|
Post by firefox178 on Mar 22, 2017 5:31:59 GMT -6
I see, they failed to properly allocate their resources as efficiently as possible. Though to be fair to them, even if they managed to allocate this resources, they simply could not inflict the kind of tonnage lost to be successful. That 600,000 tons a MONTH was simply not happening. The first and second happy time inflicted massive casualties. However, those occurred over a period of several months, not one month at a time. When I was first made aware of these events some time ago, I could see why the idea that the u-boats could have starved the British was somehow possible. But this new info about total British merchant shipping at the start of the war, plus that tonnage target pretty much showed me that starving the British using this stratagem was simply impossible.
Hmm, I just remembered the Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor. My own take in this scenario as Germany was to spam this aircraft as much as possible. It's a lot easier to build, requires fewer men to use and does not compete with the limited shipyards available for Germany. That way, the Kriegsmarine could still operate. The result is that I would have multiple options to hit the convoys. The convoys would now have to watch out for aircraft, subs and surface raiders. Granted, increase air patrols could threaten this combo. Maybe the experience gained from operating it would help to quicken the development of even further ranged aircraft? The idea is somewhat similar in how the Mid-Atlantic gap was closed. But invert the solution. Use very-long ranged aircraft to create the gap instead of closing it. Exploit the fact that there were few fighter aircraft that had long ranges at the start of the war. Thoughts on this approach?
|
|
|
Post by firefox178 on Mar 21, 2017 9:25:53 GMT -6
Sorry for the late reply, I had to take an examination. Thanks for the list of sources. I'll try to get my hands on them. And yeah, the lower ranks, especially those who actually traveled abroad had a better grasp of America's capabilities than the higher ups did.
Hmm, we had discussed much about Japan, but how about the other countries. I have read on some forums of the argument that the Germans could have seriously weakened Great Britain if they had just focused on u-boat production. Was this true? Could they have starved Great Britain to surrender? What would have the Royal Navy's response to what is essentially a u-boat spam strategy like Donitz wanted.
|
|
|
Post by firefox178 on Mar 20, 2017 3:36:34 GMT -6
I see, so it is not enough that you train pilots to a high standard. One must also put in place emphasis in getting replacements up for combat losses. Also put a priority in getting trained and experienced pilots and other personnel to teaching or advisory positions. They would help to teach new recruits. And finally, be aware that training a qualified pilot takes around a year. That means training recruits takes considerable amount of time. Hence, why increasing the training program before hand is essential. Cutting the training time could also bring new recruits quickly. But their quality is very doubtful.
Thanks also for clarifying how the war in China both helped and hindered the Japanese in their understanding of air combat. On one hand it gave them practical experience. On the other hand, it gave the Japanese an overestimation of their capabilities. They failed to take into account that at time China was not their peer in terms of air warfare. They therefore gained bad practices that would later harm them in the long run.
|
|
|
Post by firefox178 on Mar 19, 2017 11:27:19 GMT -6
Wow. Those are some detailed information. So not only was the zero's fragile frame rendered it very vulnerable when hit, it also prevented it from going faster even if you increased the speed simply because it has a good chance of destroying the wings. And I can see why it would be complex. So many variables for just the fighter planes. And it was the fact of the lack of resources that prevented the Japanese from producing high quality avgas in sufficient quantity. Thanks again for the pdfs.
My next question is how the training of the pilots was conducted. How would the experienced pilots be assigned or allocated to classes to teach the new recruits. What was the minimal time required for training before the pilot is considered fit for combat operations . And for extreme situations, how much time is necessary to teach the pilot the bare basics of flying. For example how many hours of training were given to kamikaze pilots?
|
|
|
Post by firefox178 on Mar 18, 2017 12:00:29 GMT -6
I see. Radial engines offer more advantages than in-line. And that combat radius is more important than maximum radius. Because that is the one that dictates how far an aircraft can actually fight. Go beyond that and fighter cover is badly weakened. Though I have to clarify why the Japanese did not pursue better avgas. I mean they were able to create 100 octane. So why then did they not use that as standard. They would at least achieve some parity rather than be hobbled by both weaker engine and weaker avgas. Was it simply to expensive for them to produce in enough quantity?
|
|
|
Post by firefox178 on Mar 17, 2017 2:54:15 GMT -6
My question is at around what time period did the carrier and its aircraft advanced enough that they could pose a threat to other ships. And also the process of designing and manufacturing aircraft. Maybe put it in the context of creating the zero. Like why was their only poor engines and avgas available. Couldn't they make or buy better versions of their items? Or was it that their industry could not make the necessary items in quality and quantity required. Or was said items simply not available anywhere.
|
|
|
Post by firefox178 on Mar 16, 2017 9:26:33 GMT -6
Thanks for the explanations. I can see why the construction was slow going. Also that tidbit about prioritizing fighters and their range is understood. Bombers can't operate effectively and efficiently without fighter cover. For while there is the saying that "the bomber will always get through", that only is true if you can afford the massive losses in men and aircraft. Combined with the fighters fewer take-off requirements means that fighters be given first priority. After all it's the fighter planes that make sure that your bases won't be turned to ruble.
