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Post by alexbrunius on Jun 4, 2018 9:21:59 GMT -6
I would not rate their D3A Aichi Dive Bomber equal to the SBD's. Our SBD could carry up to 1000 lbs. their Val could only carry 500 lbs. bombs. Ours were much faster and had better radios. Over Guadalcanal, an SBD shot down three Japanese Zero's in a dogfight and during Coral Sea, they performed low level CAP to protect against torpedo bombers. My father flew in the backseat of SBD's during the war, and he stated the Japanese did not jump them if they were flying in formation. On the whole, they had many factors that led to the failure of the mission and I don't want to fall into the trap of reductionism. The primary leading factor that caused the failure of the operation was a lack of signal security.
I apologize. Your quote about "In all fairness, historians and Naval personnel at the War College have never completely understood how the Japanese could have lost those first four battles" made me feel pretty sure you had not read Shattered Sword, since that book fairly thoroughly deals with how Japan could lose those battles.
I agree with most of what you wrote in above quote though, but I'm not 100% sure about Nagumo not knowing about the floatplane operations failure since it took place almost a week before the Battle, I thought it was some of the other stuff that he wasn't informed about like the failure of the submarines to get into position or signals of the US Carriers that Yamato picked up.
I also agree about the SBD being superior to the D3A, in all aspects except perhaps maneuverability, the D3A was indeed a much older and less powerful plane.
The thing I don't agree 100% with is that conclusion that signal intelligence is was what cost them the battle. It was important, and perhaps even more important then most others factors, but if all other factors you mention had been corrected ( Like bringing 6-7 Carriers to USAs 3-4 ) as well as having a better performing defensive + scouting game I think Japan still could have came out victorious from the Carrier battle of Midway ( The invasion is another matter ). The Japanese doctrine, planning and setup also made them much more vulnerable to signal security breaches. The Japanese were fearsome when their plans went roughly as they were supposed to, but slow to react and inflexible when they didn't. A more cautious and defensive approach would have significantly lessened the impact of lack of signal security.
One Alternative history approach to Midway that I haven't seen mentioned but find interesting is what would happen if Japan opens with rushing in most of their Surface fleet in range of the Island during night ( With a few CVL for close fighter support ) and opened up with a dawn bombardment of the Airbases there, instead keeping their Carrier striking force hidden in reserve.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 4, 2018 9:46:25 GMT -6
No I would not rate their D3A Aichi Dive Bomber equal to the SBD's. Our SBD could carry up to 1000 lbs. their Val could only carry 500 lbs. bombs. Ours were much faster and had better radios. Over Guadalcanal, an SBD shot down three Japanese Zero's in a dogfight and during Coral Sea, they performed low level CAP to protect against torpedo bombers. My father flew in the backseat of SBD's during the war, and he stated the Japanese did not jump them if they were flying in formation. On the whole, they had many factors that led to the failure of the mission and I don't want to fall into the trap of reductionism. The primary leading factor that caused the failure of the operation was a lack of signal security.
I apologize. Your quote about "In all fairness, historians and Naval personnel at the War College have never completely understood how the Japanese could have lost those first four battles" made me feel pretty sure you had not read Shattered Sword, since that book fairly thoroughly deals with how Japan could lose those battles.
I agree with most of what you wrote in above quote though, but I'm not 100% sure about Nagumo not knowing about the floatplane operations failure since it took place almost a week before the Battle, I thought it was some of the other stuff that he wasn't informed about like the failure of the submarines to get into position or signals of the US Carriers that Yamato picked up.
I also agree about the SBD being superior to the D3A, in all aspects except perhaps maneuverability, the D3A was indeed a much older and less powerful plane.
The thing I don't agree 100% with is that conclusion that signal intelligence is was what cost them the battle. It was important, and perhaps even more important then most others factors, but if all other factors you mention had been corrected ( Like bringing 6-7 Carriers to USAs 3-4 ) as well as having a better performing defensive + scouting game I think Japan still could have came out victorious from the Carrier battle of Midway ( The invasion is another matter ). The Japanese doctrine, planning and setup also made them much more vulnerable to signal security breaches. The Japanese were fearsome when their plans went roughly as they were supposed to, but slow to react and inflexible when they didn't. A more cautious and defensive approach would have significantly lessened the impact of lack of signal security.
