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Post by steel selachian on Jul 17, 2016 22:31:26 GMT -6
The commentary on the durability of the FFG-7s seems to be due to flawed comparisons with the UK Royal Navy vessels sunk in action during the Falklands War. It's commonly stated (as in that article) that HMS Sheffield was sunk by a dud Exocet when in fact a) later analysis indicates the Exocet's warhead did in fact detonate inside the hull, and b) she remained afloat for six days after being hit, sinking in high seas while under tow. Odds are that if Stark and Samuel B. Roberts had taken the hits they did in a comparable environment (say, the North Atlantic in a Cold War scenario) rather than the calm waters of the Persian Gulf with a friendly port close at hand, both would likely have been lost. The other RN destroyers and frigates lost in the Falklands campaign took very severe beatings; HMS Coventry took three 1000-lb GP bombs in her side and capsized in 20 minutes, HMS Antelope had a 1000-lb GP bomb go off near her engine room while an EOD crew tried to disarm it, and HMS Ardent was hit with three 1000-lb GP bombs and at least two 500-lb bombs.
Stark and Samuel B. Roberts also had the advantage of not being under continued attack; Stark's SM-1 electronics were knocked out and while Samuel B. Roberts still had full use of her weapons and sensors, she was down to maneuvering at 5 knots on auxiliary thrusters and it wouldn't have taken much more to sink her.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 18, 2016 7:49:33 GMT -6
The commentary on the durability of the FFG-7s seems to be due to flawed comparisons with the UK Royal Navy vessels sunk in action during the Falklands War. It's commonly stated (as in that article) that HMS Sheffield was sunk by a dud Exocet when in fact a) later analysis indicates the Exocet's warhead did in fact detonate inside the hull, and b) she remained afloat for six days after being hit, sinking in high seas while under tow. Odds are that if Stark and Samuel B. Roberts had taken the hits they did in a comparable environment (say, the North Atlantic in a Cold War scenario) rather than the calm waters of the Persian Gulf with a friendly port close at hand, both would likely have been lost. The other RN destroyers and frigates lost in the Falklands campaign took very severe beatings; HMS Coventry took three 1000-lb GP bombs in her side and capsized in 20 minutes, HMS Antelope had a 1000-lb GP bomb go off near her engine room while an EOD crew tried to disarm it, and HMS Ardent was hit with three 1000-lb GP bombs and at least two 500-lb bombs. Stark and Samuel B. Roberts also had the advantage of not being under continued attack; Stark's SM-1 electronics were knocked out and while Samuel B. Roberts still had full use of her weapons and sensors, she was down to maneuvering at 5 knots on auxiliary thrusters and it wouldn't have taken much more to sink her. There were extenuating circumstances with Sheffield. She was only on half-alert and her own radar was not fully operational. The carrier spotted the missile attack and incoming birds, but thought they were spurious and failed to notify the fleet. . The environmental conditions were different from our actions but there is more danger in an enclosed sea than blue water, the HMS Sheffield should have been warned and her radar should have been fully operational or she should have been replaced in the screen. The real problem was the lack of an adequate airborne screen to keep the Argentine SP-2H Neptune's from keeping the fleet under surveillance. The carriers were not capable of carrying aircraft that could provide constant BARCAP like ours. The Sheffield did not have ECM jammers on board and other important ECM equipment and never deployed a decoy system. The missile hit about 8 feet above the waterline on deck 2 and the propellants started a fire in the diesel fuel and also cut the main fire main. The MOD board inquiry did conclude that the warhead did not detonate, but some of the crew stated that was not true and a reassessment by the MOD agreed in 2015 that it had. It was a series of poor decisions about the assessment of radar returns and that lack of alertness by the RN. They were in a war zone and should have maintained constant alertness despite their belief that the opponent was weak. I am not certain that our ships would have been lost because of our better damage control and the fact that we have a larger more complete fleet available. The British fleet at Falkland Islands was an ad hoc assemblage, with little or no actual training together except what was conducted during the voyage. You compare hits and actions that are similar with similar warships, because that is all you have. It isn't always entirely correct but it is done. I believe that the both the Sheffield class of warship and the OHP class frigate were good, well designed ships but its the technology and training of crews that can make the different. Both sides made changes to ship design and technology to alleviate problems in both designs that caused the actions and loss of ships. It's the way the system works. It isn't perfect and it is usually behind the curve. Losses will occur war and we have to just accept that risk.
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Post by steel selachian on Apr 27, 2017 18:26:35 GMT -6
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Post by oldpop2000 on Apr 27, 2017 19:11:40 GMT -6
This is hilarious... unless you are the captain of the Russian "research ship". That is exactly what the Russian trawlers looked like when they were snooping at our radar site during ELINT periods. Lots of antennas, not many fishing poles. Maybe the Russian's should think twice about building a navy and just rent one.
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Post by Enderminion on May 18, 2017 5:41:31 GMT -6
This is hilarious... unless you are the captain of the Russian "research ship". That is exactly what the Russian trawlers looked like when they were snooping at our radar site during ELINT periods. Lots of antennas, not many fishing poles. Maybe the Russian's should think twice about building a navy and just rent one. they should have disgisued the antenna as fishing poles, anyway I have heard that they were devolping an armour package for LCS to call them frigates. Also as a ship launching event the first Type 001 class carrier has slide into the water from china
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Post by steel selachian on May 28, 2017 14:57:16 GMT -6
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Post by oldpop2000 on May 29, 2017 10:00:10 GMT -6
I have always been reasonably certain that a former KGB Communist Agent would want to recover former Soviet territory, it was just a matter of time. I agree with the article that Russian industry probably has a lot of spying and catching up to do on building military hardware. However, the Indian's would probably help them, maybe even Chinese. They need to focus on newer and better aircraft, possibly more smaller ships like frigates, destroyers, submarines and guided missile cruisers. These will contribute more to expansion and defense than a carrier that will difficulty getting through the Bosporus with Turkey, the Ukraine and Eastern Europe keeping their peepers on them. Their economic health is what needs to be bolstered, but not with a return to state owned businesses. They need to expand private industry and expand private banking to get help. I don't believe returning to Communism will work.... not with all the history of its economic and military failures. Putin may have to just bite the bullet, and let a market economy flourish.
