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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 24, 2017 16:59:47 GMT -6
You are completely right. But it would restrict this game as your enemies would be more determinated by "rules" of strategy, political and economics consequencies. Its more realistic but decrease posibilities the game can envolve in time. It's also pretty easy to avoid the unrealistic fights if you just try to keep tensions down. When I play democracies I usually play with the intent of avoiding war with other democracies. It's only a very rare event that I am unexpectedly plunged into such a war. And I think that seems about right, Britain and France were very unlikely to go to war in 1900 but there was a small chance that could have happened. So if I play a hundred games and in one of them I end up in war with another democracy, that seems fine to me. This very true and what the German General Staff never knew was that the French and British had come to an agreement about the British supporting a war in Europe if the German's attack. It did not matter whether the Germans did an end run through Belgium or not, British would send an army across the Channel and take its place in line. I agree that I generally do try to avoid fights with other democracies. Just a note: On my new Swedish adventure, I just got a proposal from Germany for a five year security arrangement. My knew strategy apparently was successful. Hope it lasts. It didn't, too much tension between the countries. Lordy!!
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Post by bcoopactual on Nov 24, 2017 17:56:18 GMT -6
My understanding from reading Massie is the British Foreign Minister went to great lengths to keep Britain out of any obligatory military alliances. They were aligned with France and Russia but there was no treaty requiring Britain to declare war in the event that either was attacked. I still think it would have happened regardless because England didn't want to see a German dominated continent but without the invasion of Belgium there would have been no specific casus belli for England to declare war and it would have been more controversial and possibly less popular. I suspect that there would have been more resistance in Parliament from the opposition parties than public resistance though. The British public, like most populations in Europe at the time thought they were ready and eager for a war having no idea what was coming in the first modern industrial conflict. Airy W, I agree with you. For game purposes, I just imagine that the Fashoda Incident which occurred 1898 wasn't resolved as peacefully and so tensions between the two nations never relaxed allowing the two to go to war in-game without stretching credibility.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 24, 2017 20:01:49 GMT -6
My understanding from reading Massie is the British Foreign Minister went to great lengths to keep Britain out of any obligatory military alliances. They were aligned with France and Russia but there was no treaty requiring Britain to declare war in the event that either was attacked. I still think it would have happened regardless because England didn't want to see a German dominated continent but without the invasion of Belgium there would have been no specific casus belli for England to declare war and it would have been more controversial and possibly less popular. I suspect that there would have been more resistance in Parliament from the opposition parties than public resistance though. The British public, like most populations in Europe at the time thought they were ready and eager for a war having no idea what was coming in the first modern industrial conflict. Airy W , I agree with you. For game purposes, I just imagine that the Fashoda Incident which occurred 1898 wasn't resolved as peacefully and so tensions between the two nations never relaxed allowing the two to go to war in-game without stretching credibility. Well, in 1906, January there was a series of talks between the French and British High commands regarding the landing of a British force in France or Belgium. Although these talks were secret and non-binding, the British Imperial Ministry of Defense decided " Any military cooperation on the part of the British Army, if undertaken at the outset of the war, must take on the form of an expedition to Belgium or in direct participation of the defense of the French Frontier......". So, in fact, Great Britain had tied its entry into a war to whatever the French Policy of the moment was and committed itself to land an expeditionary force in support. In fact, the British were committed to a Continental War no matter what the German's did. Schlieffen or not, the British would enter the war. The German General Staff had absolutely no knowledge of this Entente Cordiale. One wonders if it might have made a difference to them in their choice of a campaign plan.
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Post by bcoopactual on Nov 24, 2017 20:15:00 GMT -6
I don't see it as that cut and dried. General Staffs can have talks and make plans all they want and it's a good thing to be prepared. But that doesn't mean the country's leadership is going to follow through. France was continuously frustrated by the British Government's refusal to sign an actual mutual defense agreement despite their militaries having talks. The British and American General Staffs had secret contact and made plans together prior to America's entry in WW2 but it still took Pearl Harbor to actually get the Americans in the war. At least as early as it happened.
