|
Post by steel selachian on Oct 31, 2013 18:26:26 GMT -6
I figured bringing up Iraq might be edging on the no-politics ban, but it's hard to argue that the amount of force we committed there hasn't hamstrung us in regards to responding to other threats over the past decade and put a lot of wear and tear on personnel and equipment. Points taken on the economic and potential strategic ties between Turkey and Russia, but I still see little reason to keep a CSG in that area if we're going to be limited to having two or at best three carriers on-station at a time. We may have to keep the supercarriers on the Indo-Pacific beat, perhaps transferring a CSG to the Med as needed if all is quiet in the Gulf/IO. Taking a tangent from this topic, what about the role of ESGs? Should we keep them committed to their primary mission of being floating bases for a battalion of Marines, or should we put more focus on using them as light carriers/ad hoc sea control ships? Might it be possible in some areas to load the LH up with a mixed F-35B/MH-60 airwing, keep the tilt-rotors, gunships, and transport helos at a forward shore base, and then swap air components out as required? If we could use them as light carriers, that might alleviate some of the pressure on the CVNs by allowing us to put 5 or 6 carriers on station at a time. Peripherally related, but an interesting article - www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2013/10/27/south-china-sea/
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 31, 2013 19:34:55 GMT -6
The Expeditionary Strike Groups main purpose is to provide amphibious forces, maritime humanitarian assistance and disaster relief along with contingency response missions. Now, enough of the mumbo jumbo. I believe that with that mission, the ESG should remain in its current composition. This maybe where smaller carriers with smaller air wings and UCAV's might be very useful. This group can be and should be supported during joint operations by USAF, Army and NATO forces both ground, sea and air. If we field a class of smaller carriers, we can remove the STOVL birds from the LHAs and increase the number of rotary wing aircraft possibly including some UCAV's for reconnaissance. My real problem in this area are the following birds: AH-1Z super cobras and CH-53E Sea Stallions. The first is one of the oldest birds flying into its third decade for the A1-W. It's time to find another helo for this job. The CH-53E started operational service in 1981. Its in its third decade. Mobility is the key to the success of amphibious operations. If you can react quickly with a small, well trained, well supported force, you can create situations that if you wait, will require massive force. I believe that the current ESG force structure and equipment is just fine except where noted. I still would like to have a couple of smaller carriers. But I must remind you that this area has been a source of conflict and totalitarianism for 4500 years. This fertile crescent region with its southward flowing rivers and relatively flat ground has been a pathway for migrations since early times. I don't have to remind you of the many empires that have governed the region. The Arab Spring which started in probably the area closest to the Western culture; Tunisia, is not over and will probably keep this area in turmoil. You can't fight geography and ethnicity. NATO will be in the region for the foreseeable future. www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/15/us-oil-pira-idUSL1N0I51IX20131015 - This change will affect the geostrategic situation in the Middle East. As we have said, nations act in their own self-interest. We may not need CSGs and ESGs in this region, because NATO and Europe needs this oil and gas far more than we do. Let them take the burden of intervention.
|
|
|
Post by steel selachian on Nov 2, 2013 15:44:09 GMT -6
The main issue I see with the AH-1 isn't so much the age - the Zulu models are a mix of rebuilt older birds and new production - it's the lack of range and speed. They're slower and shorter-legged than the MV-22, and in a landing operation I assume they'll need a forward arming and refueling point to be effective. What I'd like to see - either as a development of the model 609 civilian tilt-rotor or a variant of the Army's new Future Vertical Lift competition - would be a new gunship that can accompany the MV-22s. If the performance and payload are good enough the Marines might be able to pull the F-35Bs from the LHD/LHA decks unless they expect heavy air defenses. As far as the CH-53Es, those are due to be replaced with new-build CH-53Ks in a few years. Much shorter legs and much slower than the MV-22s, but the extra payload capacity can come in handy.
