absolutely no job that it could possibly preform. Although training of pilots and later marks of the aircraft fixed these issues to a degree, it bears mentioning that the USAF decided not to go 'full multi-role' when they designed the next generation of aircraft... which proved not only very successful 'out of the box' at their intended jobs, but pretty adaptable multi-role craft in their own right (F-15, F-16, A-10) as their platforms achieved a similar maturity. The big difference was the Phantom was inadequate and added capability, whereas these aircraft were adequate and added more capability. [2] For the love of all that's holy, the crews of the first German BBs/BCs slept ashore because they lacked sufficient space aboard ship for the crew to actually rack out in sufficient numbers to keep them rested without becoming a borderline hindrance to operations!
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 13, 2015 11:08:41 GMT -6
Again, I will have to disagree with you. The F-4 wasn't a poor weapons system, simply a weapons system designed for a specific set of missions, like shooting down bombers not fighters. The weapons like the AIM-9 and AIM-7 were designed to hit targets that were not maneuvering, from the rear, not on a high speed merge. There were doctrinal, training and technical issues that we had to solve, to cope with combat that the designers and planners had not foreseen, but it was a good basic package that had the capability to be better. We did learn a lot from the F-4 and its engagements in Vietnam and the Arab-Israeli wars. These changes went into the design of the F-16 and F-15. We also developed energy-maneuverability formulas that were a great help in ensuring that the new birds were better. Multi-role aircraft evolved, just like the all big gun warships did in the early part of the century. All innovative weapons systems have difficulties when they are first deployed. The enemy always has a say in your plan, you can never predict how he will react and who he might be. Many times you end up fighting in locales that were never considered by the developers and hence, you adapt. Countries who can adapt the fastest, are usually the winners.
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Post by dickturpin on Sept 13, 2015 15:12:02 GMT -6
I would provide a few notes on the counter argument against the Armored Cruiser/Battlecruiser in the time frame of Rule the Waves: - - The role of the line of battle ship is essentially the requirement to deliver punishment and absorb that given out by the enemy. The requirement to compromise on armor or gun power (all else being equal) in order to allow a speed advantage for the cruiser role should ensure that the specialist Battleship should have the advantage over the multi purpose cruiser type. Also, in order to avoid fragmentation of the line, it will move at the speed of the slowest unit and thus negate any speed advantage of incorporated cruisers. The problems associated with cruisers acting independent of the main line in so called Divisional Tactics ran the risk of confusion, friendly fire issues and defeat in detail.
- The British attraction to the big gun Armored Cruiser is generally attributed to John Fisher; the 1905/06 estimates originally allowed for the building of 4 big gun AC to 1 Dreadnought and Fisher wanted to cancel Dreadnought and build only big gun AC's. Eventually 1 AC was cancelled. This view was however not supported by many within the Admiralty and the counter argument prevailed. No further big gun AC's were procured until 1908/09 by which time a further 7 Dreadnoughts had been built. Thus there was no consensus on a Battlecruiser strategy in the RN.
- Germany did not envisage using her Armored Cruisers in the battleline before Von der Tann. Tirpitz generally favored the moderation of size and cost in cruisers (and also a fairly low proportion of Cruisers to Battleships). The Kaiser was a fan of the AC and preferred the idea of replacing Battleships with AC's but the naval establishment prevailed. Tirpitz also favored the moderation of cost in "Battlecruisers" and resisted the Kaiser's desire to build fusion types.
- France favored using AC's for commerce warfare rather than for incorporation in the battlefleet.
- The USA laid down her last AC in 1905 and her next venture into the type was the Lexington class.
- My personal preference in Rule the Waves is for powerful guns and armor with modest speed. In actual history, the relative arguments were rather subtle and affected by rapid technological change; some of which produced results that are somewhat counter intuitive. The factors of tactics, strategy, finance and relative technological development produced a dynamic and rapidly changing environment for the designers and procurers to make decisions. Such decisions were not entirely clear cut and this topic is probably best considered in terms of shades of grey rather than black and white.
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Post by sabratha on Sept 13, 2015 16:23:25 GMT -6
We can argue about such issues all day, but in the end I think using the submarine force as commerce raiders would not be a particularly devastating strategy. USA was not UK and it handled most of its traffic internally rather than through sea lanes. If anything, the US found itself supplying Australia rathe rthan the other way around. Secondly, Japan's subs were not designed for long range operations the sort that would be needed to sustain a sub offensive on the US west coast (especially taht the nearest bases were in the caroline islands).
Last of all, the US could outbuild Japan anywhere anytime, even if the Japanese sub force would achieve a sucess ratio of the Doenitz 1942 sort, it still wouldn't make much of a dent. All it would do would be to devert more US resources to pacific shipbuilding.
Japan could only lose any drawn-out war of attrition against the US because of simple economic reasons. I'd say the Japanese position in the pacific was hopeless from day 1 and the fact that they lasted so long and delt such heavy losses to the allies in the early part of the war is a testimony to the quality of Japanese ships and men.
If Japan had any glimmer of pulling off a separate peace, it would be precisely a big decisive surface battle. Of course that never came, but I can't blame the JP admirals for trying to make it happen. That was their only slim chance of puilling off anything other than outright defeat.
As for the RN, well my opinion is that it kept underperforming all throuought the 20th century. It certainly had its fair share of talented men and brave sailors (my personal fav is the commande rof the HMS Carnarvon Castle btw), but most of the time the brass was not up to the task and group commanders often failed at basic combat decision making, including causing confusion in critical moments (eg: famous "Shift target right" command during the Denmark strait engagement). Given its ratehr poor strategic position, the HSF gave a good show and "overperformed" somewhat, as opposed to the RN.
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Post by thecarthaginian on Sept 13, 2015 17:45:22 GMT -6
Japan could only lose any drawn-out war of attrition against the US because of simple economic reasons. I'd say the Japanese position in the pacific was hopeless from day 1 and the fact that they lasted so long and delt such heavy losses to the allies in the early part of the war is a testimony to the quality of Japanese ships and men. I wasn't trying to argue, just agreeing that their strategic decision was far less than optimal. Going after a warship with a submarine deliberately couldn't have been anything other than an exercise in frustration and futility. I was more pointing out that Japan had so many ideas that they could have used to make their subs better at that task... had they not diverted so much resources toward the white elephants. And the US had (and still has) a unique situation in all the history of war - no adjacent enemies and massive natural resources. That adds up to someone that is very difficult to beat under any circumstances.
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