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Post by ramjb on Sept 19, 2015 17:49:22 GMT -6
The question is the adequacy of Invincible's armor scheme to resist long range 11" gun fire with pre WW1 shells.
That's the problem and the main point I try to make.
Let's see, you break the naval rules introducing something totally new and previously unseen: Namely an upscaled armored cruiser which carries battleship scale weaponry, stepping on previously unseen speeds for big ships, while keeping armored cruiser protection standards (and that's being generous, as if we're to judge Fisher's idea of a battlecruiser we should take a careful look at the Renown and Repulse, for those were the ones he was most proud of while they had protection levels that would make a Lion look like Yamato).
Now the argument is: This thing is fast enough to run away from battleships, is protected enough to deal with enemy scout screens (mostly consisting on light cruisers) and absolutely demolishes opposite armored cruisers. All fine and dandy.
But one must live in a fairy tale world of ideal flowers and loving pink bears to believe no other navy is going to take that concept and take it for itself. You might be the first one to put one of those things in the water , but objectivelly in a matter of a couple years there'll be similar things to it in the opposition hands as they'll copy the concept (the same they copied the Dreadnought one) to keep pace in the naval arms race. And what then?. You have a big fat ship with big fat guns but made of wet tissue paper.
I'm not going to argue about the scale of protection of the Invincibles being enough for the day it was designed. There was literally nothing afloat that could challenge it other than a battleship, and she wasn't designed to fight with battleships anyway. But one has to have the foresight of a blind duck to not realize that you're not alone in the naval race and that the other navies are not going to remain still: they WILL copy your concept and then your magnificent ship is open to be the main guest in the resulting fireworks party.
Of course, one could argue, if the opposition copies the concept then their battlecruisers will be as vulnerable as ours. So it's a matter of a roll of the dice to see who sinks first because it will have totally inadequate armor, right?.
Well matter of fact things didn't even go that way. The germans didn't look at Invincible and copied it. Nope - they went one step further and designed their own version of the concept wich, on top of being able to brush aside light forces, massacre armored cruisers and run away if neccessary from battleships, it could take a spot in the german battleline. Something no british battlecruiser ever gave an afterthought of (and with good reason, because the only time they took a place in a battleship battleline, when the 3rd BC took a spot in the van of the Grand Fleet, Invincible was proven very much beatable).
I'm not making a point of comparing Invincible with Von der Tann, because Von der Tann was not even an afterthought in the german minds as Indefatigable was built (their answer was Blücher because they didn't realize the foolishness of what the new "battlecruiser" actually was until it was too late to change her). British designers (and the mastermind of the battlecruiser plan, Adm Fisher) didn't have to account for Von der Tann at all as, well, it didn't exist and wasn't going to for some years. But therein lies the problem - it wasn't going to for some years, but it eventually was going to. The Battlecruisers were not going to go without an answer, the same way the Dreadnoughts didn't. There were competing navies who would bring their own battlecruisers to the table.
But it gets better: While it takes a really dumbfounding ammout of lack of foresight to not account for that in a weapon system design, it's not (by far) the only time in history we've seen such mistake. However, what really takes the cake is the repeat of the mistake in posterior versions of the weapon system. Invincible class Battlecruisers were followed by...the Indefatigables. When it was clear the germans were taking the gauntlet and were going to bring their own battlecruisers to the table did the british uparmor their ships to be able to deal with the new opposition?. Nah, why bother, let's reduce the armor a bit more, we had more than enough before. THat's not...sensible. Let's put it that way.
And while one could argue that the british took a huge leap forward with the Lion class (not big enough though, it still was not enough protection by far to be able to deal with enemy battlecruisers, nor was in the case of the even better Tiger), to then...build the Renowns. And then the Courageouses. As I said I'd rather not speak further at this point because, well...I think I don't need to, right?
In practice, blaming designs to cover up the incompetence of the command and governance appears more likely than the converse. Those responsible for the command and governance are the elite of the political establishment who tend not to voluntarily tarnish their own reputations.
