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Post by bcoopactual on Aug 28, 2018 16:34:34 GMT -6
Hello fellow admirals, here is a small excel-file about the german shipbuilding. For the ships the year indicate the laying down of the keel; for the boats it is the year of the launching. Welcome to the forum and thank you very much. Bravo Zulu, that is excellent work. I'll probably update this post with a few questions if that is alright once I've had a chance to look at the file in detail after I finish dinner. Thanks again. Edit - I don't see data for the U-boats. That's not a serious concern since submarines are abstracted in RTW and hopefully will be as well for the most part in RTW2. However, do you have the information on which shipyards were the major U-boat builders in the Pre-WW1, WW1, 1930's and WW2 periods? For the 1900-1918 time frame, what is considered a TB and what is considered a DD? I thought the Kaiserliche Marine considered the terms interchangeable? Was there a specific characteristic during the pre-WW1 and WW1 time frames that differentiated a large torpedo boat from a destroyer in the German navy? For example, a certain tonnage below which ships were classed as torpedo boats and if above they were classed as destroyers? Or did the German navy eventually just adopt the destroyer nomenclature because most of the rest of the world's navies had? Related to the above question, do the TB listed as being built in the 1930s and 1940s represent schnellboote or the larger, destroyer sized Flottentorpedoboot? I'm assuming it's the latter but I wanted to be sure. Please don't take any of my questions as criticism, I'm just satisfying curiosity or looking for a little clarification. Thanks again.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 28, 2018 16:54:38 GMT -6
Hello fellow admirals, here is a small excel-file about the german shipbuilding. For the ships the year indicate the laying down of the keel; for the boats it is the year of the launching. Can you tell me your sources? This is very interesting.
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Post by Bürkner on Aug 29, 2018 13:58:49 GMT -6
bcoopactualyou are right about the uboats: they are too abstracted in RTW and therefore I don't research and build them, and there were simply so many that I didn't consider them. About the shipyards: Germaniawerft Kiel was probably the leading uboat-builder from 1906-45. This yard not only build the most boats but also many of the "special" boats, like the submarine-cruisers in WW1 and the mine-laying Type X and the Walter-turbine boats in WW2. Pre-WWI until 1918 the KW Danzig was the second important submarine builder, followed by AG Weser, Blohm & Voss and Vulcan, Hamburg. Deutsche Werke Kiel build many of the pre WW2-boats. Deschimag AG Weser build all of the far-distance Typ IX boats in WW2. The rest of the shipyards were solely occupied with building Typ VIIC boats. The german navy surprisingly received their first DDs in 1914/15 when four boats for the argentinian navy were confiscated and the power-plants for several russian destroyers could be integrated into new hulls within half a year. The boats initially were considered too large and too clumsy for a "proper" torpedo-boat operation, that is the combined and coordinated attack of the enemy line of battle during a decisive fleet battle. But since the Royal Navy adopted to a different strategy, the T-boats became an idle asset. However, german captains quickly found out that the new heavy boats could be used as an allround vehicle in coastal waters and that because of their increased number and size of guns they were an excellent counterpart to the british destroyers. This lead to the design of a true big destroyer, which was also officially called Zerstörer: With 2000 t more than double the size of a common Torpedoboot, 15cm guns instead of 8,8 and 60cm torpedos instead of 53,3. You are right that the TBs in the 30s and 40s are actually meant to be the Flottentorpedoboote and not the wooden S-Boote. I wasn't thinking of your questions as a form of criticism - until you mentioned it (no, seriously, nobody is perfect and as long as criticism helps to reduce errors and to clarify and improve garbled information I can life with any sort of criticism) oldpop2000capital ships: Gröner, Erich: Die deutschen Kriegsschiffe 1815-1945 boats: Fock, Harald: Z-vor! Breyer, Siegfried: Die deutschen Torpedoboote 1925-1945 (Marine-Arsenal 39) Breyer, Siegfried: Flottentorpedoboote und Flottenbegleiter (Marine-Arsenal 44) auxiliaries: Breyer, Siegfried: Spezial- und Sonderschiffe der Kriegsmarine (Marine-Arsenal 30) www.german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ships/misc/index.html de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_der_Schiffe_der_Kaiserlichen_Marine u-boats: Rössler, Eberhard: Die Geschichte des deutschen U-Bootbaus Herzog, Bodo: Deutsche U-Boote 1906-1966
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 29, 2018 17:41:02 GMT -6