On to the idea of smaller carriers - any thoughts on size, capability, numbers? Where is the break-even point between something you can build in meaningful numbers and a vessel that's significantly less capable (in terms of speed, survivability, airwing size, and combat endurance) than a 100,000 ton CVN but not much less expensive to design and build? For instance, the UK is currently building two 70,000 ton Queen Elizabeth-class CVs at a projected program price of £5.9 billion, or according to my calculations about $9.145 billion. That's with no catapults and arrestor gear, no nuclear plant, an airwing of no more than 50 fixed- and rotary-winged birds, and a top speed probably not much exceeding 25 knots. The Ford set us back about $14 billion, an estimated $5 billion of which was nonrecurring R&D for things like EMALS, the new reactor design, etc. Granted, we can probably argue that the QE is something of a kludge and in the States we could turn out something considerably better for the money - i.e., something a carrier group commander would not gladly trade two of for a big-deck CVN.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 2, 2013 18:31:20 GMT -6
The real issue is the size of the LHA and the size of the corresponding birds that it has to support. The LHAs were designed with the well deck eliminated to leave more room for the aircraft. Now the ship is not optimized for its primary mission; landing amphibious armored vehicle, hovercraft and other Marine landing craft. It can be done, but it is not easy. The A-1 Cobra is still used because it is small and light, both qualities needed for carrier operations. Unfortunately, small means small engines with less power, and less fuel which translates to shorter range. This means that the LHA has to get closer to shore to fly off those helicopters. The LHA is, in fact, a large carrier by European standards and only a little smaller than the Russian Varyag now in Chinese service.
With the well deck restored as of LHA-8, the ships will have smaller hangers and actually smaller well deck. The redesign of the island means more deck space and now the MV-22s can be maintained on the deck. I am certain the kids will love that. There is no real solution as all designs both ship and aircraft are compromises. The Marines cannot get a better, larger attack helo with increased range and ordnance capacity and possibly stealth until it either gets larger LHAs or eliminates Marine fixed wing. Either doctrine has to change or the fly with what they have.
As to the smaller carriers, its easy. Simple use the America designed LHA, remove the well deck, angle the flight deck, add catapults and presto, now you have a medium size attack carrier. It would now be compatible with Marine LHAs and maintenance would be easier.
|
|
|
Post by steel selachian on Nov 2, 2013 21:18:44 GMT -6
I would imagine the LHA-6 design would require a large amount of reworking for CATOBAR ops. Angled flight deck, reduced island structure, catapults, arrestor cables, probably a redesigned power plant, and possibly a new hull for higher speed. At that point you're not really saving much time and money over a clean-sheet approach.
The reason I suggested using the LHDs/LHAs as makeshift light carriers is that 1) it is a secondary mission of the original design, and 2) we have the ships in the inventory now as opposed to having to design and build them. In Iraq they saw more use as Harrier carriers than in landing troops. If the MV-22s and CH-53s could be offloaded to other platforms - say, a shore base or an MSC prepositioning ship - they could be kept nearby while the LHD/LHA takes on extra F-35Bs and an MH-60 detachment and swapped out in case there's a need for a landing operation.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 2, 2013 22:26:14 GMT -6
I would imagine the LHA-6 design would require a large amount of reworking for CATOBAR ops. Angled flight deck, reduced island structure, catapults, arrestor cables, probably a redesigned power plant, and possibly a new hull for higher speed. At that point you're not really saving much time and money over a clean-sheet approach. The reason I suggested using the LHDs/LHAs as makeshift light carriers is that 1) it is a secondary mission of the original design, and 2) we have the ships in the inventory now as opposed to having to design and build them. In Iraq they saw more use as Harrier carriers than in landing troops. If the MV-22s and CH-53s could be offloaded to other platforms - say, a shore base or an MSC prepositioning ship - they could be kept nearby while the LHD/LHA takes on extra F-35Bs and an MH-60 detachment and swapped out in case there's a need for a landing operation. The America class was designed with an 8:1 LtoB ratio which is optimal or you start having hogging and sagging problems and place undo stress on the hull. The beam is set to allow the ship to pass through the Panama Canal. So, for a forward deployed carrier designed to provide fixed wing air support to the Marine Expeditionary Forces, its tailored made. It doesn't have to be faster than the LHA they are accompanying. This force can be deployed in regions; enclosed seas, littoral zones and any brown water environment where you would not want to risk a supercarrier. Remember that we have a precedent in the Libyan operation where the Kearsage provided air support in lieu of a supercarrier which was not available. The concept worked just fine.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 3, 2013 8:11:33 GMT -6
Here are some numbers to kick around about large deck carriers and their value. The last Nimitz class carrier was priced at $7 billion dollars for a sortie rate of 120 per day. The new Ford-class carriers have a price tag of $13.5 billion roughly and an increased sortie rate of 160 sorties per day. But sortie rates can be deceptive.
