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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 1, 2018 15:33:11 GMT -6
oldpop2000 , I think the Junkers J 1 was far outside the norm for its time. I think it is much more likely that planes in the game will follow a pattern that more closely aligns with historical norms. Certainly, I would expect variation but probably not to the extent where a plane shows up that is 20 years ahead of its time. I suspect that duralumin might show up as a technology advance but in judging from how things are handled in RTW, I suspect it would probably be more along the lines of some of the ship construction techs such as "High tensile steel - 1% weight saving on hull". So, if it is developed you might get a benefit, perhaps an increase in speed or durability, but the invention would probably not allow you to build an all-metal-clad aircraft when 99% of the planes flying are still using wood and fabric. Actually, it was just a demonstrator, but the Junker's J-7 was not. There was also the Junker's J-4, it was delivered to the front in around August 1917. Here is the Junker's site for more detailed information. hugojunkers.bplaced.net/junkers-j7.htmlIn late 1920, the Army Air Service contracted for an all metal monoplane bomber titled the DB-1. It was a failure but the bottom line is that all metal airframes were being developed and flown. Duralumin was first developed in 1903 so it could have been used in RTW had it been allowed.
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Post by axe99 on Jun 1, 2018 16:11:32 GMT -6
The concept of operations sounds ok except that the carrier was and is meant for offensive operations. If the Conops is to establish air supremacy, then attacking and destroying enemy carriers first, is the best strategy. We know from WW2 in the Pacific that the side that struck first, generally won the carrier battle. I have statistics on that in one of my books. This requires search effectiveness, strike navigation and good strike preparation. The key then is to out-range your enemy, which is subtle. Just ensure that your strike aircraft have a longer range than your opponents. This was the IJN's conops, but strikes can miss their target and this did and will happen to all of us during game.
I think that the Battle of the Philippine sea ( Marianas Great turkey shoot ) blows that out of the water.
Japanese CTF hit first and achieved nothing more then scratching a battleship + getting most of their airgroups shot down by CAP and AA.
Going mostly fighters is not far from what the US Navy late-war doctrine actually evolved into, and with their standards of Radar, AA and fighters it worked!
The only difference is what to use to sink the opposing Carriers after their airgroups are neutralized. It would need to be either bombers or surface ships faster then enemy CVs are ( not an easy feat to achieve considering the speed of most WW2 fleet CVs, but perhaps easier for earlier wars? ). With the air superiority advantage scouting should allow the chasing side an upper hand.
A pivotal element in the success for such a strategy would probably be to maneuver so you can cut off the retreat of the enemy force preventing it from heading home towards friendly air-cover.
I would hope to be able to try out alternative plausible Carrier ops like the above as well and a few others like features I hope is in the game: - Handle scouting for the CTF from Cruiser floatplanes ( Japanese ) or from Divebombers ( US ) or land based ( limited use in Pacific )
- Loitering with strike to spot and launch additional planes, or strike with a single full deckload
- CAP vs Strike escort balance of fighter assignments - Using dive bombers as "close CAP" to fight of slow enemy torpedo bombers and to spot submarines - Split up strike ( to ensure some finds enemy ) or single big group of Massed strike - All divebomber or all torpedo bomber strikeplanes
- Bomber only Carriers with extreme range plane designs to ensure first strike
- Closed hangar ( Japanese ) or Open Hangar ( US ) - Deck parking or not ( risky in severe weather ) - Attrition from scouting and CAP limiting duration a CTF can be at sea unless you have airbases to reinforce airgroup in area - Longer multiple day battles to allow for cat & mouse maneuvering of CTF
Great to see you around these parts Alex, reckon you'll enjoy it here . Also agree with most of what you're saying - while Battle of the Philippine Sea was a mite one-sided for a range of reasons OldPop mentions, Pedestal (which was anything but one-sided) is another example of in this case a relatively small fighter force proving very effective at holding off enemy air attacks. The key is radar-directed fighter control, prior to the advent of this, the US/Japanese 'first effective strike = win' approach was probably the most appropriate strategy, but once this had been developed things were far more up in the air. Had the Japanese had a similar capability, then it's likely their defensive fighters could have kept a surface battle group well-enough protected to attack the Saipan landings had they so desired (I'd expect the US surface group there to have prevailed, so I'm not sure it would have been a terribly sensible option, but that's not the issue here . I'd see carriers in this kind of scenario as difficult to fully neutralise, and fast enough to avoid surface groups, but most vulnerable to submarines (which were, after all, the vessel type that sunk the most carriers at the Battle of the Philippine Sea , although with enough about there'd always be a chance of a HMS Glorious moment.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 1, 2018 16:38:51 GMT -6
I think that the Battle of the Philippine sea ( Marianas Great turkey shoot ) blows that out of the water.
