|
Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 22, 2015 14:57:37 GMT -6
I've read that as early as October1901 the Chancellor of the Exchequer had warned the cabinet that the continued growth in naval expenditures would lead " straight to financial ruin." The First Sealord Selborne at the same time stated that Britain should possess superiorities in vessels over the combined strengths of France and Russia by 1907. The successor Exchequer stated "I cannot help viewing with considerable concern the financial outlook,". Selborne warned the Admiralty in 1903 that they were "very near their possible maximum" in naval expenditures. This situation did not get better, but worse and more complicated. Fisher believed that he could reduce greatly naval expenditures with increased efficiency. It seems to me, that this was his overriding concern and that the changes in training etc. and the building of the larger, all gun battleships and large armored cruisers were focused on that purpose. He believed that he could build bigger faster capital ships within the naval budget using the latest technical developments and the Dreadnought and large armored cruisers were the result.
|
|
|
Post by ramjb on Sept 23, 2015 0:49:06 GMT -6
All those considerations are valid, true and solid, yet they forego something here.
Fisher wanted the battlecruiser because of the class' TACTICAL speed and weaponry advantage, not because the better strategic deployement options due to the higher speed. Had he been worried by the second he'd have pushed for ships with long ranges with good cruising speed. Instead he pushed for ships with high top speed, which is irrelevant for strategical redeployements.
I won't discuss Fisher's political prowess to make his point across opposition and worrying circunstances in a moment where british supremacy was under the risk of being challenged. He obviously was a very skilled political animal (otherwise he'd never have had his ships built) even while, probably for the better, he never fully got what he wanted in his first tenure as First Sea Lord (in the second he did and we see what he really wanted: Renowns and Courageouses, and no battleships. Not inspiring, at all). I don't discuss his exceptional nature either, Fisher was a very prominent man, brilliant in his own way and in many ways worth admiring.
But we're totally sidetracking ourselves here: The criticism the british battlecruiser concept receives is because it's glaring tactical weaknesses derived from the strong bets for high tactical speeds at the cost of low armor protection levels, and the final results derived from that bet once those ships were commited to a battle. While the strategic reasoning of Fisher was probably very solid and well founded, his tactical one was deeply flawed, and that was a key factor in why the three british BCs were lost at Jutland. Those ships didn't sacrifize armor for range, they sacrifized armor for top speed and battleship weapons. Those are tactical-oriented design compromises, not strategic ones, and thus, I think that the points raised in the past posts, while valid, true and very real, are inconsequential to the topic we were discussing previously: That those ships were a very wrong decision based on their tactical compromises, not on their strategic value.
|
|
sam
New Member
Posts: 4
|
Post by sam on Sept 23, 2015 2:05:36 GMT -6
Putting aside Fisher, I would argue that the battlecruiser's value, at least in world war one, actually came from their inferiority. Battlecruisers could operate independently from the main fleet because of their speed and were more expendable than dreadnoughts (At least in thinking of admirals, if not always in actual financial cost). As a result, battlecruisers saw more action in world war one than dreadnoughts. Without them I doubt Jutland would have happened, there would have been no bait to lure out the German High Seas Fleet. The German Battlecruisers were also able to cover the retreat of the High Seas Fleet because of their speed and being more expendable. Without battlecruisers, dreadnoughts might never have met in combat.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 23, 2015 8:02:18 GMT -6
You cannot perform an analysis of a weapon without examining the strategic and tactical concepts and doctrine that generated the requirements In all the analysis that I have participated in, on this forum in the past and in the books that I have had the honor of reading before publishing, this has been a vital part of any examination. I will say, that we should not have to dwell on the subject for long, just ensure that we all understand what conditions, prevalent at the time of generation of the requirements, contributed to the weapons design and implementation.
I will abide by the decision of all the participants in this discussion, if they all concur, then I will not discuss the strategic and tactical doctrine along with the financial considerations that led to the design of the large armored cruiser.