Looking at the life-cycle costs of an F-18 Hornet compared to a Tomahawk is impressive. This works out to $7.5 Million dollars per bomb whereas the Tomahawk costs are a conservative $2 million dollars. Life-cycle costs consist of the initial cost of the aircraft, in this case about $50 Million for older F-18s, pilot training and of course; fuel, spare parts and maintenance which adds up to a conservative $60 million dollars. The estimate based on real figures is that an F-18 spends about 20 percent of its 8600 hours in combat. That figure is arrived at by using the figure of 650 hours per month for squadron flight hours on deployment. Transit time to the target is generally about 30 minutes. Estimates are that the Navy in the past has expended 16,000 air-to-ground weapons in ten year periods. Figures are difficult to determine as they are kept close to the Navy. Now, the F-35 will cost approximately $162 million dollars per bird to procure. This does not include pilot training, fuel, spare parts and long term maintenance. So, what is the life-cycle costs? Well, the plane is three times more expensive but, using the same ratio as the F-18, it will cost about $30 million in life-cycle costs. So, the total cost over time is about $192 million dollars. This is very rough, most later aircraft are far more expensive to maintain.
We can throw numbers around all day and never arrive at a sound conclusion. But it appears that the handwriting has been on the wall for a long time. We don't need large deck carriers, we need lots of medium deck carriers integrated into the Expeditionary Strike Groups along with the LHDs and LHAs. If we have an operation that does not involve boots on the ground, then we can move to TLAMs and SLAMS.
Carriers in one form or another, have been around almost 100 years. By the time of the demise of the Fords, it will be close 150 years. Large deck carriers have arrived or will arrive at the same point as the battleship. Too expensive to risk which means they are relatively useless except in certain situations. We need to put more emphasis into the UCAVs and land attack missiles. We need smaller carriers, with smaller electronic footprints, less expensive and easier to maintain. Economics is always a player in military technology.
Naval warfare has now arrived back at its roots; enclosed seas, littoral zones etc. Most of the famous sea battles took place in these kinds of waters. Blue water combat is an aberration. Large oceans are simply pathways to the areas where naval combat has traditionally taken place. We need to adapt to it.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 3, 2013 16:38:31 GMT -6
Here is some more stats to help us discuss the issue of medium versus heavy carriers. Current air wing sizes: CVW-1 44 combat / 58 total CVW-2 46 combat / 70 total CVW-3 45 combat / 66 total CVW-5 46 combat / 67 total CVW-7 44 combat / 59 total CVW-8 44 combat / 70 total CVW-9 44 combat / 75 total CVW-11 44 combat / 67 total CVW-14 46 combat / 55 total CVW-17 44 combat / 59 total When the Nimitz class was first deployed, the air wings had over 81 aircraft. The new Fords will be reduced even further. We are fast approaching the point where a medium size carrier might just be much more cost effective on a per air wing cost. Combat radius of the E/F Hornet is 300 nm, the F-35 is 400 nm. The A-6 Intruder had a combat radius of 1000 nm. External stores capacity of the A-6 was 18000 lbs whereas the Hornets is 17,700 lbs. The F-35 is 3000 lbs. Yes, the weapons are more accurate so they need less but its the overall capability versus overall cost. Keep in mind, the air wing is the most important not the carrier size. However, the defensive missiles currently being deployed have ranges far in excess of our birds. Air refueling is a slow, and hazardous process. It slows down the mission timeline and can jeopardize the attack groups by having a slow moving, tanker being identified by long range radar. Here are some interesting comparisons for discussion - www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?144822-Large-aircraft-carriers-compared
|
|
|
Post by steel selachian on Nov 3, 2013 22:58:01 GMT -6
The question is, are those airwing reductions because the carrier can't handle more, or we aren't purchasing the aircraft numbers we used to? To me, that's the value of the larger carriers - these vessels remain in service for 40-50 years; a lot can happen in that time period. Having a big flight deck on a fast hull gives you a lot of flexibility to adapt - whether it be adopting a newer and larger aircraft or changing up the composition of the airwing on short notice. What doomed the battleships is that they couldn't adapt - unless you wanted to tear the thing apart and rebuild it, you were pretty much stuck with the original main battery guns. Tough luck if the other guy builds one that can fling shells farther; in WWI dreadnought classes became obsolete a few years after they hit the water. With a carrier, stick a stealthy UCAV with a 2000 nm combat radius on the deck and a 1980s-vintage carrier design is now the deadliest modern weapon on the field. For that matter, you have the option of adding more aircraft or doing something off the wall like putting an Army aviation brigade aboard. On a small deck, you're stuck with the smaller capacity.