One Alternative history approach to Midway that I haven't seen mentioned but find interesting is what would happen if Japan opens with rushing in most of their Surface fleet in range of the Island during night ( With a few CVL for close fighter support ) and opened up with a dawn bombardment of the Airbases there, instead keeping their Carrier striking force hidden in reserve.
Admiral Kusaka stated after the war that they had never received the message from Yamamoto about the failure of Operation K. The information from the submarine about French Frigate Shoals was not received until about 30 May and it was told to monitor the situation, it did and the Operation was delayed for 24 hrs. It was then cancelled. With no word, they assumed it had gone through and the assumption was that the carriers were in Pearl. Yamamoto's CoS Kusaka had asked that Yamato radio any important radio intelligence information. My point is that if their signal security had been better, the other factors would not have made a difference. Slow launches, poor scouting and just poor planning probably would not have made any real difference. The deciding factor which brought all those others into play was our breaking of their code. This was a systemic problem for the Japanese throughout the war and so was logistics. I don't mean to cut this excellent discussion off, but we should return to RTW2. Now, will the events of June 4th, 1942 repeat in the game, only time will tell. In fact, it might have never occurred in the first place. If you wish to discuss this further as I would, there are some excellent threads on the Military History Forum that we could use. I will gladly continue with this. |
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 4, 2018 12:06:09 GMT -6
1 October 1930
FROM BuAer:
To: Department of the Navy, SecNav, CINCUS
Subj: Request for Proposal
1. We are requesting an approval for a new fighter with the following specifications:
1. Single Seat monoplane.
2. Duralumin monocoque construction
3. Single engine, twin row radial, supercharger, with three or four bladed variable pitch prop.
4. Radio, direction finder included in cockpit
5. Maximum speed - 250 MPH
6. Maximum Combat Radius - 150 miles
Signed,
Chief of BuAer
All right gents, go for it.
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Post by tbr on Jun 4, 2018 16:07:47 GMT -6
I think this is now the place to resurrect the major "what if" in naval aviation I wouild like to see in RTW" from our 2018 New Year's thread: And yes, I hope we will be able to play out this "what if" in RTW2 Oh, and my two cents on the VT-8 discussion: It is really remarkable how low the initial performance of Mk13 aerial torpedoes was at the beginning of WWII. But what is even more remarkable is how "low-tech" the modifications were that led to massive improvements. Due to "Pickle Barrell" etc. torpedo launch altitude rose by well more than an order of magnitude (50ft to 2400ft), launch speed was greatly increased (110kt to 410kt) and reliability saw like gains. Granted, VT-8 flew Devastators, so that would not have made much difference for them. But all of the improvements that made the Mk13 utimately the best straight-running aerial torpedo of any nation were achievable with a 1920's tech base or even earlier. www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WTUS_WWII.php |
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 4, 2018 16:14:52 GMT -6
I think this is now the place to resurrect the major "what if" in naval aviation I wouild like to see in RTW" from our 2018 New Year's thread: And yes, I hope we will be able to play out this "what if" in RTW2 Go for it, start us off. Here is an interesting document from NASA - history.nasa.gov/SP-468/contents.htm |
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Post by tbr on Jun 4, 2018 16:27:55 GMT -6