I'll be the last to argue this point, as I agree completely with it. However, no matter how much blame can be put on Beatty for his irresponsible practices to maximize rate of fire at any costs without regard to the security of his own ships (and how much blame we can put on Jellicoe who as First Lord did his best to cover any possible accusation of negligence towards the now CiC of the Grand Fleet), we still have to accept they were right in one of their arguments. Yes, their reload drills were horrible, yes, magazine operation was horrifyingly insecure, yes, flashtight doors were kept open during combat, and yes, those factors have a fair share of importance on why the british BCs blew up at Jutland.
But no, we can't ignore the ships which blew up weren't well designed, or were, doctrinally speaking, sound. Because they weren't. Those ships ,as they existed and were built, should've never existed or been built for they were a disgrace in the waiting, flash detonations or not. Those ships might have gone off or not with better reload drills and safety measures. Then again, they could've gone off anyway (just ask Hood), and in any case they simply couldn't withstand the gunfire of their opposite numbers for their armor wasn't up to the task ,so had they not gone off in a flash detonation, they might have sunk by other means (as I said, there's enough evidence to point out that, for instance, Queen Mary was doomed even before her magazine blew off). But the only REAL way those ships would've been never catastrophically lost if...had they never existed in that shape and form.
And that's the bottom point: those ships should've never been built the way they were so, indeed, a lot of blame can be put on the command brass who decided those ships had to be built, on top of the operational blame that worsened the situation of an already extremely series of ships making them floating versions of nitroglycerine, just waiting for the proper "bang" to go "boom".
All in all what I try to say is that the Battlecruiser concept on itself as a fast battleline wing and cruiser killer wasn't wrong at all (The german BCs did more than enough to prove how neccessary that kind of ship was), but the british interpretation of the adequate ship for that task was completely wrong, and the end results speak for themselves. The idea was right. The implementation could hardly had been worse.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 19, 2015 18:09:59 GMT -6
In practice, blaming designs to cover up the incompetence of the command and governance appears more likely than the converse. Those responsible for the command and governance are the elite of the political establishment who tend not to voluntarily tarnish their own reputations.
I'll be the last to argue this point, as I agree completely with it. However, no matter how much blame can be put on Beatty for his irresponsible practices to maximize rate of fire at any costs without regard to the security of his own ships (and how much blame we can put on Jellicoe who as First Lord did his best to cover any possible accusation of negligence towards the now CiC of the Grand Fleet), we still have to accept they were right in one of their arguments. Yes, their reload drills were horrible, yes, magazine operation was horrifyingly insecure, yes, flashtight doors were kept open during combat, and yes, those factors have a fair share of importance on why the british BCs blew up at Jutland. But no, we can't ignore the ships which blew up weren't well designed, or were, doctrinally speaking, sound. Because they weren't. Those ships ,as they existed and were built, should've never existed or been built for they were a disgrace in the waiting, flash detonations or not. Those ships might have gone off or not with better reload drills and safety measures. Then again, they could've gone off anyway (just ask Hood), and in any case they simply couldn't withstand the gunfire of their opposite numbers for their armor wasn't up to the task ,so had they not gone off in a flash detonation, they might have sunk by other means (as I said, there's enough evidence to point out that, for instance, Queen Mary was doomed even before her magazine blew off). But the only REAL way those ships would've been never catastrophically lost if...had they never existed in that shape and form. And that's the bottom point: those ships should've never been built the way they were so, indeed, a lot of blame can be put on the command brass who decided those ships had to be built, on top of the operational blame that worsened the situation of an already extremely series of ships making them floating versions of nitroglycerine, just waiting for the proper "bang" to go "boom". All in all what I try to say is that the Battlecruiser concept on itself as a fast battleline wing and cruiser killer wasn't wrong at all (The german BCs did more than enough to prove how neccessary that kind of ship was), but the british interpretation of the adequate ship for that task was completely wrong, and the end results speak for themselves. The idea was right. The implementation could hardly had been worse. I agree with this conclusion. Keep in mind, the design was controlled by the Admiralty, not the