As for the America CV idea, fine, it'll keep up with the amphibs - but we already HAVE nine baby carriers that we paid for, specifically to provide ESGs with air support. They just happen to carry Marines, troop helos, and landing craft as well. I'm more concerned that their capability to support CATOBAR aircraft is going to be crippled. Unless you up the speed to at least 25+ knots or have a very good wind over the deck, good luck getting a fully loaded 65,000 pound strike aircraft off, leaving it with enough gas to go somewhere, and then landing it with reserve fuel and ordnance. Modifying that design for fixed wing ops is going to be a big undertaking. The RN found out that adding catapults to one of their QEs would double the cost of the ship, making it as expensive as a Ford. Redesigning the LHA-6 hull into a CATOBAR carrier might not save you much money over a CVN. And even if we can build more, they'll conversely be more vulnerable to being mission-killed or lost and I doubt commanders will be any more willing to put them at risk. This is no longer WWII when we can afford to lose a few CVs per year. No sane commander is going to operate it in a littoral hot combat zone with AShM, mine, and coastal submarine threats.
As far as naval warfare going back to its roots in littoral and enclosed seas, I'm not so convinced. We may well see the next generation of carrier aircraft, particularly UCAVs, conducting combat missions at ranges of thousands of miles. It's only been in the past 70-80 years that we've seen naval combat take place at ranges beyond the horizon. It's no longer a world where you line your capital ships up in a choke point and dare the enemy to come out and fight through face-to-face. Littoral warfare is an element of modern naval operations, but we should not expect all fighting to take place there. In a conflict with a capable enemy, we should not try to go in and slug it out on his terms and on his turf - we should hit him from a range he can't fight back from, i.e. stay out in blue water and turn the littorals into a kill box. We are going to do a lot of day-to-day work in low-intensity littoral combat zones, but those are jobs for the LHDs and LHAs along with the DDGs and LCSs. We do not need a new carrier class tailored for that job. What we need are carrier birds with longer legs - it might be a bit easier to replace a lost 40,000 ton CV than a 100,000 ton CV, but it is a LOT easier to replace a few aircraft.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 4, 2013 11:25:46 GMT -6
I going to take one paragraph at a time, it helps me to focus . There is no doubt, the Nimitz and Fords could carry more aircraft. The Fords will have the capacity for 85 aircraft. Will they carry that many? Only if the air wing is filled out by UCAVs, other than that, I doubt if the air wing size will be larger than the current sizes for the Nimitz.
Why? Cost of the extra aircraft is certainly a factor. However, its the operating cost that gets the services. Once the budget for an aircraft is established, that's it. After that, its the recurring cost-- the Navy calls it OM&N, or operations & maintenance Navy--- that really causes the problems. If you place more aircraft on the decks, you have more pilots to train and maintain, more fuel, more ordnance and maintenance spare parts along with trained maintenance personnel. This is crippling if suddenly you have an incident in the world requiring combat operations because suddenly OM& N goes through the roof and now, you can't buy more aircraft for that year, deploy more ships etc.; funds have to be transferred from research and development to OM&N. Everyone loses including future operations.
However, there is another issue that gets missed. As a fleet commander in the 21st century, I don't want all my limited number of eggs in one large, vulnerable basket. I don't want my air support dependent on one large, radiation generator and target for even small boats. I want my eggs spread around, so that if the unfortunate happens, I still can conduct air operations satisfactorily. This is reality, not Fleet Command. There are people on those ships, our people and I don't want them risked unnecessarily. This is my one big criticism of our wargames, they do not calculate how many casualties occur by combat action, display them and make the game player suffer a penalty. This is the reality of actual combat.