|
|
|
Post by ramjb on Sept 23, 2015 8:22:03 GMT -6
You cannot perform an analysis of a weapon without examining the strategic and tactical concepts and doctrine that generated the requirements And I have absolutely no complains about the strategic dimension to be brought on the table as a factor to justify the existance of those ships. On the opposite, it helps showing how multi-dimensional and far reaching the consequences of building a capital ship were in the day. I see no reason why anyone should stop bringing strategic considerations to the debate, at all, so by any means, if you think they matter, bring them to the table . In this case what I meant with my last answer is that the arguments about the strategical importance of the battlecruisers are both valid and solid, but still belong to a different realm than the one where the concept was flawed. Which is the tactical one. To have a weapon system that is going to take active part in tactical engagements (meaning, battles) you need to look beyond the strategic significance of the weapon and analyze it's actual usefulness in the battles it's going to take a part of. Because having something strategically important but that when pitched in battle is going to blow up is not that much better than having nothing at all to begin with. Besides, in the case of the british battlecruiser I don't see how the arguments brought up so far about strategical considerations help the case. The base problem is that those ships were conceptually created as they were because mainly of tactical reasons, not strategic reasons. It's all pretty clear in Fisher's minutes and letters explaining why speed was so important: he always mentions top speeds and how vital the tactical considerations of having a faster speed than the enemy while in battle. He never mentions fast redeployement times or anything that would make the battlecruiser more impactful than the armored cruiser as a strategic tool (other than the fact than the BC was a bigger ship with bigger weapons). If what Fisher was following was a highly redeployable weapon with very short transfer times and great strategic mobility he'd have pushed for a design with very long range at high cruise speeds. And that, he didn't do, and as a result, those, the battlecruisers didn't have. Did they have a strategic significance?. Of course they did. Did they exist because of strategic reasons?. My argument is :No. The battecruiser was created because of it's tactical role, not because of it's strategic role. What Fisher pushed for was for high tactical top speeds, not for high strategical cruise speeds and long ranges. Hence, the weapon is still inadequate in my eyes, given that tactically speaking they might have been fast but they also were disproportionally (for their size and cost) vulnerable. Was it possible to create a different battlecruiser concept for a much larger strategic significance?. Without a doubt, but the concept that the british came with didn't answer to that concept.
|
|
Deleted
Deleted Member
Posts: 0
|
Post by Deleted on Sept 23, 2015 9:51:02 GMT -6
oldpop2000 from our past discussions I somewhat thought you were a supporter of british warship designs, however I'm not sure the battlecruisers were worthy of standing up to as "the ones that got away". Even from the evolutions PoV they were going for a dead end... something simple drawn up like this My deepest impression ofc came from an SAI battle. My BCs were very low on ammo and came in contact with 2 Courageous class BCs. A few turns later I'm completely out of ammo and one Courageous was already dead. As a last resort I launched a flottila attack as a meanings to push them away. A while later to my amazement the other Courageous stopped moving. I thought it was a critical hit but post battle debrief showed it sank. All the small caliber hits from the light DDs and cruisers penetrated its thin armor, and it was like death by a thousand cuts!....
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 23, 2015 11:39:15 GMT -6
oldpop2000 from our past discussions I somewhat thought you were a supporter of british warship designs, however I'm not sure the battlecruisers were worthy of standing up to as "the ones that got away". Even from the evolutions PoV they were going for a dead end... something simple drawn up like this My deepest impression ofc came from an SAI battle. My BCs were very low on ammo and came in contact with 2 Courageous class BCs. A few turns later I'm completely out of ammo and one Courageous was already dead. As a last resort I launched a flottila attack as a meanings to push them away. A while later to my amazement the other Courageous stopped moving. I thought it was a critical hit but post battle debrief showed it sank. All the small caliber hits from the light DDs and cruisers penetrated its thin armor, and it was like death by a thousand cuts!.... I am still a supporter of the whole concept of all big-gun armored cruiser, with better speed. In three actions in WW1, they performed up to the requirements, in one battle, extenuating circumstances caused the armor protection to come into question. However, the Admiralty had already realized that issue and had made changes to the later designs. The large armored cruiser evolved, as do all weapons, especially new innovative ones. Lion was an improvement, not only in gun size but armor protection. The turrets now had 9 in and barbettes had 8-9 in. As with any new weapon, it must evolve. Look at Tiger, she now had deck armor up to 3 in., turrets had 9 in. She was hit 18 times and was the first of the battlecruiser to be repaired and returned to service. Sounds to me, like the Admiralty had learned that the original design, while effective could use some additional armor and the machinery was now developed well enough to give her that extra armor and larger guns, while giving her higher speeds. Again, evolution of the design.
|
|
Deleted
Deleted Member
Posts: 0
|
Post by Deleted on Sept 23, 2015 11:46:59 GMT -6
Well I leave the strategical and doctrinal discussions to you grognards as usual, however personally even using the later designs I don't quite feel so secure in capital ship level engagements with their lower level of protection. They cut up light forces just fine of course, or maybe even better due to their higher top speed. (except Courageous it seems tho but that one is quite extreme!)