Director of Naval Construction as it should have been. Weapons systems are not designed, implemented and used in a vacuum. They are man-made systems. They will not be perfect. The Large armored cruiser design was not perfect and in 1921 that was acknowledged simply because, John Fisher was dead. But there were other factors that we all are familiar with, that contributed to the failures at Jutland. The problems were solved, and naval ship design moved on. We already know that the speed specification could not be met if you added 12in guns to the ship because then you have to lengthen it and add more machinery to maintain the speed. Possibly, reducing the speed requirement might have allowed for an increase in armor protection but that remains simple conjecture. Turbine machinery, boilers, gearing etc. all added power to the ships over time, and armor along with gun size could be increased and we see that in later ships. Maybe I'll use Springsharp, my only tool, to build put together an Invincible design, then drop the speed and add armor to get some ideas of how it would be affected. Not a perfect test instrument, but it works for me. I will have to find time. Overall the idea and basic design was a good one, and they did perform well except for Jutland during WW1.
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Post by dickturpin on Sept 20, 2015 15:27:53 GMT -6
That's the problem and the main point I try to make. In a period of financial constraint, the Invincible has the firepower to defeat anything afloat when she first commissions and providing she fights the way she was intended to, she will reasonably hold her own against the next generation, she will however eventually become obsolescent. Will she become obsolescent faster the Dreadnought or a repeat Lord Nelson or a repeat Minotaur? By 1916, was she more obsolescent than a Deutschland, or a Scharnhorst, or a Vermont, or a North Carolina? Attempting to second guess what a rival power will do (and this is by no means predictable) and attempting to future proof the design would effectively add prohibitively to the unit cost. Germany had previously pursued a policy of limiting unit cost (especially in cruisers) in favor of maximising the number of units built. The USA and Japan were tending to push the envelope with respect to advancing designs. This does not mean that I disagree with you on Indefatigable, Renown or especially Courageous. The splendid cats were up-armored stood up reasonably well to punishment but I would not necessarily disagree that they may have been better sacrificing some speed for more armor (they would have been better still with long base length rangefinders and improved shells). The fast Battleships of the Queen Elizabeth class would in my opinion represent the best solution in a changed world. I'll be the last to argue this point, as I agree completely with it. However, no matter how much blame can be put on Beatty for his irresponsible practices to maximize rate of fire at any costs without regard to the security of his own ships (and how much blame we can put on Jellicoe who as First Lord did his best to cover any possible accusation of negligence towards the now CiC of the Grand Fleet), we still have to accept they were right in one of their arguments.The issue is that Defence, Warrior, Black Prince, Invincible and Indefatigable were obsolescent by 1916. Had Scheer placed the placed the German Second Battle Squadron opposite British Dreadnoughts, would the outcome have been a good one? Would we laud him as a tactical genius for doing so? Beatty had the tools at his disposal in the shape of the Fifth Battle Squadron and the numbers. By not deploying them with his other squadrons then advancing precipitously into a disadvantageous tactical position whilst not signaling his best units to follow him had predictable repercussions. Dividing one's force in the presence of the enemy is not generally viewed as an intelligent military maxim. Similarly, Arbuthnot was commanding a scouting force; his job is to get out of the way when the enemy has been scouted. His job is not to charge forward masking the fire of his heavy units and getting caught at short range by the heavy units of the enemy.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 20, 2015 15:46:10 GMT -6
I've been wondering if the Admiralty shouldn't have designed two classes of large armored cruisers instead of one. The second could be a light version, with four 12in guns, 4in deck armor, 9 inch turret armor and a speed of 30 knots. This would have given them the extra 5 knots of speed and a heavier armor for scouting purposes. On the larger class, you could maintain 8 x 12 guns, reduced the speed and improved the armor protection as above. I don't know if this really solves the issue. I've completed a design with the above parameters for the light armored cruiser and it works in Springsharp. With the liberal government coming into power, I am not certain the light version would make the situation any better cost wise and strategically. I need to do more research on the costs. My springsharp cost is 2.683 million pounds. Invincible originally cost 1.750 million pounds, so I am not entirely certain it was economically viable.