I have never worked on an operational carrier at sea, so I am limited in my view. My advantage is that I know what those aircraft cost to repair and the problems that arise from flight hours in combat. You and I are both working with limited information. Unless someone on the forum has been in a command position on carriers, we are at a disadvantage but our ideas, however, they differ, are still valid. IMO.
EDIT: Here is a question that needs to be answered: if we add 20 more fixed wing assets, to the current air wings, what does that do for sortie turnaround time, ease of maintenance and most of all, safety?
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 5, 2013 10:31:58 GMT -6
I am not as concerned about extra costs to build the ship, using previous designs, equipment can save us some money. What is more important is to save as much on Operations & Maintenance and providing theater commanders with some flexibility. The supercarrier can provide theater wide surveillance, ASW and BARCAP for the ESGs. The America class LHAs will cost about $2.6bn per ship, the Fords, at least the initial CVN-78, will cost upwards of $11.7bn. We do not have any actual operating costs to compare the two, but they have to be different. If these smaller carriers are a success, maybe foreign sales will present themselves.
Operationally, we have two types of situations to prepare for and we have to decide which one is most probable. The two are a major war and the other is low intensity conflicts. We know that most of our conflicts will either be in the extended Fertile Crescent or Far East. Possible major naval adversaries are Russia and China. Russia is still searching for a warm water port, not enclosed by opponents and China is building a major blue water navy, something she hasn't had since 1405-1433 but attitudes and geostrategic changes over time.
Minor naval powers are many but mostly friendly. Iran is an opponent, but has very limited capability. I think we have a good idea of possible minor opponents and their location. What will happen in the future is not really possible to determine. We know that most our operations will be in enclosed seas, and littoral zones but there might be some blue water operations. So the issue now becomes which one of the two regions of the worlds oceans do we plan for as our major operational area; enclosed seas and Littorals or blue water. The consensus of experts is the latter. It is the traditional area of the ocean where most naval operations take place because navies support land operations. I don't believe there is any argument about that. However, does that mean the elimination of the supercarrier? Of course, not but maybe their role has to change and hence, the air wing composition. What that should be, possibly should be a subject of discussion.
|
|
|
Post by steel selachian on Nov 5, 2013 21:15:46 GMT -6
OM&N is what I figured for the lower airwing numbers - the big Cold War airwings were largely due to the number of single-mission aircraft and a heavy emphasis on fleet air defense. You that 24 F-14s that were there just to shoot down other airplanes, 24 A-7s that were there to bomb things, 10 A-6s that were the longer-legged heavy hitters, another 4 KA-6 tankers, S-3s, SH-3s, EA-6s, EKA-3s ... when the backbone of the airwing shifted to the F/A-18s a lot of those roles were combined into one airframe. You could deliver the same amount of bombs to the target and cover the air-to-air mission with fewer aircraft, and with the Super Hornet the tanker role had a less capable but more flexible solution. The H-60s did the same for the ASW role. With that said, the option to put more aircraft on still exists - say, if there's a spare airwing (from a damaged CVN or one in overhaul), the assets can be split between two CVNs in a pinch. Or you could reinforce the airwing with some Marine aircraft (an option that will go away unfortunately once the F-35B replaces the last of their F/A-18s and EA-6s) or even allied carrier-capable birds.
The idea of splitting your assets between smaller decks is something I can go either way with. It's a sound concept; however I can also favor the old saw of putting your eggs in one basket and then making that basket a real bear to crack. You can assign more surface escorts and may not have to hold back as many aircraft for fleet defense, freeing up more for strike missions. As I recall, in WWII we took that route with carrier task groups, which had three or four flattops per group. Overall it strikes me as something where either course might be best, depending on certain circumstances and how good a commander is at handling the advantages and disadvantages of either strategy.