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 23, 2015 12:02:26 GMT -6
Well I leave the strategical and doctrinal discussions to you grognards as usual, however personally even using the later designs I don't quite feel so secure in capital ship level engagements with their lower level of protection. They cut up light forces just fine of course, or maybe even better due to their higher top speed. (except Courageous it seems tho but that one is quite extreme!) In point of fact, there were officers and civilians in the Admiralty and government who would agree with you that the new ships did not have the armor protection that was required for combat. As long as the new ships kept to their missions they would be fine. But in warfare, that doesn't always work.
|
|
|
Post by dickturpin on Sept 23, 2015 15:25:39 GMT -6
Well I leave the strategical and doctrinal discussions to you grognards as usual, however personally even using the later designs I don't quite feel so secure in capital ship level engagements with their lower level of protection. They cut up light forces just fine of course, or maybe even better due to their higher top speed. (except Courageous it seems tho but that one is quite extreme!) In point of fact, there were officers and civilians in the Admiralty and government who would agree with you that the new ships did not have the armor protection that was required for combat. As long as the new ships kept to their missions they would be fine. But in warfare, that doesn't always work. Courageous and Renown appear to be somewhat different conceptually to the big gun armored cruiser. They represent part of an inshore fleet devised for a planned invasion of the Baltic for which they were designed with very shallow draft. Whilst sound in grand strategic terms, the whole operation and concept appears somewhat convoluted and muddled. I have just been reading about this in Friedman's Fighting the Great War at Sea. It seems somewhat odd to build such ships at great cost and with great secrecy and then not actually use them for the only operation that they were suitable. It appears that Churchill and Fisher had rival schemes and when Churchill's Gallipoli scheme was implemented, Fisher threw his toys out of the pram and resigned. skwabie's S&I encounter does not seem entirely unfeasible when using Courageous' in a conventional role; the 4 gun main battery is not particularly well suited to long range salvo firing, it is too overpowered to be effective against light forces and it makes a rather good target; big and not very well protected. NB: oldpop2000 - For myself, I am glad that you are continuing to contribute to this debate as your factual information enriches this forum in my opinion.
|
|
|
Post by mariandavid on Sept 23, 2015 15:32:16 GMT -6
Have just finished reading Friedmann's Brit Cruisers of the Victorian Era again and am now reasonably convinced that the characteristic features of the RN BC's - weak armour, heavy guns - had nothing to do with theory or plan. A BC was simply a late AC with the additional tonnage split between speed (plus 5 knots) and guns, though note that the additional tonnage of 8 12" turrets over innumerable 9.2" and 7.5" ones was not great. But the armour issue was simple - AC's had 6" armour so BC's obviously had 6". No more as their job was to find and fix, not duel with enemy B or BB.
|
|
|
Post by dickturpin on Sept 23, 2015 15:54:11 GMT -6
Have just finished reading Friedmann's Brit Cruisers of the Victorian Era again and am now reasonably convinced that the characteristic features of the RN BC's - weak armour, heavy guns - had nothing to do with theory or plan. A BC was simply a late AC with the additional tonnage split between speed (plus 5 knots) and guns, though note that the additional tonnage of 8 12" turrets over innumerable 9.2" and 7.5" ones was not great. But the armour issue was simple - AC's had 6" armour so BC's obviously had 6". No more as their job was to find and fix, not duel with enemy B or BB. Friedman's views on the big gun cruiser are detailed on page 278 and 279: " In 1905 the big armored cruisers still seemed to have battleship protection....as ranges opened 6in Krupp Cemented armor still seemed adequate". Thus they could duel but only if they kept the range long.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 23, 2015 16:22:12 GMT -6
In point of fact, there were officers and civilians in the Admiralty and government who would agree with you that the new ships did not have the armor protection that was required for combat. As long as the new ships kept to their missions they would be fine. But in warfare, that doesn't always work. Courageous and Renown appear to be somewhat different conceptually to the big gun armored cruiser. They represent part of an inshore fleet devised for a planned invasion of the Baltic for which they were designed with very shallow draft. Whilst sound in grand strategic terms, the whole operation and concept appears somewhat convoluted and muddled. I have just been reading about this in Friedman's Fighting the Great War at Sea. It seems somewhat odd to build such ships at great cost and with great secrecy and then not actually use them for the only operation that they were suitable. It appears that Churchill and Fisher had rival schemes and when Churchill's Gallipoli scheme was implemented, Fisher threw his toys out of the pram and resigned. skwabie's S&I encounter does not seem entirely unfeasible when using Courageous' in a conventional role; the 4 gun main battery is not particularly well suited to long range salvo firing, it is too overpowered to be effective against light forces and it makes a rather good target; big and not very well protected. NB: oldpop2000 - For myself, I am glad that you are continuing to contribute to this debate as your factual information enriches this forum in my opinion. My thanks for the compliment and no worries. I will continue to contribute. As one US sailor once said "I have not yet begun to fight". Just kidding of course.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 23, 2015 17:52:12 GMT -6
One of the problems that has to be consider about the large armored cruiser is that their fleet-scouting was compromised when the German's developed their own large armored cruisers with almost equal speed. There would be no finding the enemy then using your 4-5 knot speed to outrun them and lead them to the battlefleet. It was imperative that battlecruisers stay out of range of the enemy therefore they had to be able to engage the enemy force at a range greater than what the enemy battlecruisers could manage. Unfortunately, with the smaller range finders and a fire control system that was not capable of that kind of performance, the battlecruisers were now in a bit of a bind. Jutland seems to have brought that problem to the forefront. After the battle, if I remember, they did begin to improve the range finders and the fire control system as a whole.