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Post by ramjb on Sept 20, 2015 16:28:45 GMT -6
I've been wondering if the Admiralty shouldn't have designed two classes of large armored cruisers instead of one. Short answer, no. The battlecruisers existed the way they existed because Fisher was obsessed with the idea of getting the Royal Navy to accept his ideal ships as the capital ships, replacing the battleship alltogether. Separating the battlecruiser in two sub-classes as you mention would go against his most sacred believe: that armor didn't matter anything close to what speed mattered in naval combat. Also there's a little side problem here, and is that for naval gunnery it was estimated that the minimum broadside acceptable in an all-big-gun ship was of six guns. I doubt that any big ship with four main guns would've been accepted if only for that reason (but then again we're speaking of the navy that built the Courageous class, so everything's possible).
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Post by ramjb on Sept 20, 2015 16:53:27 GMT -6
In a period of financial constraint, the Invincible has the firepower to defeat anything afloat when she first commissions and providing she fights the way she was intended to, she will reasonably hold her own against the next generation, she will however eventually become obsolescent. Will she become obsolescent faster the Dreadnought or a repeat Lord Nelson or a repeat Minotaur? By 1916, was she more obsolescent than a Deutschland, or a Scharnhorst, or a Vermont, or a North Carolina? Well, that period of financial constraint saw the most spectacular growth of the Royal Navy ever seen. From 0 dreadnought type battleships and battlecruisers to the navy that fought at Jutland, in 11 years. I don't buy economical reasons as an excuse here. Or rather, I don't take the explanation as valid to lessen the failure the british battlecruiser concept was. Those ships weren't more armored not because of cost reasons (they were already more expensive than their battleship counterparts), but because of doctrinary reasons. The man who created the concept simply didn't believe in armor as long as the ship was faster than the opposition. And he was supported in that notion by quite many high ranking Royal Navy officers. And that concept has been proven wrong several times in naval history, the british BCs being a shining example of it, but not the only one (most italian WW2 cruisers come to mind here) As obsolescence goes: Well, this is not a matter of "block" obsolescence where the next generation of warships will make the current one obsolescent. It's a matter of current to-be opposite numbers within your same category and generation. You're creating a totally new weapon, then you must take in account what possible answers that new weapon will have to face. Because it will have to face them. And in this case it's obvious that the new weapon, the first generation battlecruiser, would soon have to face other first generation battlecruisers. Yet nothing was done to help with that possibility. And I simply don't take the explanation of "the opposition might have not answered". We're speaking the 1900s here, and we all know what kind of fierce fight there was to achieve naval and international prestige between the european powers (and soon to be joined by the americans) to believe that back then anyone would believe something as the Dreadnought or the Indefatigable would go unanswered. It'd been as good as admitting international defeat, and that's something no prestigious world power of the time would accept. You name the german previous politics in naval construction but by mid-1906 it was clear that they were taking the gauntlet thrown by the british with the commission of Dreadnought: the German Navy would also have their own dreadnoughts in short notice. It was an immediate answer that let clear the message that the Germans didn't want to be left behind in the naval race and that they were not giving up in their naval building program, by markedly stepping it up as an answer to a totally new class of ship Britain had just created. It was just obvious than when the second "new" class was unveiled to the world, they'd also give an answer to it. With that kind of knowledge, one had to be really blind not to see the Germans would answer the Invincibles the same way they answered Dreadnought. But here I'll be willing to give you a bit of room: the Invincibles had been laid down before Tirpitz was able to impose his views in the Reichstag to step up the german naval building program. However, they had just