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Post by woos13 on May 21, 2019 22:34:59 GMT -6
I suggest adding heavy strategic bombers to the RTW2, which would allow strategic bombing of enemy air bases, ports, and industrial facilities in strategic map mode, thus weakening the opponent's war capability.Ps: I'm sorry if this has already been mentioned
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Post by ramjb on May 22, 2019 0:05:55 GMT -6
You're the commander of the fleet. Your attributions in naval airpower extend to managing naval aircraft only.
Strategic bombing was the exclusive realm (and one they would do anything to keep it privative to themselves in exclusivity) of the Air Force; be it part of the Army, as was in the case of Japan or the US, or independent as in the case of the UK and Germany, that role was not in the hands of the Navy, and those who had that role would've made it sure it NEVER would be in the hands of the Navy.
Historically high brass on several air forces were able to literally kill carriers on their yards just by arguing those ships were intruding into Air Force exclusive roles and attributions or even plane ownership rights (See Graf Zeppelin or USS United States just to mention two cases), or denying planes to the Navy just by arguing the Air Force needed them more (See Bomber Command grabbing every four engined plane available in the UK in 1941-43 to use it to try to bomb Germany during the night, while Coastal Command was flying old dustbins trying to stop the U-boat onslaught from cutting off the nation from the rest of the world).
Strategic bombing is just out of the scope of the role you play. It just has no place within the frame of the game, I'm afraid.
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Post by woos13 on May 22, 2019 1:10:56 GMT -6
You're the commander of the fleet. Your attributions in naval airpower extend to managing naval aircraft only. Strategic bombing was the exclusive realm (and one they would do anything to keep it privative to themselves in exclusivity) of the Air Force; be it part of the Army, as was in the case of Japan or the US, or independent as in the case of the UK and Germany, that role was not in the hands of the Navy, and those who had that role would've made it sure it NEVER would be in the hands of the Navy. Historically high brass on several air forces were able to literally kill carriers on their yards just by arguing those ships were intruding into Air Force exclusive roles and attributions or even plane ownership rights (See Graf Zeppelin or USS United States just to mention two cases), or denying planes to the Navy just by arguing the Air Force needed them more (See Bomber Command grabbing every four engined plane available in the UK in 1941-43 to use it to try to bomb Germany during the night, while Coastal Command was flying old dustbins trying to stop the U-boat onslaught from cutting off the nation from the rest of the world). Strategic bombing is just out of the scope of the role you play. It just has no place within the frame of the game, I'm afraid. OK you are right! I just thought if Strategic bombing could takes the form of events beyond the player's control, or if player can spend prestige points advising the air force on bombing a specific target.This may enrich the gameplay |
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Post by thesovietonion on May 22, 2019 1:26:12 GMT -6
Not entirely true. The US navy for several decades was shifting itself to a strategic nuclear strike force against mainland Russia. This is seen in their requirement for catapults that could launch 100,000lb aircraft even when fighters at the time were less than a third of that weight.
