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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 8, 2013 20:47:15 GMT -6
I was reading a short book on why the Gettysburg Campaign was so named. The author contends that Lee wasn't headed towards Gettysburg, but Harrisburg, Pennsylvania so the campaign should be titled "The Harrisburg Campaign". Interesting observation and partially correct. Lets get a definition first.
If we use that definition by the well know military strategist and author, well respected by the US military, then the statement "towards a single, specific, strategic objective or result in the war" needs be used. With that information, then the question is whether Gettysburg was the ultimate objective? No, it was a meeting engagement between a Union cavalry unit on patrol and a Confederate infantry unit headed to Gettysburg ostensibly to get shoes. (There were no shoes, btw) It was never the ultimate strategic objective.
Remember that except for his memoirs, all of the information we have to use, was written by the Confederate aides and generals after the war, in some cases many decades after the war. This subject was very sensitive in the South after the war. So, what were Lee's intentions, or objective: an invasion of Northern territory. According to Lee's memoirs, not written by himself, the object of the campaign was the defense of Richmond. That defense would be an offensive type defense by attacking the north to draw the Army of the Potomac away from the Rappahannock and into the northern areas, to be defeated in a battle up there. His specific objective or objectives were Maryland and/or Pennsylvania. Lee stated that "the best course would be to invade Pennsylvania, penetrating this State in the direction of Chambersburg, York, or Gettysburg." His memoirs state that he never had designs on Philadelphia. He would be satisfied that the Federal Army, if defeated would be seriously disorganized and forced to retreat across the Susquehanna and this would give him control of Maryland, Western Pennsylvania and most likely West Virginia. It might even cause the downfall of the Federal Government.
Does this agree with many of his officers? Generally, most believed that Lee wanted to conduct a summer campaign in the North, to feed the army in the Cumberland Valley and draw the Union forces to him for defeat. Longstreet, Colonel Long his long time secretary, Major Taylor and others agreed that no city was a specific objective, because Lee felt that the defeat of the AOP, would bring these fruits to him. The objective then was the Union army and any location in the north suitable for a stout defense to destroy the AOP. Helmut Von Moltke the Elder once stated that "no plan survives contact with the enemy" and in this campaign in the north, that was certainly true. The rest is history.
So, what is the answer? Well, what's in a name? To be specific, we should call it The Northern Campaign because that was its objective, the north. We could call it the AOP campaign, but in order to get an enemy force to fight, you must attack something it has to defend. I don't think this works. The Gettysburg Campaign, after one hundred and fifty years, seems to be what we are stuck with, but it was, in fact, THE NORTHERN CAMPAIGN, ending with the Battle of Gettysburg.
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Post by spook053 on Dec 9, 2013 21:20:18 GMT -6
What, indeed, is in a name?
Concerning the ACW, well, it seems, a lot.
Common in northbound is to say the "Civil War" or ACW. To the south, more common, the War Between the States (WBTS) or the "War of Northern Aggression."
All names applied to the same war, yet loaded with very different connotations.
Necking down to Lee's campaign of 1863, I would often see in past usage the terms "Lee invades the North." Which on face value was true, though I've not seen to the same degree "Union invasions" for the campaigns in Virginia.
Well.....
I doubt that the term "Gettysburg Campaign" will ever fade out. The work of Coddington did much to ensure that. But on a clean slate, if a description was sought, I'd vouch for "Lee's 2nd Northern Offensive." After all, even if seeking a defensive battle on best terms for the ANV, Lee still strode to maintain the initiative in the campaign's flow. That's where I think the "offensive" term is what applies here.
The central shortfall to Lee's intent was what ultimately the Union command would do to accommodate. Per his druthers, Meade rathered instead for the AoP to form a defensive line along Pipe Creek, where by all indications Lee was hoping for the ANV to consolidate along the ridgelines of Cashtown.