been laid down - and there was more than enough time to do a re-assessment of the design and modify it if required. But nothing was done. They were completed as designed because noone was worried. As I said, there hardly can be worse lack of foresight (not that is rare in military history, but still, a mistake is a mistake no matter similar mistakes have been commited in the past) For me that's quite bad but what's worse is what came later. The Invincibles were followed by the Indefatigables, which had an ever weaker protection layout, and which were started after Von der Tann had already been launched. If there's little excuse for the Invincible lack of protection, the Indefatigables simply have no saving grace. All in all again, my whole point is that the british BC concept was a dismal failure because it was grossly unbalanced in its weapon/protection relationship. You simply couldn't carry guns that size to the open sea in a warship and then protect it as if it was a much lesser ship. One thing history shows us is that ,if anything a capital ship built between 1905-1945 needed to be a good design, it was just that: being balanced in the firepower/protection relationship. Because all, without exception, ships which were unbalanced in that tradeoff were, without exception, mediocre ships or, in most cases, quite worse than mediocre. (Oh, and to answer your question: out of the ships you named, Dreadnought was not obsolescent by 1916 standards. It obviously was no longer the most powerful ship in the world but arguably was better than the german Nassaus - and the Nassaus weren't bad ships at all)
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Post by dickturpin on Sept 21, 2015 14:35:46 GMT -6
Well, that period of financial constraint saw the most spectacular growth of the Royal Navy ever seen. From 0 dreadnought type battleships and battlecruisers to the navy that fought at Jutland, in 11 years. I don't buy economical reasons as an excuse here. Or rather, I don't take the explanation as valid to lessen the failure the british battlecruiser concept was. Those ships weren't more armored not because of cost reasons (they were already more expensive than their battleship counterparts), but because of doctrinary reasons. The man who created the concept simply didn't believe in armor as long as the ship was faster than the opposition. And he was supported in that notion by quite many high ranking Royal Navy officers. And that concept has been proven wrong several times in naval history, the british BCs being a shining example of it, but not the only one (most italian WW2 cruisers come to mind here)However, the British Government did buy the reason and did not spend the money. Expenditure on warship construction excluding armament (million pounds): 1903-04 11.4 1904-05 11.6 1905-06 10.0 1906-07 9.1 1907-08 8.0 1908-09 7.6 For information, Dreadnought and Invincible were part of the 1905-06 estimate. You name the german previous politics in naval construction but by mid-1906 it was clear that they were taking the gauntlet thrown by the british with the commission of Dreadnought: the German Navy would also have their own dreadnoughts in short notice. It was an immediate answer that let clear the message that the Germans didn't want to be left behind in the naval race and that they were not giving up in their naval building program, by markedly stepping it up as an answer to a totally new class of ship Britain had just created. It was just obvious than when the second "new" class was unveiled to the world, they'd also give an answer to it.Yes they did, placing contracts for 4 Nassau and 1 Blucher; this represents a significant increase in expenditure and significantly more powerful ships than in previous years. It is unclear how knowledge of this fact would have been known by the British and considered in their procurement decisions in the previous year. (Oh, and to answer your question: out of the ships you named, Dreadnought was not obsolescent by 1916 standards. It obviously was no longer the most powerful ship in the world but arguably was better than the german Nassaus - and the Nassaus weren't bad ships at all)Dreadnought fired approximately half the weight of broadside of a Battleship of the 1910-11 programme (this does not make it half as good as the performance of the shells of the 1910-11 programme were capable of penetrating thicker armor). Dreadnought's armor protection was much inferior to that of a Nassau although it was much faster and fired a heavier shell (much like the difference between an Invicible and a Von der Tann in fact).