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Post by ramjb on May 22, 2019 2:44:06 GMT -6
Not entirely true. The US navy for several decades was shifting itself to a strategic nuclear strike force against mainland Russia. This is seen in their requirement for catapults that could launch 100,000lb aircraft even when fighters at the time were less than a third of that weight. And that's precisely what ended up in Truman firing Forrestal as the head of the Department of Defense, naming Johnson instead for the spot, and the immediate cancellation of the USS United States, the subsequent Admirals Revolt, several congressional investigation commitees, the planned cutdown of Navy funding to a point where it could barely sustain it's active carriers and the foundation of the Air Force's long range strategic bomber force based on the B-36, based on the Air Force's assertion that conventional warfare was finished with the atomic bomb, and that they could drop bombs anywhere the US needed for a fraction of the cost that it would cost the taxpayer to build the carriers the Navy wanted (they claimed they could get 500 B-36s for the cost of a single United States CV). You do NOT want to mess with the Air Force by threatening to steal their priced role as strategic force. Certainly you didn't want to in 1949 USA. At one point there were even official statements that said the Marines had no reason to be anymore, that the Navy should hand over all their planes to the Air force, and that there was no need for a navy when the Air Force could protect the nation far better. (And this wasn't coming only from the Air Force PR department...Omar Bradley actually told the Congress comitee that island hopping was a thing of the past in the nuclear age and that as such there was no need for marines, nor a navy with carriers at all). Then Korea happened. Which pretty much saved the navy's bacon, as it completely dismantled the Air Force's claim that the days of conventional war were over and earned them back the support to re-start the supercarrier program, this time in the shape of USS Forrestal (and the name wasn't coincidental, Forrestal was who had tried to resist the cutdown on active navy assets demanded by Truman's planned budget cuts, instead ordering the United States class CVs in 1948 and had refused to resign when Truman asked him to, forcing the president to fire him instead). In the end Korea saved the navy because it not only vindicated the US Navy and the carrier usefulness, but it costed Johnson his job as chief of the DoD; Marshall was his substitute and obviously far more grounded in the realities of war. Still, many high ranking navy careers were cut short because of Johnson's reprisals after the Admiral's revolt (Arleigh Burke's own was only saved because of personal intervention from Truman, because otherwise he was done for), and the navy got the hint, they made very sure that they understood that the new supercarriers role as means of strategic nuclear force was a far second to the Air Force monopoly over the strategic nuclear forces in the shape of the long range bomber forces, soon to be SAC. The Navy finally got their wish later on when the SSBNs began being a thing,which clearly placed a huge part of the US strategic forces on US Navy hands - but the Navy also had to fight an open no quarters fight vs the Air Forces to see those submarines approved. It just happened that, unlike with the USS United States and in the middle of the cold war instead of in the middle of an accelerated demilitarization time as the one that held between 1945 up to 1950, they won that fight. |
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Post by ramjb on May 22, 2019 2:57:29 GMT -6
As an extra note, take a look at exactly whose arguments caused the UK to scrap their carriers in the 70s and give up on them, the kind of shenanigans the Royal Navy had to go through to get baby helicopter carriers with a full deck open (so they could operate the harrier there)...
and whose voice was the loudest in saying that giving up carriers wasn't that huge of a deal. Then, of course 1982 happened.
yup, you do nooooot want to enter a interservice fight against the air force, nor to compete with funds with them. Because they tend to win the arguments, no matter on how stupid grounds they do.
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Post by alexbrunius on May 22, 2019 3:09:29 GMT -6
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Post by ramjb on May 22, 2019 3:41:58 GMT -6
Ok, by order.
Operation starvation wasn't a "Loan" and it took Nimitz all his effort to pressure the higher chiefs to get the Air Force to do it. And it *WAS* a naval operation, within the attributions of a naval commander to petition. Had Nimitz gone to Washington with a list of strategic targets to bomb in Mainland Japan, they'd told him to shove his list where the sun didn't shine.
Okinawa wasn't a "loan" - remember that in 1945 the USAF didn't exist. It was USAAF. The second A stands for "Army". There were a lot of army troops involved in Okinawa, and the Air Force involvement was the result of the own Army generals demanding their air force supporting the invasion. The Air Force brass didn't like it one squat, but they were Army officers aswell and orders were orders (the same way the 8th Air Force hated the idea of stopping bombing germany to support the Normandy invasion, but had to end up swalling the pillow).
On to the other things:
-Coastal Command had to fight their guts and their liver for EVERY bomber they got, because Bomber Command was getting all of them. Bomber Command was flying freakin' Whitleys over the Bay of Biscay while Harris was sending Stirlings and Halifaxes over Germany - And the 4 engined "Strategic" bombers they got, when they did get them, were american. The B-17 they got because Bomber Command had tried them as bombers first and didn't like them (they were the early B-17C versions, not the far more up-gunned later E,F and Gs) and that only began being a trickle in 1942, and never many (relatively few Flying Fortresses flew under british colors).
The Liberators they got because of the very reason, Bomber Command wasn't interested in them because they considered the Lancaster a far superior night bombing platform (and given the liberator's temperamental handling because of the high wingloading, one can understand why).
And even those only began arriving in numbers in 1943.Please note how many Liberators flew in Bomber Command... or rather please note how many Lancasters. or Stirlings flew for Coastal Command. Both answers are the same: none. Bomber Command was rounding all of them up for their exclusive use in their exclusive role as exclusive british bombers of Germany.