Of course, with Gettysburg in the middle and the progression of meeting engagements, both commanders got pulled away from their pre-conceived notions for battle and joined instead into a battle of wills. Alfred Nofi, in his own smaller book summarizing the campaign, captured one central issue very effectively. That being, before the battle, perceptions may have persisted that somehow the AoP troops were fundamentally inferior to their ANV counterparts, man for man. Nofi stated repeatedly the fundamental takeaway from Gettysburg was that the AoP troops in sum were willing to fight; and with good leadership, they could match the ANV.
Granted, the AoP enjoyed larger numbers in many spots during the battle, and had the central position. Still, the sum of the battle's history is replete with individual actions down to the regiment and battery level where guts and good leadership figured as much or more than numbers.
For a period of time, I purchased copies of the "Gettysburg Magazine," compiled at the Morningside Bookshop near where I live in Dayton, OH. I've not kept up for so many years afterwards, but when I did, I had gotten the insights thru individual articles of SO many actions where much in the battle seemed in the balance. To put in another way -- the stand of the 20th Maine as a significant small-unit action was hardly unique during those three days. For example, I'd argue that the stand of the 137th New York on Culp's Hill on the evening of 2 July was of similar consequence to the events on Little Round Top. Let alone other fights like the 9th Massachusetts Battery, Battery I of the 1st Ohio Light Artillery, the 6th Wisconsin, 1st Minnesota, etc. etc.
Anyway, back to the point -- I'd prefer Lee's 2nd Northern Offensive.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 9, 2013 21:54:17 GMT -6
What, indeed, is in a name? Concerning the ACW, well, it seems, a lot. Common in northbound is to say the "Civil War" or ACW. To the south, more common, the War Between the States (WBTS) or the "War of Northern Aggression." All names applied to the same war, yet loaded with very different connotations. Necking down to Lee's campaign of 1863, I would often see in past usage the terms "Lee invades the North." Which on face value was true, though I've not seen to the same degree "Union invasions" for the campaigns in Virginia. Well..... I doubt that the term "Gettysburg Campaign" will ever fade out. The work of Coddington did much to ensure that. But on a clean slate, if a description was sought, I'd vouch for "Lee's 2nd Northern Offensive." After all, even if seeking a defensive battle on best terms for the ANV, Lee still strode to maintain the initiative in the campaign's flow. That's where I think the "offensive" term is what applies here. The central shortfall to Lee's intent was what ultimately the Union command would do to accommodate. Per his druthers, Meade rathered instead for the AoP to form a defensive line along Pipe Creek, where by all indications Lee was hoping for the ANV to consolidate along the ridgelines of Cashtown. Of course, with Gettysburg in the middle and the progression of meeting engagements, both commanders got pulled away from their pre-conceived notions for battle and joined instead into a battle of wills. Alfred Nofi, in his own smaller book summarizing the campaign, captured one central issue very effectively. That being, before the battle, perceptions may have persisted that somehow the AoP troops were fundamentally inferior to their ANV counterparts, man for man. Nofi stated repeatedly the fundamental takeaway from Gettysburg was that the AoP troops in sum were willing to fight; and with good leadership, they could match the ANV. Granted, the AoP enjoyed larger numbers in many spots during the battle, and had the central position. Still, the sum of the battle's history is replete with individual actions down to the regiment and battery level where guts and good leadership figured as much or more than numbers. For a period of time, I purchased copies of the "Gettysburg Magazine," compiled at the Morningside Bookshop near where I live in Dayton, OH. I've not kept up for so many years afterwards, but when I did, I had gotten the insights thru individual articles of SO many actions where much in the battle seemed in the balance. To put in another way -- the stand of the 20th Maine as a significant small-unit action was hardly unique during those three days. For example, I'd argue that the stand of the 137th New York on Culp's Hill on the evening of 2 July was of similar consequence to the events on Little Round Top. Let alone other fights like the 9th Massachusetts Battery, Battery I of the 1st Ohio Light Artillery, the 6th Wisconsin, 1st Minnesota, etc. etc. Anyway, back to the point -- I'd prefer Lee's 2nd Northern Offensive. Your preference actually makes perfect sense, as it was his second offensive up north, but people like to have locations in their campaigns. There were many excellent small unit actions on all sides, but the 20th Maine's always gotten the publicity.