Oh, and thanks for the speingstyles link. My favourite is the CAO:  As per the current pre-release informationwe will not see its like in game because supply vessels will not be modelled. One alternative is the "colonial CV", sacrificing speed for long endurance and reliable engines. This also brings to mind another carrier airgroup variable, the relation between "active airgroup" and "stored spare" planes. Within most of the RTW timeline combat aircraft, especially carrier aircraft, experienced many many operational losses. Most carrier navies would carry full disassembled spare planes to replace such losses, often on the carriers themselves and sometimes on outright "aircraft repair ships" (which could look like carriers as some had a flight deck). en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Unicorn_(I72)Now, when designing or refitting a CV one should have the choice to carry such spare airframes for a reduced displacement "cost" when compared to "ready" planes (e.g. a "spare" costs 25-40% of the displacement a "ready" costs). The more "spares" the higher the percentage of truly combat ready planes of the total airgroup in combat scenarios. Later in game technology could serve to reduce operational losses and increase the "combat ready quote" to a point where carrying "spare airframes" would loose attractiveness. |
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 4, 2018 17:10:16 GMT -6
Oh, and thanks for the speingstyles link. My favourite is the CAO: As per the current pre-release informationwe will not see its like in game because supply vessels will not be modelled. One alternative is the "colonial CV", sacrificing speed for long endurance and reliable engines. This also brings to mind another carrier airgroup variable, the relation between "active airgroup" and "stored spare" planes. Within most of the RTW timeline combat aircraft, especially carrier aircraft, experienced many many operational losses. Most carrier navies would carry full disassembled spare planes to replace such losses, often on the carriers themselves and sometimes on outright "aircraft repair ships" (which could look like carriers as some had a flight deck). en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Unicorn_(I72)Now, when designing or refitting a CV one should have the choice to carry such spare airframes for a reduced displacement "cost" when compared to "ready" planes (e.g. a "spare" costs 25-40% of the displacement a "ready" costs). The more "spares" the higher the percentage of truly combat ready planes of the total airgroup in combat scenarios. Later in game technology could serve to reduce operational losses and increase the "combat ready quote" to a point where carrying "spare airframes" would loose attractiveness. I was glad to share it. Here is the link to my thread that has other archives and such, hope it will help. nws-online.proboards.com/thread/1112/useful-archives-websitesThe Japanese were able to carry whole replacement aircraft in the lower hangers, such as #3. Our carriers carried enough parts stored in the overhead of the hanger to replace fifty percent of the aircraft parts. Just a note: if you desire to build smaller carriers, you had better give them adequate deck length to launch heavy aircraft or build much lighter fighters. |
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Post by dorn on Jun 5, 2018 5:28:05 GMT -6
Do you know how much cost Yorktown class and Illustrious class carriers?
Just thinking to compare with different doctrines used by USN and RN with USN using spare aircrafts stored in their carriers and RN using dedicated repair and supply carrier.
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Post by bcoopactual on Jun 5, 2018 6:46:07 GMT -6
Wouldn't it be tough to compare costs since they were built in different countries with different currencies and economies? I realize there is an exchange rate for the currencies but items like cost for labor and materials would be different because there are two completely different supply chains and labor laws, union strengths, etc. Not that I know for sure one way or the other, it's just intended as a question.
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alant
Full Member
Posts: 125
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Post by alant on Jun 5, 2018 16:44:30 GMT -6
I agree that the hermaphrodite Battleship-Carrier was a concept without merit. Float planes were not going to cut it in air combat and a half-battleship sporting flight deck/hanger is a conflagration waiting to happen in a surface engagement.
The concept of basing your primary scout planes on cruisers and/or seaplane tenders has more going for it, but carrier based scouts should also be part of that doctrine.
IJNS Tone and Chikuma are primary examples of WWII scout cruisers. The idea being for carriers to concentrate their aircraft on strike and CAP, not dilute their capabilities by flying numerous scout circuits.
Seaplane Tenders servicing long-range flying boats from shoals or atolls well to the rear can be a significant asset when land and seaplane bases aren't available.