Besides, those four engined bombers were used strictly in VLR missions over the atlantic and exclusively to hunt submarines. Not to bomb industrial targets (which is what a strategic bomber is supposed to do). Because Coastal Command didn't have the authority to do that - that was Harris' privative turf and he'd beheaded anyone trying to "steal" targets from his Bomber Command.
Now...the german Kondor...where to I begin.
First, those planes weren't flown by any navy organization, nor any "part of the airforce tasked with supporting the navy". Not at least if by "supporting the navy" you suppose the navy is going to have any say or word about how, when, or where those planes are going to be used.
Those planes were flown by Luftwaffe squadrons, under Luftwaffe command, and the only part where they Kriegsmarine was involved with them was in passively getting contact reports from convoys those planes located and attacked, or in telling them about convoy contacts made by the U-boats.
Neither Raeder (much less Dönitz) could even order them to attack a convoy spotted by a submarine - that responsability resided exclusively in the luftwaffe commanders wishes, thoughts and ideas. Cooperation was next to none.
So, yeah, I would hardly call that "acquiring strategic bombers". Now that's out of the way...the rest. Because there's more.
The Kondor...that thing was the 1940 version of what would happen if you put a couple bomb racks and a couple of machine gun sponsons on a Jumbo Jet and called it a strategic bomber. The Kondor wasn't a heavy bomber. It was barely a bomber at all, in fact. It was a purposefully designed passenger transport for long range passenger travel. It wasn't one of the "bomber fakes" that were tried to pass as commercial aircraft for the Lufthansa when they had actually been designed as bombers (such as the He111 was initially). It was a true, real, intentional, passenger airliner.
putting two racks and an underbelly bathtub with a 20mm cannon and a couple MG-17s didn't turn it into a "heavy bomber", much less a "strategic bomber". It was neither: a civil airliner pressed into emergency military service with some ad-hoc last minute adaptations that did little good to the performance of the plane.
In fact it was a quite problematic plane: the extra equipment taxed the airframe so much that the structure couldn't literally take it: a lot of them broke their back during landings. It was that bad.
The plane had huge range and the allies at the time had no means of protecting convoys against them, but the second MACs began being a thing, the Fw-200s dropped like flies before those hurricane's machineguns. And let's not enter on what happened once what was around were CVEs with Wilcats and not one-way-trip desperate measure catapults on merchants.
You could also have named the He-177, a plane that reached the squadrons on France by 1943 and that only were sent there because the Luftwaffe had no other use for flying zippos. Yet technically it was a "heavy bomber" (something the Fw200 was not).
Neither of those planes engaged in strategic bombing either - both were used strictly for antishipping purposes. And again, they were operated by the Luftwaffe without any say or word from the Kriegsmarine in the matter. Because, simply stated Göring would have no navy dude telling "his" planes what to do. Pretty much the same reason the Graf Zeppelin, had it ever been completed, would've sailed either with planes under CLEARCUT Luftwaffe independent command (which is obviously impossible in an operationally viable carrier)...or without planes.
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Post by alexbrunius on May 22, 2019 5:07:27 GMT -6
Your wrong about the bombers not being loaned to Nimitz to bomb airfields during Okinawa. I read Nimitz memoars and the Navy had overall command of the Okinawa operation + Kamikazes threatened the Navy not the Army. Sure he had to fight for it but the bombers were attacking airfields on his orders.
About the Navy not being in control:
How much control do you have over the airplanes on land bases in RTW2?
About as much control as the Naval organizations had over the real WW2 strategic bombers that flew missions against naval target, right?
No one here is asking to be able to base Strategic bombers on CVs. All that I am asking for is having strategic bombers that historically fulfilled alot of important missions against the enemy Navies represented in some way.
I 100% agree that bombing cities or the economy have no place in RTW2.