I can't say for the others reading this thread, but I find your lectures alright. And while I am sometimes busy, I can spare time to rad them. They are interesting and informative. Plus the personal stories you add to them give it a more human approach.
|
|
|
Post by firefox178 on Mar 15, 2017 22:09:24 GMT -6
Oh, thanks for clearing that up for me. And for the reminder to the dangers of geography as well. And I am also shocked by the sheer lack of support that Truk provided for the IJN. I mean they gained control of it after World War 1. They had plenty of time to build up the necessary logistical facilities as well as the necessary defensive measures. I just can't see why did not do so. After all, they decided to use the place, why not improve it to better serve its function? The answer to the Truk situation is explained by the treaties following WW1. The Japanese were strict in their compliance with those treaties and they were not allowed to improve them at all. Which of course they did not. However, after 1935 or thereabouts they could have begun the process. At the start of the Pacific war, there was only one half of a completed air strip on Takeshima island which is only 1000 meters long. There had been no logistical support functions added at all. I will also tell you that the Japanese were very slow at building airstrips and other logistical support structures. The airstrip on Guadalcanal, later titled Henderson Field was not completed by the Japanese at the time of the invasion although they had had six months to accomplish it. We invaded on 7 August and by August 20th, 1942 it was fully active and aircraft were launching off it. The Japanese had barely even graded and put down some crushed coral to make a hard structure. We simply used steel mats, put in a radar unit, built up structures for the protection of aircraft while on the ground and built a bomb dump on Lunga Point. So, it took us 13 days from the day the Marines landed on the island to the completion of Henderson Field. We were good at construction, that's for certain. That is very impressive. Only 13 days to create a fully functional airfield. How come the Japanese failed to do so with their half a year head start. I mean they had half a year. And as you said, they had plenty of time to upgrade Truk once they no longer bound themselves to the treaty. Yet their efforts were simply poor. Why such a massive difference in construction capabilities?
|
|
|
Post by firefox178 on Mar 15, 2017 12:21:48 GMT -6
Oh, thanks for clearing that up for me. And for the reminder to the dangers of geography as well. And I am also shocked by the sheer lack of support that Truk provided for the IJN. I mean they gained control of it after World War 1. They had plenty of time to build up the necessary logistical facilities as well as the necessary defensive measures. I just can't see why did not do so. After all, they decided to use the place, why not improve it to better serve its function?
|
|
|
Post by firefox178 on Mar 15, 2017 9:48:26 GMT -6
Wow. Thanks a lot for the very precise numbers. It really helps to paint a clear picture of losses and forces that were involved. And I'm honestly surprised that the submarines sank more naval ships as well as merchant ships compared to carrier and land based aircraft. I expected the subs to sink more merchant ships while the aircraft sink the naval ones. Then again submarines could sneak and operate for some period of time in areas too dangerous for surface ships to operate in. Compound this with the Japanese failure to properly initiate ASW and you get this losses. No wonder Admiral Nimitz had such high praise for submarine arm.
|
|
|
Post by firefox178 on Mar 14, 2017 23:18:23 GMT -6
I see, so the reasons for the lack of shipping were both limited shipyards and lack of resources. Thanks for the insight. Those numbers about the production of aircraft are impressive. I wonder how RTW2 would implement the production of aircraft.
Thinking further about shipping. What doctrines and tactics would a carrier force use in convoy raiding. Say for example that the aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin was completed and used. And how would the British react to such a scenario?
|
|
|
Post by firefox178 on Mar 14, 2017 10:14:03 GMT -6
Interesting points. I did not know that the Japanese had set up a resource bureau in 1920. Or that the Japanese did not even have enough local merchant ships for their own use. I would have thought that they would at least have prepared to have enough cargo ships and tankers before hand. In fact, increasing those would not have been seen as dangerous as say increasing ones navy. I had thought that their logistics problem was the result of shipping losses to submarines. And not because they did not even have enough merchant ships in the first place. So what was their plan to secure more shipping? Surely they would have at least have asked such a question during their planning stages.
Thinking about the logistics with merchant ships brought an idea to me. Maybe RTW 2 could allow the player to build something like the Liberty and Victory cargo ships. With the player of course funding them. And to make it more balance and fair they would follow the way armed merchant men were implemented. E.g. you could only build them during war time. That way a player won't be immediately at risk, because the merchant ships got hit particularly hard for several turns in a row. The A.I. of course is given this choice as well.
|
|
|
Post by firefox178 on Mar 13, 2017 10:47:39 GMT -6
I think part of what contributed to their poor doctrines in other areas was the political and cultural climate at the time. Being heavily influenced by the warrior ethos, they focused on the combat aspect more and barely paid any attention to support or non-combat roles. Hence, why the Southern Operations were poorly thought out in terms of securing their logistics. They got the conquest part, but failed on the non-glamorous but still essential part of supply preparation and security.
But the good news in RTW is that the player isn't beholden to the historical political and cultural climate at that time. And we also have the benefit of hindsight. So we know what essential preparations to make, or at least a general idea of what to expect.
|
|
|
Post by firefox178 on Mar 12, 2017 23:06:19 GMT -6
Gotcha. Find a balance between offense and defense. But don't forget to have a dedicated scouting planes, and the doctrines to support them. Get the necessary tech to make launching aircraft as efficient as possible. Aircraft carriers are fragile as well as their air groups. Do not launch too many air strikes. Operational attrition will lower effectiveness. Aircraft carriers are designed for limited but powerful air strikes. They are not designed for a continuous bombing campaign. Leave that to land based aircraft or if near the coast use naval bombardment. And finally, focus on ones objective. Do that first and foremost. Naval targets can move. Land based ones cannot or will take considerable amount of time. Also, take note that force concentration is important for carriers. The less need to coordinate between carrier air groups the better. Also that capital ships are expensive, spamming them is not really possible. Therefore, think very carefully before comitting to smaller carriers with specific goals and objectives.
|
|
|
Post by firefox178 on Mar 11, 2017 10:42:21 GMT -6
Thanks for taking the time to make the lessons. And I wonder how the game would simulate having an overall operational commander. Guess will just have to wait and see.
|
|