Air wing composition would be a good topic to shift to, both in regards to the US plan (a mixed high value fighter/attack and long-range strike/ISR UCAV wing) and how other navies are building their air wings. Perhaps we could discuss any indications we have regarding the direction of Chinese naval aviation - whether they might follow the Russian model of an air defense/ASW ship to provide an umbrella for surface warships and amphibs, or if there are any inklings of them going for the US model of a strike-oriented airwing.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 5, 2013 22:28:05 GMT -6
OM&N is what I figured for the lower airwing numbers - the big Cold War airwings were largely due to the number of single-mission aircraft and a heavy emphasis on fleet air defense. You that 24 F-14s that were there just to shoot down other airplanes, 24 A-7s that were there to bomb things, 10 A-6s that were the longer-legged heavy hitters, another 4 KA-6 tankers, S-3s, SH-3s, EA-6s, EKA-3s ... when the backbone of the airwing shifted to the F/A-18s a lot of those roles were combined into one airframe. You could deliver the same amount of bombs to the target and cover the air-to-air mission with fewer aircraft, and with the Super Hornet the tanker role had a less capable but more flexible solution. The H-60s did the same for the ASW role. With that said, the option to put more aircraft on still exists - say, if there's a spare airwing (from a damaged CVN or one in overhaul), the assets can be split between two CVNs in a pinch. Or you could reinforce the airwing with some Marine aircraft (an option that will go away unfortunately once the F-35B replaces the last of their F/A-18s and EA-6s) or even allied carrier-capable birds. The idea of splitting your assets between smaller decks is something I can go either way with. It's a sound concept; however I can also favor the old saw of putting your eggs in one basket and then making that basket a real bear to crack. You can assign more surface escorts and may not have to hold back as many aircraft for fleet defense, freeing up more for strike missions. As I recall, in WWII we took that route with carrier task groups, which had three or four flattops per group. Overall it strikes me as something where either course might be best, depending on certain circumstances and how good a commander is at handling the advantages and disadvantages of either strategy. Air wing composition would be a good topic to shift to, both in regards to the US plan (a mixed high value fighter/attack and long-range strike/ISR UCAV wing) and how other navies are building their air wings. Perhaps we could discuss any indications we have regarding the direction of Chinese naval aviation - whether they might follow the Russian model of an air defense/ASW ship to provide an umbrella for surface warships and amphibs, or if there are any inklings of them going for the US model of a strike-oriented airwing. As geopolitics changed, so did missions and objectives. This meant changes in air wing composition. With no credible threat from the Soviet Navy, the requirement to shootdown large maritime bombers like the Bear, Backfire, and Blinders disappeared. In the old wing structure, there were 36 attack aircraft, we now have about 50. The fleet defense has been supplemented by Aegis cruisers and the fact that there isn't much of a threat from bombers. With smart bombs, we can now strike more targets, once, rather than have to go back like we did in Vietnam. Operational objectives have changed and so has the technology. My problem with the procurement of the Fords is that their costs will eat up the shipbuilding budget which means we won't be able to buy the smaller ships that we desperately need to protect both the ESGs and CSGS. We tend to focus on the big boys and forget that destroyers, cruisers etc. won all the wars. We need those Zumwalts and LCSs but I am afraid that the budgets won't be there for them so the Fords will have to be protected by older, less capable ships. One of the thoughts that I've had was that the limitation of the air wing size may have something to do with a lack of electrical power, heating, cooling. As to the air wing composition, it must evolve to a position where there are only 5 different models of aircraft with a like number of different engines. The more aircraft of different types, the more complicated O level and I level maintenance becomes, believe me. The parts, manuals, engineering expertise all become complicated. This translates to cost increases, which increases OM&N. We need commonality in our parts, reduction of different types of aircraft provides that. I worked on two types of F-4s, F-14s, E2Cs, F-18As and there wasn't a whole lot of commonality. You talk about the old air wings. The A-7 had a different engine from the A-6s, so did the F-14s and of course the E2s had turboprops to confuse the issue. The helos each had different engines. The one commonality was between the E2s and C-2 Greyhounds. KA-6s and A-6s were common so that helped. Don't forget the S-3s, which also had a different engine type. It was complicated then, I can't imagine doubling that number of different birds each with a different set of test sets to use on the avionics, it must be fun. EDIT: I ran across this map in online Aviation Week. This might be a good basis for discussions. www.aviationweek.com/Portals/AWeek/media/PDF/Defense/DTIConflictMap2013.png
|
|
|
Post by steel selachian on Nov 5, 2013 23:52:30 GMT -6
Well, the current near-term plan is to neck down to four airframe/engine pairs for the entire airwing - the F/A-18E/F, F-35C, E-2/C-2, and H-60. We'll see how that changes when and if the UCAVs and the proposed F/A-XX hit the fleet way down the road.