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Post by ramjb on Sept 21, 2015 17:04:09 GMT -6
The German naval program wasn't a secret. Budgets were discussed and approved in the Reichstag, and while the minute details of the ship designs themselves weren't discussed, the changes approved in the 1900 Naval Law (ships to be replaced after 20 years, enlargement of the Kaiser Wilhem channel and other infrastructures to support the operation of much larger ships, and the approval of a larger number of new ships) made quite clear that what the germans had coming wasn't a repeat Deutschland class precisely. That was by early 1906. By 1907 the british already knew most of the details of the Nassaus . And in 1909 Von der Tann was widely known to be a proper answer to the Invincible (after the messup of the Blücher). In fact their overstated it's capabilities,as can be cearly seen in the parts where Fisher mentions the new class of german battlecruiser in the minutes and letters of that year while discussing how the battlecruiser should evolve and why it should be much larger, faster, and more powerful armed (he mentions nothing about the armor, incidentally, but not accidentally) to contest this "new massive german threat", yet the Indefatigable went ahead no matter what with it's pathetically weak armor, so did her dominion-paid sisters. Which isn't surprising, as it's obvious to see that when Fisher saw german battlecruisers his answer was to build even faster, even larger, and even heavier armed battlecruiser of his own...but giving not even a second thought about the protection of those ships and how it would fare vs the german battlecruiser, because that, seemingly, was not a problem at all. As for Dreadnought, it's weaponry being underpar when compared with one of the 1910 superdreadnoughts doesn't mean it was obsolete or obsolescent. Otherwise pretty much everything in Jutland was obsolete except the Queen Elizabeths and the Revenges. Also it was faster not just than the nassaus, but than the Helgolands aswell. And obviously it wasn't as well protected as the german counterparts, but at least it had significant armor against battleship guns. Something the Invincible didn't have, and which is the whole point of my criticism towards it
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sam
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Post by sam on Sept 21, 2015 20:44:40 GMT -6
Great discussion. Just to add, from reading quite a lot of Fisher's writing (Although a while ago so forgive me if I have misremembered anything), the invincible class ships were never intended to fight other ships, at least on the high seas. The invincible class ships were intended to be used in a pre-emptive strike on the German Fleet at port (Before a declaration of war had been given, a pearl harbour like strategy). Fisher called this to "Copenhagen" a fleet, referring I believe to the 1807 Battle of Copenhagen. Fisher used the word Copenhagen as a verb throughout his writings.
After destroying the German Fleet at anchor, the invincible class ships would then bombard the German’s north coast to force their surrender (This is why they were designed with a shallow draft). The invincible class ships were designed for a surprise attack and coastal bombardment, not high seas fleet battles. From memory, I remember Fisher also came to believe that submarines had largely rendered large well-armoured capital ships obsolete. He proposed that the invincible class ships would avoid this fate by speed and the element of surprise.
(Edit) Sorry my fault, I was thinking about Fisher's designs for the HMS Incomparable, not HMS Invincible (I warned you, it was a while since I read his writing). This design had 20 inch guns, shallow draft, high speed and light cruiser armour. The HMS Incomparable was built for pre-emptive strikes and costal bombardment. The HMS Incomparable was the logical evolution, for Fisher, of both the Dreadnaught and Invincible. I remember Fisher prioritised speed and firepower above all else, largely because he also favoured pre-emptive strikes.
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Post by ramjb on Sept 22, 2015 0:38:34 GMT -6
yep, as you corrected yourself, the concept of the baltic "light battlecruiser" has little or nothing to do with the one which created the Invincibles and latter british battlecruisers. That was the concept behind some of the most laughable abominations ever launched (Courageous, Glorious and Furious), which were so useless even the Royal Navy didn't know what to make out of them once built. Tho they did make for good aircraft carriers, at least . The Battlecruiser concept was created for a totally different purpose. Explicitly Fisher "sold" the idea of them being heavy fleet scouts, able to do recon in force and wipe away the enemy light scouts in the meantime. Implicitly it's easy to see that Fisher actually wanted the battlecruiser to replace the battleship as the main capital ship of the royal navy (the same he was pushing for the armored cruiser to do the same with the pre-dreadnought battleship when he was CiC Mediterranean fleet). He just didn't believe in heavily armored but slow ships.
