|
Post by axe99 on Jun 3, 2018 16:11:36 GMT -6
I never mix large caliber guns with my aircraft carriers; its either a dreadnought or an aircraft carrier and never the twain shall meet. "The secretary of the navy recently read a book extolling the virtues of hybrid battleship/carriers. He requires you build 5 ships of that type..." Probably never going to happen, but I would laugh a lot if this kind of event had a chance to show up. Now this, this would be cool . I think all the major navies at one point or other had sketch designs for either hybrid BBs/CVs, or 'though deck cruisers' (iirc the London Naval Treaty (1930) had a clause that referred to them', so it's far from implausible that a pollie might get it in their head to order the navy to build a few.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 3, 2018 16:30:35 GMT -6
"The secretary of the navy recently read a book extolling the virtues of hybrid battleship/carriers. He requires you build 5 ships of that type..." Probably never going to happen, but I would laugh a lot if this kind of event had a chance to show up. Now this, this would be cool . I think all the major navies at one point or other had sketch designs for either hybrid BBs/CVs, or 'though deck cruisers' (iirc the London Naval Treaty (1930) had a clause that referred to them', so it's far from implausible that a pollie might get it in their head to order the navy to build a few. London Navy Treaty of 1930 Article 3 Paragraph 2 The fitting of a landing-on or flying-off platform or deck on a capital ship, cruiser or destroyer, provided such vessel was not designed or adapted exclusively as an aircraft carrier, shall not cause any vessel so fitted to be charged against or classified in the category of aircraft carriers Paragraph 3 3. No capital ship in existence on the 1st April, 1930, shall be fitted with a landing-on platform or deck. m-ust000002-1055.pdf (827.62 KB)
|
|
|
Post by archelaos on Jun 3, 2018 17:09:18 GMT -6
London Navy Treaty of 1930 Article 3 Paragraph 2 The fitting of a landing-on or flying-off platform or deck on a capital ship, cruiser or destroyer, provided such vessel was not designed or adapted exclusively as an aircraft carrier, shall not cause any vessel so fitted to be charged against or classified in the category of aircraft carriers Paragraph 3 3. No capital ship in existence on the 1st April, 1930, shall be fitted with a landing-on platform or deck. IMHO this clause is there to prevent using carrier tonnage to "smuggle" additional cruisers and/or battleships by placement of a landing deck (possibly one that could be easily removed?). So it shows that at this point CVs were regarded as less valuable that "true battle classes" like CA/BB by naval theorists.
|
|
|
Post by axe99 on Jun 3, 2018 17:09:51 GMT -6
Now this, this would be cool . I think all the major navies at one point or other had sketch designs for either hybrid BBs/CVs, or 'though deck cruisers' (iirc the London Naval Treaty (1930) had a clause that referred to them', so it's far from implausible that a pollie might get it in their head to order the navy to build a few. London Navy Treaty of 1930 Article 3 Paragraph 2 The fitting of a landing-on or flying-off platform or deck on a capital ship, cruiser or destroyer, provided such vessel was not designed or adapted exclusively as an aircraft carrier, shall not cause any vessel so fitted to be charged against or classified in the category of aircraft carriers Paragraph 3 3. No capital ship in existence on the 1st April, 1930, shall be fitted with a landing-on platform or deck. That'd be the one .
|
|
|
Post by archelaos on Jun 3, 2018 17:14:47 GMT -6
Shitposting aside, consider that the carrier is basically a floating airfield. That is, that a carrier provides nothing that an airfield does not also provide, so if you always have an airfield nearby you don't really need a carrier. Assuming we can build airfields, then if you intend to fight near land (ex. Northern Europe and Mediterannian sea zones), a carrier might not even be necessary if you can adequately coordinate between land-based aircraft and fleets. Otherwise, you might be able to do something like fighter-only carriers and just use it to negate enemy aircraft and allow a battle fleet to operate unmolested. If I was going to go full battleship wank, that's what I'd do.