Japanese CTF hit first and achieved nothing more then scratching a battleship + getting most of their airgroups shot down by CAP and AA.
Going mostly fighters is not far from what the US Navy late-war doctrine actually evolved into, and with their standards of Radar, AA and fighters it worked!
The only difference is what to use to sink the opposing Carriers after their airgroups are neutralized. It would need to be either bombers or surface ships faster then enemy CVs are ( not an easy feat to achieve considering the speed of most WW2 fleet CVs, but perhaps easier for earlier wars? ). With the air superiority advantage scouting should allow the chasing side an upper hand.
A pivotal element in the success for such a strategy would probably be to maneuver so you can cut off the retreat of the enemy force preventing it from heading home towards friendly air-cover.
I would hope to be able to try out alternative plausible Carrier ops like the above as well and a few others like features I hope is in the game: - Handle scouting for the CTF from Cruiser floatplanes ( Japanese ) or from Divebombers ( US ) or land based ( limited use in Pacific )
- Loitering with strike to spot and launch additional planes, or strike with a single full deckload
- CAP vs Strike escort balance of fighter assignments - Using dive bombers as "close CAP" to fight of slow enemy torpedo bombers and to spot submarines - Split up strike ( to ensure some finds enemy ) or single big group of Massed strike - All divebomber or all torpedo bomber strikeplanes
- Bomber only Carriers with extreme range plane designs to ensure first strike
- Closed hangar ( Japanese ) or Open Hangar ( US ) - Deck parking or not ( risky in severe weather ) - Attrition from scouting and CAP limiting duration a CTF can be at sea unless you have airbases to reinforce airgroup in area - Longer multiple day battles to allow for cat & mouse maneuvering of CTF
Great to see you around these parts Alex, reckon you'll enjoy it here . Also agree with most of what you're saying - while Battle of the Philippine Sea was a mite one-sided for a range of reasons OldPop mentions, Pedestal (which was anything but one-sided) is another example of in this case a relatively small fighter force proving very effective at holding off enemy air attacks. The key is radar-directed fighter control, prior to the advent of this, the US/Japanese 'first effective strike = win' approach was probably the most appropriate strategy, but once this had been developed things were far more up in the air. Had the Japanese had a similar capability, then it's likely their defensive fighters could have kept a surface battle group well-enough protected to attack the Saipan landings had they so desired (I'd expect the US surface group there to have prevailed, so I'm not sure it would have been a terribly sensible option, but that's not the issue here . I'd see carriers in this kind of scenario as difficult to fully neutralise, and fast enough to avoid surface groups, but most vulnerable to submarines (which were, after all, the vessel type that sunk the most carriers at the Battle of the Philippine Sea , although with enough about there'd always be a chance of a HMS Glorious moment. The results of Operation Pedestal do not reflect any success for the British tactically. They lost thirteen vessels including nine merchantmen, one aircraft carrier, two cruisers and a destroyer. However, they did save Malta so the operation was a strategical success. Frankly it was a tactical disaster for the British and an Italian success. But on the whole, it raised the morale of the people on Malta and the garrison. I am reminded of what Plutarch said of Pyrrhus "one other such victory would utterly undo him". Update: I don't want to get into an historical discussion about Malta and Pedestal. I will however say that the British deployed seventy-two fighters; sixteen Fulmars, six Hurricanes and fourteen Albacores. The Fulmars and Hurricanes were obsolete, to say the least. The Albacore was a torpedo bomber. Indomitable had ten Martlets(F4Fs), twenty four Hurricanes and fourteen Albacore's while Eagle carried sixteen Hurricanes. The Italians had 189 aircraft deployed. Even without the German and Italian submarines, they were outnumbered. Now, will this happen in the game? Who knows? Could you avoid this tactical defeat? Well, it's another "path not taken".