bcoopactual you are right about the uboats: they are too abstracted in RTW and therefore I don't research and build them, and there were simply so many that I didn't consider them. About the shipyards: Germaniawerft Kiel was probably the leading uboat-builder from 1906-45. This yard not only build the most boats but also many of the "special" boats, like the submarine-cruisers in WW1 and the mine-laying Type X and the Walter-turbine boats in WW2. Pre-WWI until 1918 the KW Danzig was the second important submarine builder, followed by AG Weser, Blohm & Voss and Vulcan, Hamburg. Deutsche Werke Kiel build many of the pre WW2-boats. Deschimag AG Weser build all of the far-distance Typ IX boats in WW2. The rest of the shipyards were solely occupied with building Typ VIIC boats. The german navy surprisingly received their first DDs in 1914/15 when four boats for the argentinian navy were confiscated and the power-plants for several russian destroyers could be integrated into new hulls within half a year. The boats initially were considered too large and too clumsy for a "proper" torpedo-boat operation, that is the combined and coordinated attack of the enemy line of battle during a decisive fleet battle. But since the Royal Navy adopted to a different strategy, the T-boats became an idle asset. However, german captains quickly found out that the new heavy boats could be used as an allround vehicle in coastal waters and that because of their increased number and size of guns they were an excellent counterpart to the british destroyers. This lead to the design of a true big destroyer, which was also officially called Zerstörer: With 2000 t more than double the size of a common Torpedoboot, 15cm guns instead of 8,8 and 60cm torpedos instead of 53,3. You are right that the TBs in the 30s and 40s are actually meant to be the Flottentorpedoboote and not the wooden S-Boote. I wasn't thinking of your questions as a form of criticism - until you mentioned it (no, seriously, nobody is perfect and as long as criticism helps to reduce errors and to clarify and improve garbled information I can life with any sort of criticism) oldpop2000 capital ships: Gröner, Erich: Die deutschen Kriegsschiffe 1815-1945 boats: Fock, Harald: Z-vor! Breyer, Siegfried: Die deutschen Torpedoboote 1925-1945 (Marine-Arsenal 39) Breyer, Siegfried: Flottentorpedoboote und Flottenbegleiter (Marine-Arsenal 44) auxiliaries: Breyer, Siegfried: Spezial- und Sonderschiffe der Kriegsmarine (Marine-Arsenal 30) www.german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ships/misc/index.html de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_der_Schiffe_der_Kaiserlichen_Marine u-boats: Rössler, Eberhard: Die Geschichte des deutschen U-Bootbaus Herzog, Bodo: Deutsche U-Boote 1906-1966
Thanks, I always appreciate sources.
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Post by bcoopactual on Aug 30, 2018 16:52:41 GMT -6
bcoopactual you are right about the uboats: they are too abstracted in RTW and therefore I don't research and build them, and there were simply so many that I didn't consider them. About the shipyards: Germaniawerft Kiel was probably the leading uboat-builder from 1906-45. This yard not only build the most boats but also many of the "special" boats, like the submarine-cruisers in WW1 and the mine-laying Type X and the Walter-turbine boats in WW2. Pre-WWI until 1918 the KW Danzig was the second important submarine builder, followed by AG Weser, Blohm & Voss and Vulcan, Hamburg. Deutsche Werke Kiel build many of the pre WW2-boats. Deschimag AG Weser build all of the far-distance Typ IX boats in WW2. The rest of the shipyards were solely occupied with building Typ VIIC boats. The german navy surprisingly received their first DDs in 1914/15 when four boats for the argentinian navy were confiscated and the power-plants for several russian destroyers could be integrated into new hulls within half a year. The boats initially were considered too large and too clumsy for a "proper" torpedo-boat operation, that is the combined and coordinated attack of the enemy line of battle during a decisive fleet battle. But since the Royal Navy adopted to a different strategy, the T-boats became an idle asset. However, german captains quickly found out that the new heavy boats could be used as an allround vehicle in coastal waters and that because of their increased number and size of guns they were an excellent counterpart to the british destroyers. This lead to the design of a true big destroyer, which was also officially called Zerstörer: With 2000 t more than double the size of a common Torpedoboot, 15cm guns instead of 8,8 and 60cm torpedos instead of 53,3. You are right that the TBs in the 30s and 40s are actually meant to be the Flottentorpedoboote and not the wooden S-Boote. Thanks for the clarifications. That's interesting about German destroyer development. If you don't mind expanding, what are you referring to by the Royal Navy's change in strategy?
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Post by aeson on Aug 30, 2018 18:50:39 GMT -6
Thanks for the clarifications. That's interesting about German destroyer development. If you don't mind expanding, what are you referring to by the Royal Navy's change in strategy? Burkner's probably referring to Britain's decision to pursue a distant blockade in the First World War rather than a close blockade as in earlier wars.