I agree that it probably would have happened but I wouldn't agree that a British declaration of war in WW1 was certain without the justification of Belgium's invasion. Just my take on it. I understand if you disagree.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 24, 2017 20:44:26 GMT -6
I don't see it as that cut and dried. General Staffs can have talks and make plans all they want and it's a good thing to be prepared. But that doesn't mean the country's leadership is going to follow through. France was continuously frustrated by the British Government's refusal to sign an actual mutual defense agreement despite their militaries having talks. The British and American General Staffs had secret contact and made plans together prior to America's entry in WW2 but it still took Pearl Harbor to actually get the Americans in the war. At least as early as it happened. I agree that it probably would have happened but I wouldn't agree that a British declaration of war in WW1 was certain without the justification of Belgium's invasion. Just my take on it. I understand if you disagree. On the surface, one might agree that without Belgium's invasion, the British could not react and send a force. But there was another more important factor. The British were well aware of the changes in the political atmosphere in Europe and the whole world. It was the beginning of the bipolar world; a world that we currently live in now. This bipolar world was not new, Alexis De Tocqueville had this idea that the US and Russia would the two great powers of the future. The actual beginning of this bipolar world did not occur until 1943, but the foundation was laid long before that in around 1885. The British were well aware of the "erosion of their supremacy". The spread of industrialization and the change in the military and naval power actually weakened the British position. Tome's have been written about this but suffice it to say, they would have had no choice but to assist the French against the rising power of the German state. The First Lord of the Admiralty Joseph Chamberlain stated it succinctly. "The United Kingdom by itself will not be strong enough to hold its proper place alongside of the US, Russia or Germany. We shall be thrust aside by sheer weight". To me, that says it all. I welcome opinions and especially different opinions, it makes me dig deeper and think deeper. Keep it up, don't agree with everything. BTW, we would have gone to war without Pearl Harbor, because the IJN would have attacked the Philippines, so if was a Fait Accompli. The information about the millitary discussions between Sir Henry Wilson and the French are documented in Vol 1 of his diary. I have that document.
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Post by Airy W on Nov 25, 2017 12:37:07 GMT -6
I don't see it as that cut and dried. General Staffs can have talks and make plans all they want and it's a good thing to be prepared. But that doesn't mean the country's leadership is going to follow through. And excellent example of this: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franco-Belgian_Accord_of_1920The belgian choice to leave this alliance strikes me as one of the stupider diplomatic moves of the century. If they had simply allowed French troops to enter their country in 1939, WWII never would have gone beyond the invasion of Poland.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 25, 2017 12:49:42 GMT -6
I don't see it as that cut and dried. General Staffs can have talks and make plans all they want and it's a good thing to be prepared. But that doesn't mean the country's leadership is going to follow through. And excellent example of this: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franco-Belgian_Accord_of_1920The belgian choice to leave this alliance strikes me as one of the stupider diplomatic moves of the century. If they had simply allowed French troops to enter their country in 1939, WWII never would have gone beyond the invasion of Poland. You would have thought that the Belgians would have learned a lesson from World War 1... that the German's considered them just a highway to Northern France. I am not certain that allowing French troops into Belgium would have done any real good because the main attack was through the Ardennes. These kinds of alliances usually don't take into account mobilization times and topography.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 25, 2017 15:29:05 GMT -6
Just an update on my second attempt at Sweden. I was summarily ejected from my position due to low prestige. However, I had the solace of knowing that I had not been involved in a war and had developed a modest but effective fleet. It ended in 1917. From my point of view, I succeeded. I retired to Sandhamn, where I have a nice mansion with sandy beaches and rocky landscapes. Lots of hiking paths and a gorgeous nightlife.