That is exactly what Italians thought, I believe. And then they were never able to coordinate, because order has to go up one command chain and then down another and that is not really good idea. In theory it could work if you have actual land based naval air.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 3, 2018 17:26:50 GMT -6
London Navy Treaty of 1930 Article 3 Paragraph 2 The fitting of a landing-on or flying-off platform or deck on a capital ship, cruiser or destroyer, provided such vessel was not designed or adapted exclusively as an aircraft carrier, shall not cause any vessel so fitted to be charged against or classified in the category of aircraft carriers Paragraph 3 3. No capital ship in existence on the 1st April, 1930, shall be fitted with a landing-on platform or deck. IMHO this clause is there to prevent using carrier tonnage to "smuggle" additional cruisers and/or battleships by placement of a landing deck (possibly one that could be easily removed?). So it shows that at this point CVs were regarded as less valuable that "true battle classes" like CA/BB by naval theorists.
The flight deck cruiser was derived out of the strategic frustration due to the fortification clause prohibiting the improvement of fortifications on islands in the Pacific. There was during this mid-1930's period a movement in the US Navy toward naval aviation. As one author states it; " The U.S. Navy was more 'blue water' and 'air-minded' than it would have been in the absence of the treaty system." In all my search through documents and books, I have not seen any reference to your idea that it was used to prevent someone sneaking in more cruisers, but I can't discount the idea.
|
|
|
Post by axe99 on Jun 3, 2018 17:30:21 GMT -6
Aye, naval and land-based air coordination wasn't really done well until radar-assisted fighter direction was a thing (and even then it took a while to get all the ducks in a row). Land-based air needed to find the fleet it was supporting, and then be there when it was needed (I've got this vague memory of Allied (I think mainly RN) forces operating in the Aegean in the later period of the war having their land-based air cover 'change the guard', and get bounced by enemy bombers while they were exposed and cop a mauling - while carriers have the aircraft on hand all the time).
On hybrid carriers, it wasn't until the second half of the thirties that aircraft ranges (effective in a sortie, not on paper - so including all the time forming up and then landing on after a raid) weren't that long, such that carriers wouldn't have been that far from an enemy surface fleet, which I think is one of the reasons up until the 1930s most CVs also had fairly decent anti-surface armament as well. In that context, the hybrid concept isn't _quite_ as silly.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 3, 2018 17:41:12 GMT -6
One of the concerns of the General Board and Joint Board was that the next treaty conference scheduled for 1932 might outlaw the building of the Flight Deck Cruiser so that might explain some of the fears.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 3, 2018 17:45:59 GMT -6
In RTW2, I don't know if disarmament treaties will go so far as to ban carriers or restrict their size and air-wings. This also goes for flight-deck cruisers. This might be a good question for the team to provide some rough information but I don't think they will.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 3, 2018 18:50:41 GMT -6
One suggestion to those of you that are going to build fighter-only carriers. Battle forces need scouting and the carrier is the best vehicle for that, much better than float planes. You might consider building a two seat fighter like the Fairy Fulmar for just that purpose, scouting. I am not saying it would be the primary fighter, just an addition. It can also be used for inner patrols which is ASW. They could also be used to provide low level combat air patrols for torpedo bombers who usually attack from low level. Just a thought for you. Remember: This isn't a game..... it's an adventure.
|
|
|
Post by axe99 on Jun 3, 2018 19:32:03 GMT -6
One suggestion to those of you that are going to build fighter-only carriers. Battle forces need scouting and the carrier is the best vehicle for that, much better than float planes. You might consider building a two seat fighter like the Fairy Fulmar for just that purpose, scouting. I am not saying it would be the primary fighter, just an addition. It can also be used for inner patrols which is ASW. They could also be used to provide low level combat air patrols for torpedo bombers who usually attack from low level. Just a thought for you. Remember: This isn't a game..... it's an adventure. The Fulmar was still quite competitive against strike aircraft well into the war, it just wasn't much chop up against other fighters in the Zero/Wildcat era. It will be interesting to see how much granularity the game goes into, in terms of the 'effect' of an air group relative to its make-up in terms of aircraft and their characteristics. It would be all sorts of cool if things like the benefit of an observer for observation/spotting was included (and whether certain wings can be specified for certain roles as well).