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Post by oldpop2000 on May 25, 2017 20:15:41 GMT -6
The US Civil War was the defining moment in US history and I have always had a great interest in it. I have visited the battlefield and witnessed a reenactment of the first day’s action. It was excellent.
I am not going to relive the whole battle, there are some excellent books on the subject, but I would like to present some of my thoughts on why Lee, Jefferson Davis and James Seddon made the decision to commence the Gettysburg campaign, as historians now call this combat operation. It was an operation that would move the Army of Northern Virginia into the North away from its home base at Richmond and eventually fight a decisive battle somewhere in the north. General Lee was planning to fight this decisive battle, defeat Hooker's Army of the Potomac and cause the Republican administration to fall in the next elections. His idea was that the north was tiring of the war and the Peace Party needed an excuse to force negotiations between the north and the south. Lee thought that at that peace conference, southern independence could be secured. Jefferson Davis agreed with Lee’s ideas at the June 3rd meeting and so did the Secretary of War at that time, James Seddon.
The question to ask is simply; why they agreed with Lee’s plan to invade the north. We have to take a brief look at the current situation strategically for the south. The war had been going on now for about two years and two months. The Union Navy had blockaded the southern coastline; the Union Army has taken New Orleans, Norfolk and had various islands along the eastern and southern coast like the ones off of Jacksonville, the town of Beaufort, South Carolina. Imports of food and weaponry had diminished and the south had converted from growing cotton, to growing food and grains. The south is under economic pressure and its money is essentially worthless. This is problem number one.
The second problem is the military situation. In the east, Lee is holding the Union Army at bay, having defeated them at least five times. However, Lee knows and states this important point in the reports and letters that he writes; that the Army of the Northern Virginia is being overwhelmed by numbers. The Union is adding more and more men to their ranks, building more and better guns, and the lost battles have cleaned out almost all of the politicians turned generals. The officers in the Union Army are now experienced and well trained as are the men. The navy has more and better ships and the cavalry is now coming into its own. On Lee’s side, it’s the opposite. He has very few new recruits; he has lost some very good brigades to the coastal defense forces now under P.G.T. Beauregard, and cannot get them back. He has lost numerous experienced officers including Stonewall Jackson. In short, he has been and will continue to fight an attrition campaign and he knows he cannot win such a campaign. His army is currently bivouac on the Rappahannock River about 50 miles from Richmond, his supply base. Yet, his army is starving. The RR from Richmond to his area is not in good shape and there is not enough food. He has to do something to get his forces fed, clothed and armed. The essential fact is, that the Union Army is much better at logistics than the southern forces and armies march and fight on their stomachs. This is a vital point to a general like R.E. Lee.
The last issue that contributes to the decision or at least that is what Longstreet states in his memoirs is the current situation in the west around Jackson, Mississippi and especially Vicksburg. Vicksburg is on the Mississippi and is the last southern access port across the river to Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas and Missouri. In the first year of the war, the south lost New Orleans and since then has lost Memphis, Tennessee. If they lose Vicksburg, much of the Confederacy will be cut off and possibly lost. Currently, US Grant has crossed the river south of Vicksburg, moved Johnson out of Jackson, Mississippi and forced the 20,000 men under Pendleton back into the fortress around Vicksburg and begun a siege. The key then for Lee and Davis is how to relieve this situation? The only possible way is to send General Joseph Johnson more forces and have him, along with Pendleton attack Grant from both sides and relieve the siege. With the poor infrastructure in the South i.e. Railroads and such, that is no easy task, even if they could find the men; which they can’t. So there is the last problem that Lee and Davis have to deal with.