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Post by cv10 on Nov 25, 2017 16:03:13 GMT -6
I was summarily ejected from my position due to low prestige. However, I had the solace of knowing that I had not been involved in a war and had developed a modest but effective fleet. Sharper than a serpent's tooth is the ingratitude of a nation! Maybe the govt. could have afforded a better navy if the King wasn't busy buying Minnie a house of gold and steel. Plus a diamond car with platinum wheels! From what I've read, those aren't cheap.
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Post by Airy W on Nov 25, 2017 16:18:15 GMT -6
If France had the chance to fortify the country, they wouldn't have preemptively committed their mobile reserve.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 25, 2017 18:12:08 GMT -6
If France had the chance to fortify the country, they wouldn't have preemptively committed their mobile reserve. I am not certain how long we can continue to discuss this on this forum. France assumed that the German's would repeat the Schlieffen-Moltke plan and correctly so. Had it not been for the German aircraft landing in Belgium and the plans being captured, the German's might have continued with their repeat of the WW1 plan. However, with that event, now another plan had to be devised and suggested by Manstein. That plan, as we know was to feint toward Belgium, then send the armored forces through the Ardennes. The Allied forces had devised the Dyle Plan to move forward, however, again the Belgians shot themselves in the foot. Leopold's government refused to allow Allied troops into the country to build a defense line for fear of provoking a German attack. The Dyle plan was devised to give the Allies a battleline. The refusal by King Leopold to allow the forward movement of the Allied forces should have caused the Allies to scrap the Dyle plan. It seems callous but in my opinion, if the Belgians would not cooperate, so be it. You are on your own. In the end, it probably did not matter. As to fortifying, the French spent a lot of money on fortifications at Maginot, money better spent on organizing better armored forces and improving their tanks with radios. They needed four man turrets, not two. But that is another story. As I have said; failure to learn, anticipate and adapt.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 7, 2017 23:17:21 GMT -6
Well, another game as the Japanese without a war. Very good game, results were just what I wanted, and low tensions. Interesting that this should occur on December 7th, the Day of Infamy.
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Post by bramborough on Dec 8, 2017 8:33:20 GMT -6
As to fortifying, the French spent a lot of money on fortifications at Maginot, money better spent on organizing better armored forces and improving their tanks with radios. They needed four man turrets, not two. But that is another story. As I have said; failure to learn, anticipate and adapt. I know this has long been the dominant consensus verdict on the Maginot Line; a wasteful failure. I have an alternative take on it. To my mind, the Maginot did precisely what it was supposed to do: fortify the Franco-German border so stoutly (and with relatively modest manpower) that any conceivable German attack plan had to involve violation of Belgian neutrality. This in turn would've meant: a) greater impetus/justification for Britain & other nations to join the fight, and b) vast bulk of French army freed up to concentrate north, without having to worry about committing lots of maneuver forces to the Maginot-covered frontage. As earlier mentioned in thread, the main problem (or at least one of them) was that Belgium didn't cooperate. The long-standing French-British plan for a forward defense in Belgian territory therefore couldn't materialize. That was, to me, the true fatal flaw in the overall strategy; the large and unresolved assumption that an independent nation's foreign policy and crisis decision-making would be cooperative. Sure, the whole thing fell apart like a house of cards...but not because of the Maginot element; that's one of the few pieces of the plan - perhaps the only one - which fulfilled its intended purpose. ------ Bigger picture, one thing that often strikes me about history in general (and early WW2 discussions in particular) is our benefit of hindsight. Even when trying not to, it's difficult not to let one's view of various strategies, events, decisions, etc to be significantly affected (whether consciously or not) by knowing how it turned out. I think we're often too critical (and occasionally too charitable) today in assessing actions taken long ago by folks who didn't have a crystal ball, lol. (This is not at all directed at oldpop or anyone else in this thread, just a general thought that occurred to me as I typed the above).