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Post by millsian on May 22, 2019 5:32:08 GMT -6
As I have mentioned on another thread most of the mines laid by raf were laid by bomber command on ‘gardening ‘ missions similarly Brest was bombed constantly by bomber command whilst the twins were there pre Cerberus
It’s a difficult one but does have naval implications
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Post by ramjb on May 22, 2019 9:41:30 GMT -6
Your wrong about the bombers not being loaned to Nimitz to bomb airfields during Okinawa. I read Nimitz memoars and the Navy had overall command of the Okinawa operation + Kamikazes threatened the Navy not the Army. Sure he had to fight for it but the bombers were attacking airfields on his orders. About the Navy not being in control: How much control do you have over the airplanes on land bases in RTW2? About as much control as the Naval organizations had over the real WW2 strategic bombers that flew missions against naval target, right? No one here is asking to be able to base Strategic bombers on CVs. All that I am asking for is having strategic bombers that historically fulfilled alot of important missions against the enemy Navies represented in some way. I 100% agree that bombing cities or the economy have no place in RTW2. To the first - bombing airfields is not strategic bombing. Is as tactical in nature as one can imagine. Strategic bombing goes for the enemy resources and industry. Airfields arent' either. The Okinawa bombing wasn't a strategic operation. It just used heavy bombers than until then had been bombing industries over Japan. Whole different thing. Nimitz could name the objectives, but it was the extent of his control. To the second- you decide the size of your airfields, how many squadrons, how big, and of which plane aboard them. You choose to either attack enemy ships or suppress enemy land bases. The "naval organizations of WW2" didn't call the shots in naming the airfields the Army Air Force (or the independent air force, depending on the nation) would use and which not, much less on which planes would the Air Force build and operate, much less in which numbers they were deployed. And certainly naval officers had no control over the air force at all, unless exceptional cases like the attacks during the okinawa preparation, and even in those cases their decisions were extraordinarily limited in scope and extent, and void of any strategic nature (they were airfield supression operations - tactical missions through and through). Finally, the mining offensive was akin to ground interdiction missions for air force tactical bombers - on land you attack bridges, railway yards, etc...on the sea you mine their ports. Once more, that's not strategic bombing. Now I think you're making some wrong assumptions based on planes and plane usage in-game and in reality. There was no such thing as a "strategic bomber" in WW2 with the possible exception of the B-29 (And not even that one, as it also was used in tactical operations, not just over Okinawa, from time to time). A bomber is a bomber. It can be four engined, but if you use it to support your troops on the field or attacking enemy airfields it's fullfitting tactical roles. Naval commanders of the time did have power and were allowed to make tactical calls for their bombers - even heavy bombers they might have under their command (There were naval versions of the Liberator, for instance, to use in long range ASW/antishipping/air-to-sea rescue missions...but they never bombed a japanese factory). If you ask to have the power to conduct strategic operations in-game you're essentially saying you want to be able to throw your bombers against factories and cities. Which naval commanders of their time had no attribution to do (Again, the naval version of the Liberator the Navy operated wasn't used to go and bomb mainland japan cities, and it had the range to do so since mid 1944, because that was a privative role of the Air Force). In-game you already can do what Nimitz did: Beginning of the game call for "supress enemy airfields", your bombers will go and bomb them. While I agree that maybe a tech for 4 engined bombers might be nice to have so farther bases also can throw planes into the attacks, that's the extent of control you're supposed to have as a navy commander. Basically if you agree that the player should have no call on bombing cities nor factories, you're agreeing that he doesn't should have a call on strategic bombing. I do agree that having an air tech for your land based medium and heavy bombers for mining enemy ports (something that wouldn't be done in the middle of a battle, it should happen on the strategic part of the game) would be neat - but I guess it would require quite far more effort to code, implement, and mesh into the game than the benefits of having such a secondary option would be. There are many things this game does not represent or fully abstracts for simplicity. We're talking about a 3 man team here, after all... and again, not even air minelaying would be considered strategic bombing. |
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Post by Procopius on May 22, 2019 11:26:25 GMT -6
And even those only began arriving in numbers in 1943.Please note how many Liberators flew in Bomber Command... or rather please note how many Lancasters. or Stirlings flew for Coastal Command. Both answers are the same: none. Bomber Command was rounding all of them up for their exclusive use in their exclusive role as exclusive british bombers of Germany. Lancasters were seconded to Coastal Command (61 Squadron, shortly after the type's introduction in 1942) but the results were poor, and at least one was shot down by a German tanker. After the war, of course, quite a few moved into Coastal Command, as did their baby sister the Shackleton. Arthur Harris absolutely loathed the Halifax and Sir Frederick Handley-Page, so Coastal Command did have permanently-assigned squadrons operating that type during the war. |
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Post by ramjb on May 22, 2019 12:21:40 GMT -6
Lancasters were appropiated by Bomber Command. As "poor" as the trials might have gone you can bet Coastal Command would've wanted more of those rather than keeping wellingtons or even whitleys flying over the Atlantic. Not that those planes were bad, they were good for what they were supposed to be, and the date of their design, but they just didn't compare with the capabilities the Lancaster had in what regards to range and payload over distance, two vital considerations for long range patrols over the north Atlantic.