Let’s list these issues affecting his decision about what to do this summer of 1863 and see how R.E. Lee would have approached the solution. 1. The economic health of the Confederacy 2. The military situation for the Army of Northern Virginia 3. The current strategic situation in the west
After Lee had reorganized his army and appointed two new Corps commanders, he has to sit down and decide how best to use this army. The three issues above will guide his decision.
So, Lee sits at his desk, with an organization chart, intelligence data and a map, to decide how best to use his force. On the first issue, he has no real control over the economic health of the Confederacy. It is an agricultural economy and they do not do well against industrial economies in wars. His only possibility is to give the North, a taste of its own medicine by moving into the north and forcing it to realize what it is like to have a foreign army on your territory. This might help the Peace Party to win the next election and bring both sides to the bargaining table to end the war. So, his only method of helping to solve the first issue is to invade the North, defeat the Army of the Potomac and push the Federal Government into peace negotiations; one point for invasion.
For the second issue, the Army of Northern Virginia is his army, they love R.E. Lee and he loves them. His main concern is always the safety and health of this force. He has rebuilt the army but in its present bivouac, it is having difficulties feeding itself. He has to improve the conditions. He has two options; move the army to Richmond fortify the positions around the capital, as he will do in one year and await Hookers onslaught. He can move this army northward, into the Shenandoah Valley, live off of the North and move towards Washington. This will feed his army and will probably draw Hooker away from the capital. This concept of operation is risky, but if planned well, it can succeed. For Lee, this second option is by far the best for his army. Lee is an offensive minded general, trained in the ways of Napoleon. He might fight a defensive battle, but he will opt for an offensive strategy. The first option, sounds easy, but will lead eventually to the loss of the army; One more point for invasion.
For the third issue, Lee is aware that he cannot do anything about the operations in the West. If he sends Longstreet’s First Corp to Bragg in Tennessee to begin an offensive to draw Grant away from Vicksburg, there is now nothing to stop Hooker from moving across the river, and destroying the remainder of Lee’s army. Without Longstreet, he will have about 40,000 men against Hooker’s 120,000 men and that is the worst power ratio for a force: 3:1. Even if the offensive by Bragg is successful, and there is nothing to say that it will be because Bragg has not really done well, it does not mean that Grant will move north, he might just send one of his corps north and maintain the siege with the remainder. This means that now the south may lose Vicksburg and will almost certainly put Richmond in jeopardy. So the best option is to invade the north and force the end of the war as I related in an earlier paragraph. Now, this issue has always been the focal point of historians in their research about the Gettysburg Campaign. They have almost all stated that it was this last issue that forced Lee to adopt the invasion strategy. They get this idea from Longstreet’s post war memoirs in which he claims that this was Lee’s main reason. Well, not according all the surviving letters and telegraphs that Lee wrote in this period. In fact, Lee knew and stated as such, that he could not do anything to save Vicksburg except invade and end the war. Both Jefferson Davis and James Seddon agreed with him at their June 3rd 1863 meeting in Richmond. Later, Longstreet agreed although it was his suggestion to move his corps to Bragg’s army. The invasion operation was the only solution. Another point for invasion.
In my mind, this is how Lee decided to conduct the invasion of the North for a second time. It was a risky operation, but the only solution that could possibly work. The plan was offered to Jefferson Davis and James Seddon, and they approved it. He explained the concept of operations to his commanders and they all decided it was the only solution. All the rest is history. Was it a perfect plan or solution, no plan ever is. As history tells us, no plan survives contact with the enemy, this one did not. But the best phrase that typifies the results is what Nimitz said “hindsight is cleverer than foresight”. This was certainly true of the invasion operation which was later given the name; The Gettysburg Campaign. For Lee, at the time, this was the only viable option and the Battle of Gettysburg was not the way he wanted to fight. However, as we have always said " the enemy always has a say in your plan". We can even add a little victory disease in the planning. Possibly Lee, after having defeated the Union Army so many times, just could not realize that under Meade and with its experience, and in a defensive position, the conditions for success had changed.