The British were a little slow to understand this problem and hence, the later battlecruisers were not improved in the area of armor. Along with this problem, they were now to be used after scouting, to cover the wing of the battlefleet in a fleet action. Seems someone simply neglected these two problems, Beatty certainly did. The Grand Fleet Battle Orders in fact state the two missions of these ships. According to "The Rules of the Game", the light cruisers were supposed to take over the scouting role again and the battlecruisers withdrawn from service overseas. This was to happen in 1915. However, this would have relieved Beatty of a central position, in my opinion and he would not stand for that, is my guess. Services as I have indicated, are conservative(or supposed to be) and a little slow to react. I have first hand knowledge of their slowness to recognize a problem.
I thought this was interesting.
Source: "The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command" by Andrew Gordon
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 23, 2015 20:12:12 GMT -6
I was curious about the last two classes of armored cruisers, Invincible and Blucher, so here are some brief stats for comparison:
Minotaur Class - Completed in 1908-1909 Size: Length 490 feet pp 519 feet overall, beam 74 feet 6 inches, draught 26 feet, displacement 14,600 tons load.
Propulsion: 2 shaft triple expansion engines, 27,000 ihp, 23 knots Trials:
Defence 27,853 ihp = 23 knots Shannon 28,128 ihp = 22.41 knots
Armour: 6-3in belt, 7-3in barbettes, 8in turret faces, 1.5-0.5in decks
Armament: 4 x 9.2in Mk XI (2 x 2), 10 x 7.5in Mk II (10 x 1), 16 x 12ponder (16 x 1), 5 x 18in TT
Warrior Class - Completed in 1906-1907
Size: Length 480 feet pp 505 feet 4 inches overall, beam 73 feet 6 inches, draught 25 feet, displacement 13,550 tons load.
Propulsion: 2 shaft triple expansion engines, 23,000 ihp, 23 knots
Trials: Natal 23,344 ihp = 22.9 knots Achilles 23,968 ihp = 23.27 knots
Armour: 6-3in belt, 6in barbettes, 7.5in turret faces, 1.5-0.5in decks
Armament: 6 x 9.2in Mk IX (6 x 1), 4 x 7.5in Mk II (4 x 1), 26 x 3pounder (26 x 1), 3 x 18in TT
Invincible Class:
Size: Length 560 feet waterline 567 feet overall, beam 78 feet 9 inches, draught 26 feet 8 inches, displacement 17,420 load 20,135 tons full load.
Propulsion: 4 shaft Parsons turbines, 41,000 shp, 25 knots
Trials: Invincible 46,500 shp = 26.64 knots Inflexible 46,947 shp = 26.48 knots Indomitable 47,791 shp = 26.11 knots
Armour: 6-4in belt, 7in barbettes, 7in turret faces, 2.5-1in decks
Armament: 8 x 12in 45cal MK X (4 x 2), 16 x 4in (16 x 1), 5 x 18in TT
Here is Blucher class for comparison:
SMS Blücher
Size: Length 528 feet 6 inches waterline 530 feet 10 inches overall, beam 80 feet 3 inches, draught 26 feet 3 inches, displacement 15,590 load 15,250 tons deep load.
Propulsion: 3 shaft Triple expansion engines, 32,000 ihp, 24.5 knots Trials: 38,323 shp = 25.8 knots
Armour: 7-2.5in belt, 7in turret faces, 3-2in decks
Armament: 12 x 8.2in 45cal (6 x 2), 8 x 5.9in 45cal (8 x 1), 16 x 3.45in 35cal (16 x 1), 4 x 17.7in TT
I just though we should discuss the issues with actual data. This was the simplest method of retrieving it, but I have and most of you probably do also, more books with greater information. Does anyone see a radical change except for gun size in the British ships?
Source: www.worldwar1.co.uk/ww1-warships.html
|
|