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Post by steel selachian on Jul 4, 2017 11:59:25 GMT -6
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 4, 2017 12:32:19 GMT -6
Interesting video but they are going to have to eliminate that ski jump because the aircraft had no external fuel tanks and four small missiles; that is not much of a load. I wonder if they have videos of them launching with air to ground smart bombs. Those are also very heavy aircraft.
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Post by steel selachian on Jul 5, 2017 19:31:54 GMT -6
The footage does show one aircraft starting from the aft takeoff spot carrying two YJ-83 AShMs, which are presumably comparable in weight to the AGM-84 Harpoon. That said, it should be noted that aircraft was not carrying any AAMs - not even a pair of short-range IRH weapons. Their max takeoff payload may be around 2,000-3,000 lbs, or since the aircraft were landing with those weapons those could have been the result of limitations in bringback weight.
I thought I saw what looked like a single centerline tank on at least some of those aircraft.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 5, 2017 20:11:19 GMT -6
The footage does show one aircraft starting from the aft takeoff spot carrying two YJ-83 AShMs, which are presumably comparable in weight to the AGM-84 Harpoon. That said, it should be noted that aircraft was not carrying any AAMs - not even a pair of short-range IRH weapons. Their max takeoff payload may be around 2,000-3,000 lbs, or since the aircraft were landing with those weapons those could have been the result of limitations in bringback weight. I thought I saw what looked like a single centerline tank on at least some of those aircraft. I didn't see any external tanks and I looked for them. On the limitation of bringback weight, they might have been just mockups.
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Post by ksbearski on Jul 11, 2017 21:23:29 GMT -6
Saw today that USN is looking for a new frigate to replace(?) the LCS, which I believe this audience has been panning for years. Been awhile since I posted, but I know most of you old pro's are saying "What took them so long". So what's the skinny on the the requirements for a new FF?
ksbearski
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 11, 2017 21:55:45 GMT -6
Saw today that USN is looking for a new frigate to replace(?) the LCS, which I believe this audience has been panning for years. Been awhile since I posted, but I know most of you old pro's are saying "What took them so long". So what's the skinny on the the requirements for a new FF? ksbearski Well, the Navy needs a real heavy frigate. We have to look at the 2016 Force Structure Assessment. It covers many different things and I have to go find it and read it. An LCS cannot really protect a Carrier Battle Group, its a one mission system. Only a frigate can do that job and I suspect the new North Korean threat and the Chinese movements in the South China Seas is beginning to get more attention than the Persian Gulf. My guess is that it is an outgrowth of the research and development of the LCS. In other words, an overgrown LCS. Anyway, more to come. I will do some research as time permits.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 12, 2017 9:24:09 GMT -6
As anyone who has studied world politics and geostrategy knows, the world and nations evolve. The geography doesn't change but nations develop better weapons, new strategies and in many cases new governments. All this changes the global security environment as the Navy calls it. Any technological advantage we or our allies have, will erode over time. The longer a weapons system takes to evolve, develop and deploy, the more its capabilities are no longer adequate handle the new situations. I've uploaded a summary of the FSA. FSA_Executive-Summary.pdf (78.07 KB)
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Post by steel selachian on Jul 13, 2017 19:45:02 GMT -6
I suppose my main question regarding the proposed FFG(X) is where the cost/capability line is being drawn. Last I checked, the USN was building Flight IIA Burke DDGs for around $1.8 billion per (the upcoming Flight III ships will be more expensive). For that you get a ~9000-ton combatant with 96 VLS cells, a 5-inch gun, Aegis, two helos, a top speed of over 30 knots, and a cruising range of about 4,400 nmi at 20 knots. Crew is about 320. The USN is currently planning on building at least 76 of them, which even under the more robust plans for fleet expansion totals 20% of the USN's combatants.
For FFG(X) (or whatever other vessel the USN uses to fill out the force structure, including LCS), the capability has to balance against making it cost-effective. If I recall, the USN has not specified cost limits for this design, but I believe I've seen estimates of $750 million - $1.2 billion per hull. At the upper end, that means being able to buy 3 FFGs for the price of 2 Flight IIA DDG-51s. Whether that's economical is dependent on the number of hulls needed and how reduced the FFG's capabilities are compared to the DDG. By contrast the LCS seems to be settling at about $500-$600 million per hull, and going by one figure I saw the FFG-7 initial build price was about $500 million in FY 2017 dollars (assuming $122 million in 1977).
So the question should be whether this ship needs to be a mini-Burke with AEGIS, Tomahawks, over-the-horizon AShMs, Standard SAMs, etc. or if the capabilities should be pared down to reduce costs and buy more hulls. If you're only including a 16-cell VLS in the design, odds are you're going to want to emphasize packing them with ESSMs and VL-ASROCs rather than offensive weaponry. The FFG-7s were great at ASW and aviation support, modest at AAW (to the point where the USN judged the capability not worth maintaining at the end of their lives), unimpressive at ASUW, and with little to no land-attack capability. ASW was primarily what we built them for, so they did the job.
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