Thanks for reading and your patience.
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Post by Enderminion on May 25, 2017 21:36:31 GMT -6
if Lee had better intel and recon he could have won, but thats true of everything, if he hadn't been as shaken by the lose of good commanders he could have won, Lee had no home front anyway, Sherman and Grant were tearing up the deep south, the blockade and cotton embargo had killed the souths economey so he didn't have as many or as good guns (some union battalions with reapeaters were reported as regiments), if he had hit hard and fast and didn't let up till he hit trenches he might have won.
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Post by oldpop2000 on May 26, 2017 7:58:45 GMT -6
if Lee had better intel and recon he could have won, but thats true of everything, if he hadn't been as shaken by the lose of good commanders he could have won, Lee had no home front anyway, Sherman and Grant were tearing up the deep south, the blockade and cotton embargo had killed the souths economey so he didn't have as many or as good guns (some union battalions with reapeaters were reported as regiments), if he had hit hard and fast and didn't let up till he hit trenches he might have won. When you analyze combat operations after their completion, you can always find areas where such and such should have been done differently. Many factors are out of the control of Admirals and Generals. The south was not an industrial economy so it had to have known the future difficulties it would find itself in when it made the decision to fire on Fort Sumter. I believe it misread the North. In short, the south declared independence, then hoped the north would fold its hand.... it didn't and now they had a real fight for which they were not prepared. Lee was really fighting to protect his home state of Virginia. He was not fighting for states rights or slavery... he was fighting for Virginia, that's all. If you review his actions in the war, this attitude of protecting Virginia seems to pervade them. This colored his view of the whole strategic situation for the south.
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Post by Enderminion on May 26, 2017 9:27:01 GMT -6
if Lee had better intel and recon he could have won, but thats true of everything, if he hadn't been as shaken by the lose of good commanders he could have won, Lee had no home front anyway, Sherman and Grant were tearing up the deep south, the blockade and cotton embargo had killed the souths economey so he didn't have as many or as good guns (some union battalions with reapeaters were reported as regiments), if he had hit hard and fast and didn't let up till he hit trenches he might have won. When you analyze combat operations after their completion, you can always find areas where such and such should have been done differently. Many factors are out of the control of Admirals and Generals. The south was not an industrial economy so it had to have known the future difficulties it would find itself in when it made the decision to fire on Fort Sumter. I believe it misread the North. In short, the south declared independence, then hoped the north would fold its hand.... it didn't and now they had a real fight for which they were not prepared. Lee was really fighting to protect his home state of Virginia. He was not fighting for states rights or slavery... he was fighting for Virginia, that's all. If you review his actions in the war, this attitude of protecting Virginia seems to pervade them. This colored his view of the whole strategic situation for the south. that's true, but the south also tried to get Europe on side... by embargoing cotton exports before the blockade hit, mistakes were made. As for Lee, he would have fought for the North if he thought he could protect Virginia the best that way.
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Post by oldpop2000 on May 26, 2017 11:08:34 GMT -6
When you analyze combat operations after their completion, you can always find areas where such and such should have been done differently. Many factors are out of the control of Admirals and Generals. The south was not an industrial economy so it had to have known the future difficulties it would find itself in when it made the decision to fire on Fort Sumter. I believe it misread the North. In short, the south declared independence, then hoped the north would fold its hand.... it didn't and now they had a real fight for which they were not prepared. Lee was really fighting to protect his home state of Virginia. He was not fighting for states rights or slavery... he was fighting for Virginia, that's all. If you review his actions in the war, this attitude of protecting Virginia seems to pervade them. This colored his view of the whole strategic situation for the south. that's true, but the south also tried to get Europe on side... by embargoing cotton exports before the blockade hit, mistakes were made. As for Lee, he would have fought for the North if he thought he could protect Virginia the best that way. The South did try to embargo the cotton to push England on to their side. The problem was that cotton comes from India and that is where the best cotton originated.... and India was an English colony. So, Manchester which was the heart of the clothing industry in England and used the most cotton, did have major problems economically for about one year to two, until the Indian cotton program got underway. After that, the problem for England went away. Not so for the south, the embargo and the lack of food reduced the cotton crop and now there was no cash crop to fund the war. One domino falling leads to another.