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 1, 2018 19:08:48 GMT -6
Let's leave history for a moment and discuss theory. If you are placed in a similar position as the British with Malta and you are going to send a convoy, how do you protect it adequately. Remember, we talking about the game action, not what the British should have done.
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Post by axe99 on Jun 1, 2018 19:16:15 GMT -6
The results of Operation Pedestal do not reflect any success for the British tactically. They lost thirteen vessels including nine merchantmen, one aircraft carrier, two cruisers and a destroyer. However, they did save Malta so the operation was a strategical success. Frankly it was a tactical disaster for the British and an Italian success. But on the whole, it raised the morale of the people on Malta and the garrison. I am reminded of what Plutarch said of Pyrrhus "one other such victory would utterly undo him". Update: I don't want to get into an historical discussion about Malta and Pedestal. I will however say that the British deployed seventy-two fighters; sixteen Fulmars, six Hurricanes and fourteen Albacores. The Fulmars and Hurricanes were obsolete, to say the least. The Albacore was a torpedo bomber. Indomitable had ten Martlets(F4Fs), twenty four Hurricanes and fourteen Albacore's while Eagle carried sixteen Hurricanes. The Italians had 189 aircraft deployed. Even without the German and Italian submarines, they were outnumbered. Now, will this happen in the game? Who knows? Could you avoid this tactical defeat? Well, it's another "path not taken". The British did indeed suffer grievously during Pedestal, but the key point is that those aircraft you listed faced over 400 Axis sorties, of land-based aircraft, and the worst damage received was Formidable being put out of action (but in no danger of being sunk) and the sinking of one destroyer. It was only after the carrier vs land air battle that the key damage by aircraft was done, after the British forces had lost all of their cruisers equipped for fighter direction (none of which were lost to aircraft). Pedestal is a great example of radar-directed fighter control defence, but also a good example of the danger of submarines and MTBs, as well as the danger of a force without radar-directed fighter defence (the convoy after the carriers had turned back to Malta). So I agree that tactically Pedestal was a very, very expensive 'win' for the British, but I (respectfully disagree it disproves the effectiveness of radar-directed fighter control.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 1, 2018 19:30:32 GMT -6
The results of Operation Pedestal do not reflect any success for the British tactically. They lost thirteen vessels including nine merchantmen, one aircraft carrier, two cruisers and a destroyer. However, they did save Malta so the operation was a strategical success. Frankly it was a tactical disaster for the British and an Italian success. But on the whole, it raised the morale of the people on Malta and the garrison. I am reminded of what Plutarch said of Pyrrhus "one other such victory would utterly undo him". Update: I don't want to get into an historical discussion about Malta and Pedestal. I will however say that the British deployed seventy-two fighters; sixteen Fulmars, six Hurricanes and fourteen Albacores. The Fulmars and Hurricanes were obsolete, to say the least. The Albacore was a torpedo bomber. Indomitable had ten Martlets(F4Fs), twenty four Hurricanes and fourteen Albacore's while Eagle carried sixteen Hurricanes. The Italians had 189 aircraft deployed. Even without the German and Italian submarines, they were outnumbered. Now, will this happen in the game? Who knows? Could you avoid this tactical defeat? Well, it's another "path not taken". The British did indeed suffer grievously during Pedestal, but the key point is that those aircraft you listed faced over 400 Axis sorties, of land-based aircraft, and the worst damage received was Formidable being put out of action (but in no danger of being sunk) and the sinking of one destroyer. It was only after the carrier vs land air battle that the key damage by aircraft was done, after the British forces had lost all of their cruisers equipped for fighter direction (none of which were lost to aircraft). Pedestal is a great example of radar-directed fighter control defence, but also a good example of the danger of submarines and MTBs, as well as the danger of a force without radar-directed fighter defence (the convoy after the carriers had turned back to Malta). So I agree that tactically Pedestal was a very, very expensive 'win' for the British, but I (respectfully disagree it disproves the effectiveness of radar-directed fighter control. It does not disprove the effectivess of radar-directed fighter control, on the contrary it shows that without it, it would have been both a strategic and a tactical defeat. However, its ok to have radar-directed fighter control but you have to have good fighters; they did not. BTW, I served in NORAD, the hub of our radar-directed fighter controls in the US, so I am a strong advocate of it. But again, you must have the fighters to execute the missions. Radar is a detection system, it tells you where the enemy aircraft are in both range, altitude and azimuth. It can also give you some idea of the size of the raid. But it cannot shoot down aircraft, only another fighter can do that or anti-aircraft weapons.