As far as the Fords, we'll have to see what the payoffs are for the investment. Parts of the extra upfront construction costs are supposed to lower the lifecycle cost, improve sortie generation, and provide room for expansion (particularly with the electrical system, which will come in handy when we start seeing laser-based antimissile systems). That may be worth an extra few billion per hull. As to the cruisers and destroyers, their primary contribution since 1943 has been escorting carriers, convoys, and amphibs. I'm not sure how much use the Zumwalt will be for that. I get the feeling it is more valuable as a technology demonstrator. It's optimized for ground-pounding, not defense against AShMs, which makes it of low value as a carrier escort. The sonar suite is supposed to be an improvement over the DDG-51s in the littorals but less effective in blue water; however I have a hard time seeing a Navy commander risking one of those things in a littoral knife-fight with diesel subs and minefields. LCS is going to be a platform for low-intensity conflicts, not a carrier escort. Those ships are meant to go in places where it isn't worth sending a carrier. The newer DDG-51s are still coming off the lines, with the Flight IIIs expected in about a decade; those will be the carrier's defenders and we have a number to go around for the CSGs and ESGs.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 6, 2013 11:42:45 GMT -6
Let's take a step back and see where we have come from. The old air wing composition was designed for ASW, IAMD, AAW and SUW. Those are antisubmarine warfare, integrated air and missile defense, antiairwarfare, surface warfare and strike. The mix of aircraft was designed to facilitate those missions. With demise of the Soviets, those missions are not as important, but some are. The air wing was a very expensive and "luxurious" collection of aircraft. We cannot afford such luxuries anymore, as per CNO in a document this year.
Here is the list that I feel are important, in order of priority: strike, SEAD, ISR and ASW. The mix of F-18E/F, F-35s, EA-18 Growlers and E2D Hawkeyes, while not as "luxurious" as the previous editions of the carrier air wing are still high end vehicles. These are short legged vehicles, with limited capacity and this is a limitation. Those vehicles do not have ISR and that must be provided for their strike packages to be successful. I agree with the naval analysts that the UCLASS is the preferred package over manned, expensive and short legged vehicles. The unmanned carrier-launched surveillance and strike system holds the key to the future and its development should be accelerated. This vehicle can make the smaller America type carrier a much more effective package and relieve the super carriers of this responsibility. Estimates are four UCLASS per air wing. Maybe we can increase this to eight in the future.
So, what is the mix if we add the UCLASS: here is my view.
4 - E2Ds for AEW 4 - SH-60s for ASW with dipping sonar. 2 - C2 Greyhounds for COD 4 - EA-18Gs for EW 12 - F-35Cs for interdiction and SEAD missions in high threat areas 4 - UCLASS - Should be a total of 8. 24 - F/A-18E/F for strike missions - This requirement could be augmented or replaced by F-35s if costs are reduced
BTW, you can add tankers into this mix as a removeable addition, you really don't need dedicated tankers.
This gives us an air wing size of about 54 vehicles with expansion. The expansion should be the addition of UCLASS to eight and one more twelve plane squadron of F-35s. This would expand, during major combat operations the air wing to seventy-four vehicles. We might have to eliminate one twelve plane detachment of F-18E/Fs to keep deck operations and hanger space tolerable along with parts, pilots and maintenance personnel.
Anyway, those are some of my thoughts, which in all fairness are colored by my work over 35 years on Naval aircraft. I try to be forward thinking but we are all victims of our past. I liked what the CNO commented on, that we should be deploying "a Ford F-150 instead of a Porsche or Lexus". It fits perfectly. We cannot afford luxury aircaft with limited payload, bring-back weight and range. I also do not believe that stealth is here to stay since bistatic and lower frequency radars can now detect those aircraft. Limited stealth is fine but is must not take over the design.
EDIT: I almost forgot,my bad. By 2030, a version of UCLASS will probably replace the four EA-18Gs. So, you can add that after 2030.
|
|