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Post by Airy W on Dec 8, 2017 9:17:54 GMT -6
I dont think it was such a large assumption, they had a treaty with the Belgians when the Maginot Line was being built.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 8, 2017 10:20:40 GMT -6
As to fortifying, the French spent a lot of money on fortifications at Maginot, money better spent on organizing better armored forces and improving their tanks with radios. They needed four man turrets, not two. But that is another story. As I have said; failure to learn, anticipate and adapt. I know this has long been the dominant consensus verdict on the Maginot Line; a wasteful failure. I have an alternative take on it. To my mind, the Maginot did precisely what it was supposed to do: fortify the Franco-German border so stoutly (and with relatively modest manpower) that any conceivable German attack plan had to involve violation of Belgian neutrality. This in turn would've meant: a) greater impetus/justification for Britain & other nations to join the fight, and b) vast bulk of French army freed up to concentrate north, without having to worry about committing lots of maneuver forces to the Maginot-covered frontage. As earlier mentioned in thread, the main problem (or at least one of them) was that Belgium didn't cooperate. The long-standing French-British plan for a forward defense in Belgian territory therefore couldn't materialize. That was, to me, the true fatal flaw in the overall strategy; the large and unresolved assumption that an independent nation's foreign policy and crisis decision-making would be cooperative. Sure, the whole thing fell apart like a house of cards...but not because of the Maginot element; that's one of the few pieces of the plan - perhaps the only one - which fulfilled its intended purpose. ------ Bigger picture, one thing that often strikes me about history in general (and early WW2 discussions in particular) is our benefit of hindsight. Even when trying not to, it's difficult not to let one's view of various strategies, events, decisions, etc to be significantly affected (whether consciously or not) by knowing how it turned out. I think we're often too critical (and occasionally too charitable) today in assessing actions taken long ago by folks who didn't have a crystal ball, lol. (This is not at all directed at oldpop or anyone else in this thread, just a general thought that occurred to me as I typed the above). The problem with constructing the Maginot line was the mindset that it engendered in the French nation and its military. After WW1, in a discussion between Clemenceau and Petain, the question of National Defense of France was discussed. There were three schools of thought, two of them advocating a line of fortifications along the French Eastern border. The third, under Charles De Gaulle, favored more mobile and fast approach, organized around tanks and air support. However, DE Gaulle's ideas were not in favor, because they seemed to be aggressive, the first two defensive schools of thought were preferred. The Maginot Line was symptomatic of a WW1 mentality even though mobile warfare was growing, not only in Germany but in Russia. The French used the WW1 battles for the fortifications of Verdun as their example yet Douamont fell easily due to poor manning. It was theorized that if a fortification along the Eastern border was built and properly manned, it would be effective. The attrition warfare of WW1 would be effective in such a fortification. The first defensive school was led by Joffre who wanted large quantities of troops based in a line of small heavily defended areas from which counter attacks could be launched. The second school was led by Petain who wanted a long and deep network of forts... the Maginot Line. It is a complex story and far too much to discuss here. But the fortifications as such were a partial success. Other nations had built after WW1 improved defensive fortifications. Italy, Finland, Germany, Czechoslovakia just to name a few. The USSR did the same thing. What Maginot built was a continuation of pre and post WW1 doctrine and military thought. Unfortunately, warfare had now moved in a different direction; mobile warfare with armored vehicles attacking through soft spots in a defensive line to penetrate and move quickly to cut supply lines and surround an enemy force. This was the warfare being developed in Germany, which the French were aware of. The Maginot Line was a glorified trench and as such, it failed doctrinally, but not tactically. It did its job, forcing the German's through the Belgian Plain and the German forces necessary to man the German side of the Eastern French border were lost to the German army attack through Belgium. We do have to be careful to examine events in hindsight and not be selective in our use to prove our points. That's the issue with 20/20 hindsight that I have, the selective use of events to prove one point.
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