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Post by oaktree on Jun 1, 2018 20:00:03 GMT -6
On the "path not taken" (or not for long) is the placing of catapult fighters on capital ships. (Something else to claim deck room on a ship - and one reason the V position for a turret went to the X position, to free up space for boats and planes.) The RN post-WW1 was putting turret mounted catapults on their battleships and larger cruisers as well I think with the intent that the fleet would be able to provide some of its own fighter protection for a time without requiring a carrier.
And another factor with aircraft tech would be range, especially on fighters.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 1, 2018 20:12:54 GMT -6
On the "path not taken" (or not for long) is the placing of catapult fighters on capital ships. (Something else to claim deck room on a ship - and one reason the V position for a turret went to the X position, to free up space for boats and planes.) The RN post-WW1 was putting turret mounted catapults on their battleships and larger cruisers as well I think with the intent that the fleet would be able to provide some of its own fighter protection for a time without requiring a carrier. And another factor with aircraft tech would be range, especially on fighters. Catapult fighters, not floatplanes are lost once they are launched unless a friendly airfield is near, I don't honestly see much use. Floatplanes can be useful in ASW and spotting but they also have problems. First is the big fuel tank necessary to keep them refueled. Second would be recovery with is complex especially in rough weather. When a ship has to go into a gun fight, the planes have to be launchd to eliminate explosions and fires, they might not be recovered. So, they have their uses and they have their drawbacks and you have to make the decision as to what more important. Well, as to range, aerodynamic efficient wing and fuselage structures, larger fuel tanks, more efficient engines and external fuel tanks are the best way to maintain good range capability so this would be three areas of technology we should explore in depth. What is an efficient engine? Where do you place larger fuel tanks? How big and how many external fuel tanks should an aircraft carry? How do we design an aerodynamically efficient aircraft? Keep in mind, more external tanks, less ordnance. If you are jumped, you dump the tanks and now your range decreases dramatically because in air to air combat you use a lot of fuel.
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Post by alexbrunius on Jun 2, 2018 12:20:42 GMT -6
A pre-war US Navy document changed the number of fighters on board the carriers from eighteen to thirty-six. The aircraft allocation document for June of 1944 shows the Yorktown, Hornet each with on average about 37 aircraft. That is exactly what was authorized by that 1941 memorandum. That is stretching the truth a bit much don't you think? Sure that change was authorized, but even 6 months after outbreak of war it was only about half way carried out. At Midway the 3 US Carriers had 25, 27 and 27 fighters respectively ( While carrying an average of 51 bombers each ). As Axe wrote on a broader perspective striking first being most likely to win in a Carrier battle should only hold true before decent radars and fighter direction doctrines are put into use. After radar and fighter direction however the quality of your fighters and pilots ( as well as the number of them ) is going to be more important to who will win than which side can strike first. I do agree that we need to be careful about interpreting latewar pacific battles due to the disparity of both quality and quantity, but they IMO prove it's possible to win clear and devastating victories even if you don't strike first. IMO it seems Carrier and naval air warfare should transition between about 4 time "eras" depending on the capabilities of the airplanes: - Scouting asset only ( ~1913-1923 ) - Development of First Carriers / Float planes / Zeppelins
- Attrition but struggle to sink Capital Ships ( ~1923-1933 ) - Development of planes capable of carrying decent bombs
- Main offensive strike / raiding force (~1933-1943 ) - Development of the decent airdropped torpedo + dive bombing
- Main defensive and offensive force ( ~1943-1950 ) - Development of radar and fighter direction
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 2, 2018 12:35:35 GMT -6