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sam
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Post by sam on Sept 22, 2015 1:29:13 GMT -6
Yes he certainly didn't. He considered speed and firepower paramount above all else. I guess the point I was trying to make is that the battlecruiser wasn't really what he wanted. It was the most he could get away with. What he wanted was much more radical, embodied in the Baltic battlecruisers. He wanted a port strike and coastal bombardment force that would bring a country to its knees, specifically Germany. I remember he had no time for the British army. For him the navy was the only British military force worth talking about. All his strategies involved the navy alone achieving victory (Although his alternative strategy for world war one involved amphibious landing by Russian troops supported by the British navy, the Russian millions he called them optimistically). He also regarded it as fully justified for Britain to destroy other countries' fleets in their ports without a declaration of war. For him this was the optimal strategy. Fleet battles would not be necessary under this strategy.
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Post by cwemyss on Sept 22, 2015 7:52:34 GMT -6
Re. HMS Incomparable.... 40k tons worth of national treasure, sunk into a project that required either A) pre-emptive strike before a war started B) total local superiority/control of the seas where it's used
It would have been fabulous in is narrowly defined role, and absolutely toast on day two of the war.
Concept designs are fun!
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 22, 2015 11:10:51 GMT -6
The Fisher Revolution has to be viewed within the international context that it was developed in, late 19th century and early 20th century. Weapons system are not developed and deployed in a vacuum. Economics and politics both internally and externally have a great deal to do with weapons systems.
Britain led the world in the industrial revolution, but by 1880 that lead had been reduced by its European partners. As of 1910, German had overtaken Britain in the output of pig iron and crude steel and was far ahead in the Chemical industries and electrical as well. England's industrial growth slowed as the demand for her products were reduced and by 1910 her share of the world trade had dropped by 14%. She did have a superiority in shipping and banking, but the production of wealth was deteriorating to the extent that her European neighbors felt they could challenge her.
This change in the financial conditions throughout Europe, also meant that nations like Japan, the US, Germany, Russia and France could now begin to improve and expand their navies. This was a direct challenge to the British. The pace of technological change also increased and this increased the cost per unit of the ships. This cost per unit increase, and what I would term, overhead expenses like more complete training to enlisted and officers in the area of machinery, and gunnery could be tolerated, except for the change in the navies developed by other nations like Germany.
If you are leading in the area of weapons development, you are on your own and your geostrategic position, financial condition and doctrine will have to guide you , especially if this is a revolutionary change that has never been tested in combat. This is where I believe the British were, in the first two decades of the Twentieth Century. As the pace of shipbuilding increased and the ships became larger, additional dockyards and repair facilities had to be developed. Larger fitting out facilities including larger cranes. In fact, there were dockyards on the Thames that were not capable of being improved, so facilities on the Clyde had to be developed and ships were built there.
These and many more factors, too numerous to enumerate and discuss here, pushed battleship development and large armored cruisers. The fact that England now had to import most of her food and supplies, made overseas commerce even more critical and the development of steam, torpedoes and the submarines put those increased overseas commerce under stress during wartime. In 1750 England exported 25% of her grain but by 1895 she had to import four-fifths of it from abroad.
To me, this scenario is what drove Sir John Fisher to try to revolutionize naval warfare and improve the efficiency of the British Fleet. He felt he had to meet the challenges of the changing international world. This is what drove the Admiralty to build the all big-gun dreadnought and large armored cruiser. I agree that speed should have been sacrificed to improve armor protection especially in the Indefatigable's. I have never understood why you would go backwards, knowing the direction of the other navies of the world. But we have the clarity of hindsight, the clearest vision in the world.