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 3, 2018 20:27:08 GMT -6
One suggestion to those of you that are going to build fighter-only carriers. Battle forces need scouting and the carrier is the best vehicle for that, much better than float planes. You might consider building a two seat fighter like the Fairy Fulmar for just that purpose, scouting. I am not saying it would be the primary fighter, just an addition. It can also be used for inner patrols which is ASW. They could also be used to provide low level combat air patrols for torpedo bombers who usually attack from low level. Just a thought for you. Remember: This isn't a game..... it's an adventure. The Fulmar was still quite competitive against strike aircraft well into the war, it just wasn't much chop up against other fighters in the Zero/Wildcat era. It will be interesting to see how much granularity the game goes into, in terms of the 'effect' of an air group relative to its make-up in terms of aircraft and their characteristics. It would be all sorts of cool if things like the benefit of an observer for observation/spotting was included (and whether certain wings can be specified for certain roles as well). We will have to wait and see how our two seat fighters perform, but for other missions, they have their advantages.
|
|
|
Post by bcoopactual on Jun 3, 2018 22:05:34 GMT -6
Shitposting aside, consider that the carrier is basically a floating airfield. That is, that a carrier provides nothing that an airfield does not also provide, so if you always have an airfield nearby you don't really need a carrier. Assuming we can build airfields, then if you intend to fight near land (ex. Northern Europe and Mediterannian sea zones), a carrier might not even be necessary if you can adequately coordinate between land-based aircraft and fleets. Otherwise, you might be able to do something like fighter-only carriers and just use it to negate enemy aircraft and allow a battle fleet to operate unmolested. If I was going to go full battleship wank, that's what I'd do.
That is exactly what Italians thought, I believe. And then they were never able to coordinate, because order has to go up one command chain and then down another and that is not really good idea. In theory it could work if you have actual land based naval air.
That was my first thought as well, that I wasn't aware of anyone who tried this where it actually worked. At least on a regular basis. Another advantage of having an airfield (aircraft carrier) embedded in your fleet is minimal transit time for the CAP to get to and from the airfield to the fleet to be protected since the carrier is probably smack in the middle of the fleet in question. You don't have to worry as much about the fleet being caught without air cover because your air cover had to return an hour or two early to get back and refuel.
|
|
|
Post by alexbrunius on Jun 4, 2018 2:53:17 GMT -6
You cannot leave out the deciding factor and that was signal intelligence. By February 1942 we were reading JN25-B the Japanese Operational Naval Code. It wasn't perfect, but with time our intelligence could tell the fleet where and when the Japanese might strike. As to winning one carrier battle, I think we can give them the Battle of Santa Cruz although most historians consider it a draw. I agree that they had a lot of factors in their favor. As to the number of carriers, they had six and we also had six. We just did not have them in the Pacific yet. We had Yorktown, Enterprise, Hornet, Saratoga, Lexington and Wasp. Yorktown was in the east and Wasp was delivering aircraft to Malta. At Midway, we had almost the same number of aircraft on three carriers as they did on four. When you examine the first four Carrier battles, the side that struck first, won the battle. At Santa Cruz, due the CinC of the carrier task forces delay, it was a tie, but we lost Hornet and they had both Shokaku and Zuikaku heavily damaged all this due to not striking first when we had the information available and the aircraft sitting on the decks ready to launch. In all fairness, historians and Naval personnel at the War College have never completely understood how the Japanese could have lost those first four battles with their experienced pilots, better aircraft etc. Was it superior training at the mid and high levels of command, the freedom that our commanders had to conduct their missions the way they felt or just dumb luck. I believe it was a collection of factors. We did not win Coral Sea or Santa Cruz tactically, but we won strategically. I have enjoyed this discussion because it is one of my most important subject in military history and I have enjoyed your comments because you appear to have studied the subject. Let's keep this going but use this information and our knowledge in RTW2.
You have a point about signal intelligence, it was important for sure but I wouldn't say it was the only deciding factor.
After already having fought the American Carriers at Coral Sea, and them showing up exactly where they needed to be to score a strategic victory Japan could have figured out that their code was compromised or at least deduced a high probably for them showing up the 2:ed time as well. ( If Japanese culture had produced more rational and less feudal/emotional/aggressive leadership )
If Japanese defenses ( like AA and damage control ) would have been as good as the American one they would probably only have lost the Kaga instead of 3 Carriers in big 10:25 attack at Midway. Akagi only took a single hit, and with decent AA just 3 attacking bombers would have had a hard time scoring at all. Soryu was attacked by 17 bombers, some who had no bombs due to earlier accidents, and was hit 3-4 times. Better fighter cover and AA could probably have reduced the amount of hits to 0-2 here as well, which certainly was manageable for US damage control.