A pre-war US Navy document changed the number of fighters on board the carriers from eighteen to thirty-six. The aircraft allocation document for June of 1944 shows the Yorktown, Hornet each with on average about 37 aircraft. That is exactly what was authorized by that 1941 memorandum. That is stretching the truth a bit much don't you think? Sure that change was authorized, but even 6 months after outbreak of war it was only about half way carried out. At Midway the 3 US Carriers had 25, 27 and 27 fighters respectively ( While carrying an average of 51 bombers each ). As Axe wrote on a broader perspective striking first being most likely to win in a Carrier battle should only hold true before decent radars and fighter direction doctrines are put into use. After radar and fighter direction however the quality of your fighters and pilots ( as well as the number of them ) is going to be more important to who will win than which side can strike first. I do agree that we need to be careful about interpreting latewar pacific battles due to the disparity of both quality and quantity, but they IMO prove it's possible to win clear and devastating victories even if you don't strike first. IMO it seems Carrier and naval air warfare should transition between about 4 time "eras" depending on the capabilities of the airplanes: - Scouting asset only ( ~1913-1923 ) - Development of First Carriers / Float planes / Zeppelins
- Attrition but struggle to sink Capital Ships ( ~1923-1933 ) - Development of planes capable of carrying decent bombs
- Main offensive strike / raiding force (~1933-1943 ) - Development of the decent airdropped torpedo + dive bombing
- Main defensive and offensive force ( ~1943-1950 ) - Development of radar and fighter direction
Actually it isn't because it shows that the USN recognized that the carriers needed more fighters. The AAR after Coral Sea complained about this very factor. The problem was production of F4F fighters was also supplying the British with Martlet's. So, it wasn't possible to equip the carriers with the required 36. There were production limitations. Actually statistics compiled by Captain Wayne Hughes of the Naval War College show that the strike first was the most effective until the Battle of the Philippine Sea. Ozawa attacked first, but we had three times as many aircraft as he had and all our destroyers and support ships had surface search radar so we easily intercepted them. Remember that Spruance was assigned to provide air support and air cover for the Saipan and Tinian Invasion fleets, this was his most important mission, not pursuing the Japanese battle force. This battle force was easily dispatched by submarines, as already explained. Had Spruance attacked first, he would have done far more damage to the IJN than was actually done, but he followed his mission statement; protect the invasion fleet. Spruance stated after the war that he would have preferred to move away from the beach and attack but his mission was to defend the beach. By waiting for the attack and defending the beach, Spruance was able to attack and destroy the Japanese land based air which was to be used in conjunction with the carriers. With the land bases destroyed, Ozawa could not execute his plan to land his carrier planes on the island and then rearm and refuel. Spruances plan achieved numerical superiority over the carrier battle because it eliminated the shuttle tactics and allowed us to jump their aircraft on their was to or over Guam. I think this explains all this completely. The War in the Pacific and carrier warfare changed from 1942 to late 1943 to 1944 principally due to the attrition of Japanese pilots and our increased number of carriers, better aircraft and more experienced crews along with better radar warning systems.
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Post by alexbrunius on Jun 2, 2018 12:43:40 GMT -6
I don't see any disagreement between our points We both agree that USA ended the war with vastly more fighters vs bombers on carrier decks than they started it with, and we both agree that early in the war striking first was important for CTFs, but radar + fighter direction + large numbers of fighters changed that.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 2, 2018 13:13:24 GMT -6
I don't see any disagreement between our points We both agree that USA ended the war with vastly more fighters vs bombers on carrier decks than they started it with, and we both agree that early in the war striking first was important for CTFs, but radar + fighter direction + large numbers of fighters changed that. The point that I want to make, then we should return to RTW2, is that in 1943 US Naval operations had changed from defensive to offensive action which required a change in Carrier operational doctrine. The strike first while still valid, had to be forsaken for the defense of landing operations.