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Post by Bürkner on Aug 31, 2018 9:49:40 GMT -6
Thanks for the clarifications. That's interesting about German destroyer development. If you don't mind expanding, what are you referring to by the Royal Navy's change in strategy? Burkner's probably referring to Britain's decision to pursue a distant blockade in the First World War rather than a close blockade as in earlier wars. Sorry for being unprecise. Aeson is right, the Royal Navy did not act as it was expected by the german admirality: it was planed that the british ships of a close blockade could be fought by a ruthless mine- and submarine warfare and (after the RN had suffered big enough losses) that an all-out vigorous battle in the north sea will inflict heavy losses to the enemy. But the new First Lord of the Admiralty did opt for a much smarter strategy and established a full and distant blockade. Source: Tirpitz, A. von: Deutsche Ohnmachtspolitik Im Weltkriege, page 35ff. books.google.de/books?id=NSwmy2aFlD8C&pg=PP2&hl=de&source=gbs_selected_pages&cad=3#v=onepage&q&f=falseEpkenhans,M.; Hillmann,J.; Nägler,F.: Jutland: World War I's Greatest Naval Battle, part 2 books.google.de/books?id=oNKQCgAAQBAJ&pg=PT6&hl=de&source=gbs_selected_pages&cad=3#v=onepage&q&f=false
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 31, 2018 12:33:17 GMT -6
I thought I would add some detail concerning the issue of “close blockade” versus “distant blockade”. It was Sir Henry Wilson, the Director of Military Operations, that based his war plans on the “close blockade”. In April 1912, a War Staff was announced and began to study the issue of the Naval War. The officers that were to man this staff were trained in 1912 at the Naval War College at Portsmouth. It was this staff that decided that the “distant blockade” was the best option due to the presence of submarines and mines. The whole concept of the “close blockade” was predicated on the capture and retention of a German base for the blockade flotillas but the submarine made this almost impossible to execute and it threatened the safety of the British fleet. An Admiralty Study in December 1912 declared “that the enemy’s submarines, in conjunction with the destroyer, has made an efficient blockade impossible”. Just a note, even Alfred Thayer Mahan had never reckoned on the development of the submarine and his famous book does not view this development. The development of the airplane also added to the problems of a “close blockade”. The German naval strategy was dependent on a “close blockade” to enable the High Seas Fleet to equalize the naval strength. They had little actual intelligence about the change in war plans made in 1912 and 1914. They did have some indications from British naval maneuvers and their knowledge of new technological breakthroughs and how they would affect the outmoded “close blockade” but they assumed the British would alternate between the two. They assumed that in the initial phases of the war, possibly the first year, the “close blockade” would be the most prevalent type to transport the BEF to the continent. Churchill liked the “close blockade”. He did not like the new strategy because it was defensive and lacked initiative. My assessment of all this information is that the German’s, while they hoped for a “close blockade” were patently aware that the submarine, destroyer and mines had basically eliminated that type of blockade from any nations repertoire and the distant blockade would be the strategic plan in the future. This of course disrupted all their strategic naval plans to use attrition to wear down the British Fleet, then use the decisive battle to finish it off. It goes without saying, that in this case, "the enemy always has a say in your plans". The IJN found out after Pearl Harbor that the US Navy was not going to fight the way they had planned. This changed all of the pre-war plans and the Battle of Midway was the result.
Now, there was one technological advancement that actually made the concept of a close blockade obsolete, in fact, under the right conditions, it almost made it useless. Now this only applies to certain nations on certain geographical areas. The answer is...….. railroads. Railroads and the ability to move supplies from around Europe and the US with possibly China added, makes real blockade very hard to impose. The use of gasoline or diesel trucks also performs that same function.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 31, 2018 14:30:14 GMT -6
I’ve been reading through my copy of Admiral Reinhard Scheer war diaries. The German plan was for the High Seas Fleet to strike when the circumstances were favorable. However, CinC could not risk the whole fleet in battle without a good possibility of victory. This whole plan assumed that the opportunity to perform a strategy of attrition against the British Royal Navy would present itself with the expected blockade of the German Bight. In fact, they had no plans to really use a submarine offensive unless it was necessary. All these plans were to keep their actions within International Law. All trade in the North Sea was considered ended when the war started, so the High Seas Fleet really had to develop a new strategy and the ratio of their fleet to the British precluded any sort of offensive action. It really boiled down to coastal raids and a submarine offensive. This was the German's only option, as far as I can tell.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 31, 2018 16:06:55 GMT -6
Here are some of my conclusions concerning “close blockade” and why it was archived in favor of the “distant Blockade.