If Japanese doctrine had more of an emphasis on defense their Carriers wouldn't have kept closing distance to Midway after the enemy Carriers were located, but tried to move away to put extra distance so the island based airplanes would be taken out of the battle, and could not interfere.
If 3 Japanese Carriers survive the initial attack, and if they had brought along Zuikaku as well ( with Shokakus airgroup ), then suddenly when it's time to counterattack you got 3-4 full Japanese Carrier decks worth of planes heading out back towards the US fleets, instead of just 1.
If you want to understand how and why Japan lost those 4 battles ( as well as mainly Midway ) I recommend the book Shattered Sword. The why part can be very briefly summarized as:
- Failure to learn from the past ( mainly learn and respect the American performance in Coral Sea, and how a handful of allied bombers surprised them in the Indian ocean )
- Failure to understand the importance of defensive measures ( Fighter coordination, AA, Scouting, Damage control, Radar )
- Failure to anticipate what the enemy can do, rather then what you think they will do ( Belief that US Carriers would not be present at Midway despite all evidence pointing towards that they could )
- Failure to adapt to the situation at hand ( How early both the invasion and the CV force was detected + attacked as well as Midway resistance would have warranted much more caution then was observed by Nagumo )
I would also say it's a bit of a myth that the Japanese had better Aircraft. During those 4 battles American Wildcats shot down more Japanese Zeroes then Japanese Zeroes shot down American Wildcats, and both sides fighters could really dish it out if they caught bombers without escorted. It is probably fair to say that the Japanese had vastly superior torpedo bombers though, but I would rate their fighters and dive-bombers at least equal, if not even slight advantage for USA ( looking just at the technical aspect here, pilot experience wise I agree that Japan had a clear advantage overall, but here were some notable exceptional pilots on the US side too ).
I also recommend "The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway" if you want to drill down into the early Pacific air to air action from the US perspective ( in case you haven't already read it ).
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 4, 2018 8:28:54 GMT -6
You cannot leave out the deciding factor and that was signal intelligence. By February 1942 we were reading JN25-B the Japanese Operational Naval Code. It wasn't perfect, but with time our intelligence could tell the fleet where and when the Japanese might strike. As to winning one carrier battle, I think we can give them the Battle of Santa Cruz although most historians consider it a draw. I agree that they had a lot of factors in their favor. As to the number of carriers, they had six and we also had six. We just did not have them in the Pacific yet. We had Yorktown, Enterprise, Hornet, Saratoga, Lexington and Wasp. Yorktown was in the east and Wasp was delivering aircraft to Malta. At Midway, we had almost the same number of aircraft on three carriers as they did on four. When you examine the first four Carrier battles, the side that struck first, won the battle. At Santa Cruz, due the CinC of the carrier task forces delay, it was a tie, but we lost Hornet and they had both Shokaku and Zuikaku heavily damaged all this due to not striking first when we had the information available and the aircraft sitting on the decks ready to launch. In all fairness, historians and Naval personnel at the War College have never completely understood how the Japanese could have lost those first four battles with their experienced pilots, better aircraft etc. Was it superior training at the mid and high levels of command, the freedom that our commanders had to conduct their missions the way they felt or just dumb luck. I believe it was a collection of factors. We did not win Coral Sea or Santa Cruz tactically, but we won strategically. I have enjoyed this discussion because it is one of my most important subject in military history and I have enjoyed your comments because you appear to have studied the subject. Let's keep this going but use this information and our knowledge in RTW2.
You have a point about signal intelligence, it was important for sure but I wouldn't say it was the only deciding factor.
After already having fought the American Carriers at Coral Sea, and them showing up exactly where they needed to be to score a strategic victory Japan could have figured out that their code was compromised or at least deduced a high probably for them showing up the 2:ed time as well. ( If Japanese culture had produced more rational and less feudal/emotional/aggressive leadership )
If Japanese defenses ( like AA and damage control ) would have been as good as the American one they would probably only have lost the Kaga instead of 3 Carriers in big 10:25 attack at Midway. Akagi only took a single hit, and with decent AA just 3 attacking bombers would have had a hard time scoring at all. Soryu was attacked by 17 bombers, some who had no bombs due to earlier accidents, and was hit 3-4 times. Better fighter cover and AA could probably have reduced the amount of hits to 0-2 here as well, which certainly was manageable for US damage control.