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Post by dorn on Jun 2, 2018 15:18:06 GMT -6
A pre-war US Navy document changed the number of fighters on board the carriers from eighteen to thirty-six. The aircraft allocation document for June of 1944 shows the Yorktown, Hornet each with on average about 37 aircraft. That is exactly what was authorized by that 1941 memorandum. That is stretching the truth a bit much don't you think? Sure that change was authorized, but even 6 months after outbreak of war it was only about half way carried out. At Midway the 3 US Carriers had 25, 27 and 27 fighters respectively ( While carrying an average of 51 bombers each ). As Axe wrote on a broader perspective striking first being most likely to win in a Carrier battle should only hold true before decent radars and fighter direction doctrines are put into use. After radar and fighter direction however the quality of your fighters and pilots ( as well as the number of them ) is going to be more important to who will win than which side can strike first. I do agree that we need to be careful about interpreting latewar pacific battles due to the disparity of both quality and quantity, but they IMO prove it's possible to win clear and devastating victories even if you don't strike first. IMO it seems Carrier and naval air warfare should transition between about 4 time "eras" depending on the capabilities of the airplanes: - Scouting asset only ( ~1913-1923 ) - Development of First Carriers / Float planes / Zeppelins
- Attrition but struggle to sink Capital Ships ( ~1923-1933 ) - Development of planes capable of carrying decent bombs
- Main offensive strike / raiding force (~1933-1943 ) - Development of the decent airdropped torpedo + dive bombing
- Main defensive and offensive force ( ~1943-1950 ) - Development of radar and fighter direction
Just note. Fighter direction was developed on Ark Royal 2 years earlier. However as Ark Royal did not posses radar, they used cruisers radar. Even by this complication it was quite effective. All new British carriers were built with this. This the reason why mediocrate Fulmar was quite effective CAP.
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Post by alexbrunius on Jun 2, 2018 17:42:56 GMT -6
Just note. Fighter direction was developed on Ark Royal 2 years earlier. However as Ark Royal did not posses radar, they used cruisers radar. Even by this complication it was quite effective. All new British carriers were built with this. This the reason why mediocrate Fulmar was quite effective CAP. Well I don't think anyone disputes that the British were pioneers when it comes to radar + fighter direction, a brief look at the Battle of Britain should be enough. The purpose of my list was not to give exact dates ( thus why they got a little ~ sign in front of the years ) If you look at other naval powers like the Japanese, Italians or Soviet they still had not been able to master naval radar + fighter direction by 1945 ( 2 years later ), so take the years as a crude average. Your point was made and I still agree with it. The only claims I did not agree with was your initial ones that Carriers always were for "offensive operations" and that attacking and destroying the enemy carriers first always "is the best strategy".
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 2, 2018 18:07:25 GMT -6
That is stretching the truth a bit much don't you think? Sure that change was authorized, but even 6 months after outbreak of war it was only about half way carried out. At Midway the 3 US Carriers had 25, 27 and 27 fighters respectively ( While carrying an average of 51 bombers each ). As Axe wrote on a broader perspective striking first being most likely to win in a Carrier battle should only hold true before decent radars and fighter direction doctrines are put into use. After radar and fighter direction however the quality of your fighters and pilots ( as well as the number of them ) is going to be more important to who will win than which side can strike first. I do agree that we need to be careful about interpreting latewar pacific battles due to the disparity of both quality and quantity, but they IMO prove it's possible to win clear and devastating victories even if you don't strike first. IMO it seems Carrier and naval air warfare should transition between about 4 time "eras" depending on the capabilities of the airplanes: - Scouting asset only ( ~1913-1923 ) - Development of First Carriers / Float planes / Zeppelins
- Attrition but struggle to sink Capital Ships ( ~1923-1933 ) - Development of planes capable of carrying decent bombs
- Main offensive strike / raiding force (~1933-1943 ) - Development of the decent airdropped torpedo + dive bombing
- Main defensive and offensive force ( ~1943-1950 ) - Development of radar and fighter direction
Just note. Fighter direction was developed on Ark Royal 2 years earlier. However as Ark Royal did not posses radar, they used cruisers radar. Even by this complication it was quite effective. All new British carriers were built with this. This the reason why mediocrate Fulmar was quite effective CAP. I can disagree completely with what you are saying as Captain Wayne Hughes does say: Hughes, Wayne. Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat: Second Edition (Kindle Locations 2260-2264). Naval Institute Press. Kindle Edition. I just firmly believe that search and destroy through offensive tactics were still the major factor in carrier warfare, regardless of one specific operation. Admiral Nimitz must have agreed with my perception because for the Leyte Gulf operation he revised the priorities and made the destruction of the Japanese Fleet Admiral Halsey's primary mission. So it seems that the CinC of the US Pacific Fleet agreed that the carriers primary mission was search and destroy.
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