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Post by oldpop2000 on May 27, 2017 9:35:48 GMT -6
When you analyze combat operations after their completion, you can always find areas where such and such should have been done differently. Many factors are out of the control of Admirals and Generals. The south was not an industrial economy so it had to have known the future difficulties it would find itself in when it made the decision to fire on Fort Sumter. I believe it misread the North. In short, the south declared independence, then hoped the north would fold its hand.... it didn't and now they had a real fight for which they were not prepared. Lee was really fighting to protect his home state of Virginia. He was not fighting for states rights or slavery... he was fighting for Virginia, that's all. If you review his actions in the war, this attitude of protecting Virginia seems to pervade them. This colored his view of the whole strategic situation for the south. that's true, but the south also tried to get Europe on side... by embargoing cotton exports before the blockade hit, mistakes were made. As for Lee, he would have fought for the North if he thought he could protect Virginia the best that way. I agree that if Virginia had stayed in the Union, Lee would have been the Commander in Chief of the Union Army which was offered to him. The issue of the South trying to get recognition from foreign nations and failed, was ultimately caused by the issue of slavery. Interestingly, the Civil War was more about states rights than the issue of slavery. Had the South simply abolished slavery, they probably would have gotten recognition from Great Britain and France.
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Post by Enderminion on May 27, 2017 10:57:36 GMT -6
that's true, but the south also tried to get Europe on side... by embargoing cotton exports before the blockade hit, mistakes were made. As for Lee, he would have fought for the North if he thought he could protect Virginia the best that way. I agree that if Virginia had stayed in the Union, Lee would have been the Commander in Chief of the Union Army which was offered to him. The issue of the South trying to get recognition from foreign nations and failed, was ultimately caused by the issue of slavery. Interestingly, the Civil War was more about states rights than the issue of slavery. Had the South simply abolished slavery, they probably would have gotten recognition from Great Britain and France. it was not about slavery until Lincoln made it about slavery. of all the reasons why the war started states rights is but one of many. What was the reason for states rights anyway? Another reason the war started was trade, the north wanted to be mechanized so as to not be reliant on imported machined goods and to achive that they wanted higher tariffs on machined goods while the swouth just wanted to buy things with the cotton they made. their was the powder keg laced with nitroglycerin and mercury fulminate of weather new states would be free or slave states. as for recognition from forigen powers, that would have lead to a world war which britian and france could not have won, the Royal Navy was big but Ironclads were hitting the water, submarines were plowing the waves, steamships were running blockades, ballons were directing fire and dropping bombs, the Royal Navy and French Navy could not have landed troops on American soil.
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Post by oldpop2000 on May 27, 2017 12:48:31 GMT -6
First myth to dispel is that Lincoln and the Republicans were not against slavery but declared themselves against the EXTENSION of slavery into the territories. These territories were not states yet and were under the control of Congress and the President. They were against any interference with slavery in the states which already had it but they demanded freedom for the vast unorganized territory west of the Missouri. Charleston, South Carolina was an ultra pro-slavery state and it was eager to secede. They were very happy when Lincoln became president, for it now they could use it as an excuse to leave the union. They regarded their slaves as property like horses and mules. Lincoln did not like slavery and felt it was wrong in regards to the constitutional rights of free people but he was not going to intercede in states. Again the watch word is states rights, which he agreed with. To answer the question about the origin of States Rights, here is a good article that should explain it. www.civilwar.org/learn/articles/states-rightsAs to the issue of trade, the southern states were advocates of free-trade since that would provide them the avenue to continue to buy and sell slaves along with machinery and other goods with their cash crop. The north was not a free-trade advocate because they were industrialized and wanted tariff protection against European goods which might be cheaper than the locally produced. It was a serious bone of contention between the two rivals.