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Post by axe99 on Jun 5, 2018 17:32:37 GMT -6
Do you know how much cost Yorktown class and Illustrious class carriers? Just thinking to compare with different doctrines used by USN and RN with USN using spare aircrafts stored in their carriers and RN using dedicated repair and supply carrier. HMS Victorious (one of the Illustrious Class) cost 6.4 million pounds (source - Send Her Victorious), but as BCoop says it's best to be cautious when comparing costs due to purchasing power issues, different time periods (that 6.4 million pounds was spread over four years, and a slightly different time period to the Yorktowns iirc, and I've no idea of the rate of inflation at the time in general, let alone for CV-specific equipment). Afraid I don't have a cost for the Yorktowns though. |
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 5, 2018 17:40:51 GMT -6
I agree that the hermaphrodite Battleship-Carrier was a concept without merit. Float planes were not going to cut it in air combat and a half-battleship sporting flight deck/hanger is a conflagration waiting to happen in a surface engagement. The concept of basing your primary scout planes on cruisers and/or seaplane tenders has more going for it, but carrier based scouts should also be part of that doctrine. IJNS Tone and Chikuma are primary examples of WWII scout cruisers. The idea being for carriers to concentrate their aircraft on strike and CAP, not dilute their capabilities by flying numerous scout circuits. Seaplane Tenders servicing long-range flying boats from shoals or atolls well to the rear can be a significant asset when land and seaplane bases aren't available. Just some comments about using floatplanes as scouts versus carrier based scouts. Floatplanes are not maneuverable, they are slow generally below 200 mph, and very tricky if not impossible to land and take aboard during bad weather. Generally, they can ranges from about 800 miles to around 1500 miles. That would mean a scouting distance of about 500 miles out, 50 miles across, then 500 miles return. The launchers can fail very easily and they do require black power in most cases to launch. When in a surface battle, generally the floatplanes have to be thrown overboard. If you use an integrated scout bomber squadron consisting of another squadron of your dive bombers, you now have a faster, more maneuverable, long range and a plane that can carry a bomb for targets of opportunity. I am going for the integrated scout bomber squadron myself. |
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 5, 2018 17:53:25 GMT -6
Do you know how much cost Yorktown class and Illustrious class carriers? Just thinking to compare with different doctrines used by USN and RN with USN using spare aircrafts stored in their carriers and RN using dedicated repair and supply carrier. HMS Victorious (one of the Illustrious Class) cost 6.4 million pounds (source - Send Her Victorious), but as BCoop says it's best to be cautious when comparing costs due to purchasing power issues, different time periods (that 6.4 million pounds was spread over four years, and a slightly different time period to the Yorktowns iirc, and I've no idea of the rate of inflation at the time in general, let alone for CV-specific equipment). Afraid I don't have a cost for the Yorktowns though. The Essex class, in 1942 cost from $58 million to $68 million dollars to build. |
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 5, 2018 18:00:49 GMT -6
Do you know how much cost Yorktown class and Illustrious class carriers? Just thinking to compare with different doctrines used by USN and RN with USN using spare aircrafts stored in their carriers and RN using dedicated repair and supply carrier. HMS Victorious (one of the Illustrious Class) cost 6.4 million pounds (source - Send Her Victorious), but as BCoop says it's best to be cautious when comparing costs due to purchasing power issues, different time periods (that 6.4 million pounds was spread over four years, and a slightly different time period to the Yorktowns iirc, and I've no idea of the rate of inflation at the time in general, let alone for CV-specific equipment). Afraid I don't have a cost for the Yorktowns though. My research says that the pound sterling in 1940 was equal to about 2600 USD. |
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alant
Full Member
Posts: 125
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Post by alant on Jun 5, 2018 18:36:54 GMT -6
HMS Victorious (one of the Illustrious Class) cost 6.4 million pounds (source - Send Her Victorious), but as BCoop says it's best to be cautious when comparing costs due to purchasing power issues, different time periods (that 6.4 million pounds was spread over four years, and a slightly different time period to the Yorktowns iirc, and I've no idea of the rate of inflation at the time in general, let alone for CV-specific equipment). Afraid I don't have a cost for the Yorktowns though. My research says that the pound sterling in 1940 was equal to about 2600 USD. Twenty Six Hundred Dollars per pound, so 6.4 million pounds would be $16,640,000,000 (16.64 billion dollars). Somehow I don't think that's it. My quick Google check says nineteen hundred and forty pounds equals 2601.93 USD, but that is at today's exchange rate. www.miketodd.net/encyc/dollhist-graph.htm"From 1940, and through the war, although no longer on the Gold Standard, the £/$ rate had been pegged by the British government at $4.03, and in at the end of the war a world conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, decided on a variation of the Gold Standard." That would make 6.4 million pounds = 25,792,000 USD. Sound better? |
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