If Japanese doctrine had more of an emphasis on defense their Carriers wouldn't have kept closing distance to Midway after the enemy Carriers were located, but tried to move away to put extra distance so the island based airplanes would be taken out of the battle, and could not interfere.
If 3 Japanese Carriers survive the initial attack, and if they had brought along Zuikaku as well ( with Shokakus airgroup ), then suddenly when it's time to counterattack you got 3-4 full Japanese Carrier decks worth of planes heading out back towards the US fleets, instead of just 1.
If you want to understand how and why Japan lost those 4 battles ( as well as mainly Midway ) I recommend the book Shattered Sword. The why part can be very briefly summarized as:
- Failure to learn from the past ( mainly learn and respect the American performance in Coral Sea, and how a handful of allied bombers surprised them in the Indian ocean )
- Failure to understand the importance of defensive measures ( Fighter coordination, AA, Scouting, Damage control, Radar )
- Failure to anticipate what the enemy can do, rather then what you think they will do ( Belief that US Carriers would not be present at Midway despite all evidence pointing towards that they could )
- Failure to adapt to the situation at hand ( How early both the invasion and the CV force was detected + attacked as well as Midway resistance would have warranted much more caution then was observed by Nagumo )
I would also say it's a bit of a myth that the Japanese had better Aircraft. During those 4 battles American Wildcats shot down more Japanese Zeroes then Japanese Zeroes shot down American Wildcats, and both sides fighters could really dish it out if they caught bombers without escorted. It is probably fair to say that the Japanese had vastly superior torpedo bombers though, but I would rate their fighters and dive-bombers at least equal, if not even slight advantage for USA ( looking just at the technical aspect here, pilot experience wise I agree that Japan had a clear advantage overall, but here were some notable exceptional pilots on the US side too ).
I also recommend "The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway" if you want to drill down into the early Pacific air to air action from the US perspective ( in case you haven't already read it ).
First of all, I've read both of those books and about 38 others. The deciding factor was the lack of surprise. In military science, there is a basic precept: surprise, speed and concentration. The Japanese Navy achieved none of those factors in this operation. They failed in surprise because they could not determine that we had broken their codes although they, in fact, changed those codes in May 1942. But this was too late. They failed to concentrate their forces at the main point of attack i. e. Midway. The Aleutian operation detracted two carriers that could have been useful to Kido Butai. They should have delayed the attack for one month, and gotten Shokaku and Zuikaku back into the fleet. This could have given them six fleet carriers and two light carriers. The light carriers could have provided air cover for the rest of fleet. As to speed, it is well known that their carriers were slow in launching aircraft due to the issue of slow lifts and the fact that they could not warm-up their engines in the hangers. They had to bring them up on deck then spend the 20 minutes warming up the radial engines. The last factor, of course, was the lack of adequate fighter cover. They realized this after the battle and changed their air-wing composition. Probably the factor that they reckoned cost them the battle, was "victory disease". The failure of Operation K to verify that the carriers were not in Pearl and the fact that that information was not passed to Nagumo, allowed him and his staff to assume we were their, and we were not. Is this a failure of training, or just ego, I let others judge that. As to the issue of fighters, our fighters were stronger, and better armed in the area of ammunition supply and muzzle velocity. Our pilots had learned to dive and climb, not dogfight with the Japanese. However, in the long run, none of these issue might have been a factor, if we had not known exactly when and where they were going to attack and were prepared for it. We not only ambushed them, but we had improved the airfields on Midway and placed more aircraft on them. We had placed a seaplane tender on French Frigate Shoals and used PBY-4's to search along with B-17's and PBY's from Midway. It was these assets that discovered the Japanese Striking Fleet. I would not rate their D3A Aichi Dive Bomber equal to the SBD's. Our SBD could carry up to 1000 lbs. their Val could only carry 500 lbs. bombs. Ours were much faster and had better radios. Over Guadalcanal, an SBD shot down three Japanese Zero's in a dogfight and during Coral Sea, they performed low level CAP to protect against torpedo bombers. My father flew in the backseat of SBD's during the war, and he stated the Japanese did not jump them if they were flying in formation. On the whole, they had many factors that led to the failure of the mission and I don't want to fall into the trap of reductionism. The primary leading factor that caused the failure of the operation was a lack of signal security.
|
|