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Post by Enderminion on May 27, 2017 15:27:18 GMT -6
First myth to dispel is that Lincoln and the Republicans were not against slavery but declared themselves against the EXTENSION of slavery into the territories . Yes that is what I said, the Civil War was not fully about slavery until Lincoln made it about slavery with the emancipation proclamation. These territories were not states yet and were under the control of Congress and the President. They were against any interference with slavery in the states which already had it but they demanded freedom for the vast unorganized territory west of the Missouri. Charleston, South Carolina was an ultra pro-slavery state and it was eager to secede. They were very happy when Lincoln became president, for it now they could use it as an excuse to leave the union. They regarded their slaves as property like horses and mules. Lincoln did not like slavery and felt it was wrong in regards to the constitutional rights of free people but he was not going to intercede in states. Again the watch word is states rights, which he agreed with. To answer the question about the origin of States Rights, here is a good article that should explain it. www.civilwar.org/learn/articles/states-rightsAs to the issue of trade, the southern states were advocates of free-trade since that would provide them the avenue to continue to buy and sell slaves along with machinery and other goods with their cash crop. The north was not a free-trade advocate because they were industrialized and wanted tariff protection against European goods which might be cheaper than the locally produced. It was a serious bone of contention between the two rivals. Thats what I said
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Post by oldpop2000 on May 28, 2017 7:59:33 GMT -6
First myth to dispel is that Lincoln and the Republicans were not against slavery but declared themselves against the EXTENSION of slavery into the territories . Yes that is what I said, the Civil War was not fully about slavery until Lincoln made it about slavery with the emancipation proclamation. These territories were not states yet and were under the control of Congress and the President. They were against any interference with slavery in the states which already had it but they demanded freedom for the vast unorganized territory west of the Missouri. Charleston, South Carolina was an ultra pro-slavery state and it was eager to secede. They were very happy when Lincoln became president, for it now they could use it as an excuse to leave the union. They regarded their slaves as property like horses and mules. Lincoln did not like slavery and felt it was wrong in regards to the constitutional rights of free people but he was not going to intercede in states. Again the watch word is states rights, which he agreed with. To answer the question about the origin of States Rights, here is a good article that should explain it. www.civilwar.org/learn/articles/states-rightsAs to the issue of trade, the southern states were advocates of free-trade since that would provide them the avenue to continue to buy and sell slaves along with machinery and other goods with their cash crop. The north was not a free-trade advocate because they were industrialized and wanted tariff protection against European goods which might be cheaper than the locally produced. It was a serious bone of contention between the two rivals. Thats what I saidWell, then we agree. But slavery was always a point of contention between the northern and southern states since the 1820's. But what started the war, is a moot point now. It is two years since the start and slave traders are still following Lee's army into the north, grabbing freed slaves and returning them back to the South. The fiscal situation in the South is worsening, and only an end to the war will stop it. They will get no help from Europe unless they free the slaves and they aren't going to waste two years of fighting and privation just to end it. So, the South is on its own but they have an opportunity here. The North is getting tired of the war. The South only needs to push the northern states to possibly get peace talks. So the question for Robert E. Lee and Jeff Davis is, how best to do that? Sitting on the Rappahannock River across from an ever growing Army of the Potomac with a starving army isn't a good plan. Retreating back about 50 miles and taking up positions around your base of supply which also happens to be the capital of the South, isn't a good solution either. So, Lee's plan is simple, do what he did in 1862 but failed at Antietam, head north into Pennsylvania, gathering supplies for his army and the South, disrupt the railroads headed east and west in Pennsylvania, take and destroy Harrisburg, then move on Washington and eventually fight a decisive battle against Hooker, a man he has already bested at Chancellorsville. Well, that is the solution he arrives at and both Davis and Seddon agree. Was it the best solution? Probably but it was dependent on good intelligence from his favorite cavalry officer, JEB Stuart. A move north is risky and requires absolutely excellent combat intelligence arriving daily as to the location and direction of the Union Army. He has to know which roads he is taking and at which time. Without that information, he could be surprised in the wrong position. And that is what actually happens. But what Lee doesn't know is that Hooker created the Bureau of Military Intelligence under Sharpe. This bureau is doing a fine job of collecting information from deserters, slaves and cavalry to put together a reasonably good picture of what Lee is planning and doing at any moment. This will keep the Army of the Potomac, at least three days ahead of lee especially after Stuart fails to provide the necessary information that Lee requires during the movement north. The game is on.