1. Torpedo Boat destroyers that could steam out quickly from the harbor, launch torpedoes and return. They could, if configured, lay mines also 2. The submarine, probably coast submarines first but later the medium range submarine could move out at night, sit and wait for the morning, submerge and torpedo enemy ships, and lay mines. 3. Aircraft and lighter-than-air ships could fly out, drop bombs, lay mines and later, launch torpedoes. 4. Better land-based transportation such as railroads and trucks along with barges moving down the rivers such as the Rhine and others in Germany. The barges could move supplies and raw materials down the rivers to a port, off load to the land transportation, and then it would be moved to the supply centers or industrial areas where the supplies and raw materials could be used.
Now, what tools does the opponent nation have in his tool box. 1. He can develop aircraft carriers and long-range aircraft to interdict the land and river-based supply system. 2. He can place his own mines in the areas around the harbors he wants to blockade and hope that the enemy submarines and ships will hit them. 3. He can develop ASW techniques, ships and weapons to counter the submarine. 4. He can use his aircraft to shoot down and gain air supremacy over the port areas and industrial areas to prevent resupply.
Well those are some of the methods both sides could use to prevent a blockade. I am certain with a little more concentration we can develop some other ideas, so have at it.
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Post by oaktree on Sept 1, 2018 12:14:38 GMT -6
Assuming WW1-era tech (or just after WW1) then I don't think offensive aircraft and aircraft carriers would be effective enough to help with a blockade beyond observation. The aircraft of the time that could operate from a carrier or seaplane carrier did not generate sufficient offensive power in terms of effective bomb load and turn around time for operations. And they are more vulnerable to attack than a network of land-based airfields. Naval aviation is still in its infancy, and carrier strikes beyond quick raids really did not mature at all until late WW2. And really only the US Navy with its large logistics tail was able to support a longer support/offensive use of massed aircraft carriers.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 1, 2018 12:28:47 GMT -6
Assuming WW1-era tech (or just after WW1) then I don't think offensive aircraft and aircraft carriers would be effective enough to help with a blockade beyond observation. The aircraft of the time that could operate from a carrier or seaplane carrier did not generate sufficient offensive power in terms of effective bomb load and turn around time for operations. And they are more vulnerable to attack than a network of land-based airfields. Naval aviation is still in its infancy, and carrier strikes beyond quick raids really did not mature at all until late WW2. And really only the US Navy with its large logistics tail was able to support a longer support/offensive use of massed aircraft carriers. Well, let’s look at the details. How about the Airco DH.10 Twin Engine Medium bomber by the British. It had a range of 680 Nautical Miles with a bomb load of up to 920 lbs. of internal carried stores. This was developed by 1917 but there were others that could have accomplished, not only scouting but dropped a small number of bombs on commercial transports that are not armored or have AA guns. The Royal Naval Air Service began strategic bombing mission on 22 September 1914 and 8 October of that same year, when it bombed the Zeppelin bases in Cologne and Dusseldorf.
The French formed a strategic bombing unit in September 1914. They raided German supply networks and troop concentrations, so it was possible to bomb ports and civilian merchant ships. In December 1914 the French bombed Freiburg im Breisgau.
There were other nations, like Italy, Austria-Hungary, Russia that were using strategic bombing besides submarines, destroyers, mines. The aircraft could have contributed more than just scouting. The aforementioned weapons could have been and were augmented by aviation. They could have harassed commercial transport in harbors. There are many ways to execute a blockade. It doesn't mean sinking every ship, it means making it difficult to sail and unload supplies. If you can cut the supply line by fifty percent, you have a good blockade. You have to use all the tools in your toolbox to be successful in your strategic naval goal.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 1, 2018 13:25:46 GMT -6
Another type of blockade is a very important tool. Economic blockade was used by the Allies in both wars. Allied agents could be sent into neutral countries to purchase raw materials so that they could not be purchased and sent to the enemy. You could approach the neutral country and, as Vito said " Make them an offer they can't refuse". There were many ways including buying the companies in these neutral countries. Prior to WW2, the Japanese after our embargo tried to buy supplies from Central and South America. Unfortunately, US companies already owned almost all the companies in these neutral countries, that were necessary providers of raw materials. The Japanese could not buy anything, especially after we put a freeze on their gold in the New York Federal Bank and would not let them exchange it. It is a valuable tool
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 1, 2018 14:56:08 GMT -6
Now, for those of you who are really, really interested in the blockade and seaborne trade during WW1, I suggest you go to the Internet Archive and download the three volume set by C. Edward Fayle titled The History of Seaborne Trade. It is based on actual documents. It is something to read.
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