As it was the "atlantic gap" could've been severely cut down in dimensions had the Lancaster entered service in numbers for Coastal Command in 1942. It wasn't until the Liberators arrived in enough numbers (which only happened by 1943) that the "gap" was closed. The Lancaster didn't have the max range the Liberator had, but it was far more than what Coastal Command was operating in 1942. The gap couldn't be closed in 1942, but could've been much smaller for months prior to the final arrival of the Liberator in big enough numbers had Coastal Command had the planes for the job.
Meanwhile Lancasters were flying night missions over Germany. It just so happens that those months were the height of the Battle of the Atlantic, which the allies came inches close to completely lose, and Coastal Command was still denied the planes they needed for the country to survive, just for Bomber Command to drop more bombs in forests and open country (until the introduction of radio navigation aids, and specially H2S, in 1943 the night bombing offensive killed a lot of rabbits but not much beyond that)
Halifaxes were indeed a different proposition - as you mention Harris had personal issues going on with the plane and the manufacturer so he didn't care for the plane, but that still didn't prevent Bomber Command appropiating most of them, again, at a time where the UK was struggling to survive the submarine blockade. Bomber Command wanted bombs over Germany and by gosh they'd drop them there no matter what and stepping over no matter who.
If that doesn't say enough...
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Post by Procopius on May 22, 2019 12:33:10 GMT -6
in 1943 the night bombing offensive killed a lot of rabbits but not much beyond that You couldn't be more wrong. 1943, until the shift to Berlin, was a very good year for Bomber Command. In his magisterial study of the Nazi economy, The Wages of Destruction, Adam Tooze writes: 1943 was the year of the Hamburg firestorm and the raid on Peenemunde which delayed the German rocket program as well. |
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Post by ramjb on May 22, 2019 12:46:11 GMT -6
Uhhh...I said "until 1943"?
1943 saw Gee finally coming into mass widespread use after it's rather slow incorporation into the service during 1942, and the use of Oboe and H2S, not to mention of german transmissions originally involved in their own night radio navigational aids over the UK as beacons the british used for their own navigation themselves. The german emitters didn't stop transmitting after the 1940-41 blitz was over and the british took good care in using them for their own purposes. (The british did that a lot: Fun story, a german radionavigation transmitter built on the spanish atlantic coast intended to help german planes over the Bay of Biscay and the Atlantic, placed in Galicia, was well known by british intelligence. They didn't bother protesting or acting against it - they used it for Coastal Command's radionavigation themselves).
All of those combined dramatically increased accuracy. Which wasn't hard given that until then british bombers were dropping eggs in the middle of open country, at numerous times not even close to the intended targets.
Going into 1942 there still was strong belief in the top Bomber Commander brass that navigation by stars was reliably getting them over the objective when it was not. And it was a true struggle for the intelligence sections to prove them wrong so they'd stop trying and instead push for electronic means of navigation.
During 1942 the whole "Star navigation is perfectly fine" BS was finally dispelled. At the same time the paulatine introduction of Gee helped thing out, and by the end of 1942 Oboe was in service (though Oboe had only limited range). Then H2S came.
Hence, UNTIL 1943 bomber command was mostly dropping bombs in the forest. During 1942 their performance improved immensely compared with 1940-41, but only as much as the relatively slow introduction of Gee allowed, and in total the bombers didn't achieve anything worth mentioning.
By 1943 however Bomber Command could pinpoint bomb spots in the darkness with such reliability and accuracy that made the daylight bombings by the 8th seem like randomly dropping bombs by guesstimation. From then on things were very different - but until that point they had been what they had been.
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