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Post by Enderminion on May 28, 2017 11:51:59 GMT -6
Well, then we agree. But slavery was always a point of contention between the northern and southern states since the 1820's. But what started the war, is a moot point now. It is two years since the start and slave traders are still following Lee's army into the north, grabbing freed slaves and returning them back to the South. The fiscal situation in the South is worsening, and only an end to the war will stop it. They will get no help from Europe unless they free the slaves and they aren't going to waste two years of fighting and privation just to end it. So, the South is on its own but they have an opportunity here. The North is getting tired of the war. The South only needs to push the northern states to possibly get peace talks. So the question for Robert E. Lee and Jeff Davis is, how best to do that? Sitting on the Rappahannock River across from an ever growing Army of the Potomac with a starving army isn't a good plan. Retreating back about 50 miles and taking up positions around your base of supply which also happens to be the capital of the South, isn't a good solution either. So, Lee's plan is simple, do what he did in 1862 but failed at Antietam, head north into Pennsylvania, gathering supplies for his army and the South, disrupt the railroads headed east and west in Pennsylvania, take and destroy Harrisburg, then move on Washington and eventually fight a decisive battle against Hooker, a man he has already bested at Chancellorsville. Well, that is the solution he arrives at and both Davis and Seddon agree. Was it the best solution? Probably but it was dependent on good intelligence from his favorite cavalry officer, JEB Stuart. A move north is risky and requires absolutely excellent combat intelligence arriving daily as to the location and direction of the Union Army. He has to know which roads he is taking and at which time. Without that information, he could be surprised in the wrong position. And that is what actually happens. But what Lee doesn't know is that Hooker created the Bureau of Military Intelligence under Sharpe. This bureau is doing a fine job of collecting information from deserters, slaves and cavalry to put together a reasonably good picture of what Lee is planning and doing at any moment. This will keep the Army of the Potomac, at least three days ahead of lee especially after Stuart fails to provide the necessary information that Lee requires during the movement north. The game is on. yes the game is on. good Intel can win most any battle, it was only due to French Code-breakers that kaiserschlacht failed, etc, etc
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Post by oldpop2000 on May 30, 2017 7:20:16 GMT -6
From the famous Cornerstone Speech by Confederate Vice President Alexander Stephans
"Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea; its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery subordination to the superior race is his natural and normal condition. This, our new government, is the first, in the history of the world, based upon this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth."
Now, does this speech change anything? Was the war really about slavery or was this just one man’s opinion. The Confederate constitution did not give any of the states any more rights than our constitution, in fact, it did not allow for states to secede. Which is interesting. I still believe that this war was about the rights of states. Lincoln stated in his speeches before his first election that he did not have the right to eliminate slavery and no will to do so. Why then would this cause the states to secede. Possibly they knew that this was just politics and that he was really against slavery? BTW, the date of the now famous "cornerstone" speech was March 4th, 1861 which was Lincoln's Inauguration Day.
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