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sam
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Post by sam on Sept 22, 2015 13:28:43 GMT -6
Too right, Fisher saw the British Navy as Britain’s protector in an increasingly dangerous world. To him radical ideas were needed and technology was advancing at a rate of knots. The possibilities would have seemed far more open than we probably consider now. He also considered that any strategy would have to rely on the navy alone to strike a decisive blow on Britain’s enemies. I know we are getting away from battlecruisers and armoured cruisers, but this is the context they were designed in, not in RTW excellent ship designer. That said, I like the idea of Fisher and his German counterparts playing RTW, with politicians looking over their shoulders making unhelpful comments.
It is worth noting that Fisher was brilliant in the role of moderniser. The British Navy was only fit to fight on paper when he started his reforms. It is also worth noting that Churchill had his own adventure in trying to use the navy as a decisive weapon in the naval portion of the Dardanelles Campaign. Finally, considering the butchery that happened on land in World War One, radical ideas to end wars with naval power alone seem worth pursuing, at least at the time (Short version, Fisher wasn’t totally insane, but definitely a bit out there, especially towards the end).
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Post by dickturpin on Sept 22, 2015 14:38:10 GMT -6
In addition to the changing world it terms of economics and politics as mentioned by oldpop2000, the strategic situation had changed and entirely new challenges presented themselves. In addition, the balance of world naval power stood on the cusp of seismic changes which completely re-aligned the world order in 1904.
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, Britain had maintained a naval supremacy based upon the two power standard. Traditionally, the next two powers were France and Russia who formed a second division of naval powers. A huge gulf then existed to the minor naval powers.
The naval arms race around the turn of the century meant that by late 1904, the naval world order had completely changed. Germany and the United States had joined the second division of world naval powers, Japan (whilst allied to Britain) was establishing herself as a significant player and the development of Italy was complicating the balance of power in the Mediterranean. The British system of station fleets was coming under pressure as she could not maintain sufficient strength to counter all possible threats in all possible areas. The strategic situation that fascinated the naval historian A.T. Mahan of Britain losing her naval supremacy (as had occurred in the American War of Independence) was a real possibility.
At the same time, Britain was facing a severe financial crisis and political pressure for increased welfare spending; thus at a time in which she was facing a serious challenge to her preeminent status as the leading naval power, she was also facing pressure to curb and possibly cut naval expenditure.
This was the set of circumstances when John Fisher became First Sea Lord in October 1904.
The response to these changed circumstances was a realignment of the fleet to home waters. Old ships of questionable fighting value were scrapped to save money. The new class of Armored Cruiser was central to this strategic redeployment as the centrally held squadrons could be rapidly deployed to any potential trouble spot. The strategy was linked to a new communication net that allowed control from the center (as opposed to the semi autonomous station fleets) and new intelligence systems. The big gun Invincibles were intended to form the core of this strategic rapid deployment force. Fisher opposed the construction of Dreadnought as he believed that Battleships were becoming obsolescent and that home waters could be protected by flotillas of light craft.
With respect to the changing world order, Russia was suddenly relegated from the second division of world powers by her catastrophic defeat at the hands of Japan. The signing of the Entente Cordiale resulted in a rapid thawing of relations with France who did not respond to the building of the new big gun warships until 1910. The pace of naval construction in the United States also slowed and became highly centered upon the Battleship.
The nation that responded to the new types of warship was Germany. The Germans had previously lagged behind the French and Americans in the number of large armored warships that they possessed and they were also built to modest displacement; Tirpitz had an agreed number of units to build under the Naval Law but his chief concern was to construct these units within the agreed budget. The ships contracted in 1906 were both more numerous and much larger (proportionally in respect to foreign designs) than had been the case prior to this date.
Whilst not necessarily to the approval of Fisher, the procurement of large British ships switched to Dreadnought Battleships from the 1906-07 programme; this was because such ships were felt to be most appropriate to deal with the German threat. It was a further 3 years until another Battlecruiser was procured and this was the Indefatigable that we appear to have a consensus of opinion that this was not really a good idea (although it was a very low cost unit and was built in a year with a particularly constrained budget).
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