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Post by aeson on Nov 17, 2018 10:06:55 GMT -6
Created because discussing mostly-WWII-era anti-aircraft artillery in the Washington Naval Treaty Option thread didn't seem particularly appropriate to the thread's notional topic.
The information thus far available suggests that we will be able to arm ships with heavy, medium, and light AA guns.
2" and heavier weapons, such as the 76mm (3"), 88mm (3.47"), and 93mm (3.67") cannon mentioned above, will probably be classed as "heavy" AA guns within the game and be represented by dual-purpose secondary and tertiary batteries, as Rule the Waves allows weapons of these calibers to be carried as secondary and tertiary batteries and the developer journal parenthetically calls heavy AA guns "PD guns," which I presume was meant to be "DP" or dual-purpose guns rather than being intended to be "PD" or point-defense guns, a label which would probably more accurately be applied to lighter, shorter-ranged weapons.
Medium and light AA weapons appear to be handled more abstractly; the image showing basic information on a pair of Italian CVLs in the developer journal thread indicates that the ships carry a number of "light" AA guns but has no other indicators of their caliber or quality, and similarly garrisonchisolm's Bismarck-class battleship shown in the Radar Fire Control thread is listed as carrying a number of "light" and "medium" AA guns with no indication of their caliber or quality. My assumption, then, is that the caliber and quality of these guns will be abstracted into the AA tech level and possibly game year. As a guess, at low tech levels light AA guns would represent a variety of machine guns used as AA armaments while medium AA guns would represent obsolescent light cannon (anything between about 1" and 2") repurposed as AA guns in the 1910s; as the game progresses and AA technology advances, light AA guns would begin representing heavier machine guns and eventually light autocannon of not more than about 1" caliber such as the 20mm Oerlikon while medium AA guns would represent more and more modern autocannon of between about 1" and 2" caliber.
As to whether or not AA gun type, caliber, and quality will be a nation-specific attribute, I rather suspect not; Rule the Waves does not give any playable power any advantages of this kind. Some nations may have an advantage in certain AA-related technologies and thus typically have superior AA defenses when their ships are compared to contemporary ships with similarly-large AA armaments of other powers, but I very much doubt that there will be any power with an advantage in AA weaponry such that the effectiveness of its ships' AA armaments in a given year and with a given set of AA-related technologies is superior to that of any other power in the same year, with the same AA-related technologies, and with equal AA armament on their ships. The permanent advantages and disadvantages that Rule the Waves gives to the various playable powers tend to be things which are harder to copy or correct - the comparatively enormous experience of British shipyards giving Britain shorter construction times, or the Russian education system or lack thereof reducing typical crew quality of Russian ships, for example - whereas having a great advantage in AA guns will only last until you start exporting them and granting production licenses to other powers' armaments industries, or for another power to steal/capture enough information on it to successfully copy it. There's also no guarantee that producing a good gun will guarantee a good follow-on design, whereas a lackluster education system will consistently do a lackluster job of preparing its students and highly-experienced shipyards will continue to be highly-experienced shipyards over relatively long periods of time.
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Post by forcea1 on Nov 17, 2018 10:28:33 GMT -6
Are we going to be seeing automatic large-calibre dual-purpose guns?
Examples include the 90-120rpm 3"/70 guns developed by Britain and the US, and the 66rpm 5"/70 QF Mk N1 that was designed by Britain in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
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Post by hrcak47 on Nov 17, 2018 11:00:24 GMT -6
From one of the screenshots posted, any turret, including main battery can be made dual purpose as a tickbox. Dual purpose turret will likely be heavier, but it will have a nominal ability to shoot at planes. "Autoloader" is also an additional tickbox attribute.
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Post by bcoopactual on Nov 17, 2018 11:02:11 GMT -6
Are we going to be seeing automatic large-calibre dual-purpose guns? Examples include the 90-120rpm 3"/70 guns developed by Britain and the US, and the 66rpm 5"/70 QF Mk N1 that was designed by Britain in the late 1940s and early 1950s. [Edit - Haha, I got ninja'd. Sorry for the redundant info.] One of the pictures garrisonchisholm posted was a RTW2 ship design screen. All three of the main and secondary and tertiary armament sections had check boxes for autoloaders. They were greyed out but that could mean any number of things including it hasn't been implemented yet in the current build or the player just hadn't researched it yet that game. Best I think we can say is the concept is on the planned list of features that made it to one of the later cuts. Can't say for sure that it will be in but I'm reasonably confident that the odds are good. |
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Post by axe99 on Nov 17, 2018 17:15:21 GMT -6
Great thinking Aeson  The impression I have is that things that seem to influence AA effectiveness are: - Number of attacking aircraft, particularly if they can overwhelm the number of fire control positions on the ship. Note, however, as per reply to Britishball below, there are limits on how many aircraft can effectively attack at once. - Whether those aircraft face other aircraft as opposition. It seems that the disruptive effect of defending aircraft is as or more important as their capacity to shoot down attackers. Hitting a ship with a bomb or torpedo is not easy, and ever extra element that makes the job harder makes a hit less likely. Pedestal is a great example of this, where numerous attacking aircraft (400 sorties in all) achieved far less than might have been expected of them (iirc - but this is hazy - one DD and one merchant ship sunk, one CV significantly damaged - but I may have missed other significant damage - compare this with 284 sorties to sink Yamato and about half her escorts in 1945) - AA was part of the story, but the effectiveness of the CAP, even when frequently outnumbered, as probably the single biggest influence. - the quality of the AA fire control. AA fire control, particularly pre-radar, is very, very difficult. Once radar came along, it provided effective ranging (which, iirc, could then be used with multiple observations to calculate a more accurate speed of the attacking aircraft) which improved things greatly (although the US Mk 34/37 directors were better set up to take radar inputs, while British HACS weren't as able to take as much advantage of radar information - although radar still helped). AA fire control also is what determines the fuse setting - and if you can imagine how fast aircraft travel, with the difficulties of getting an accurate range setting in the first place, and then the difficulty in predicting where the aircraft would be when that information had been sent to the particular AA mount, taking into account the time taken to set the fuse, it provides some indication of how hard AA fire control was. Proximity fuses were very important because the effectively cut out the 'fuse setting' loop (so reduced the time between fire control reading and shell arriving on target, simplifying the prediction problem) and were generally far more accurate. As an interim measure, things like the US Mk 38 (I think, going from memory) mount for the 5in/38 Mk 12 had an integrated fuse-setter in the hoist, so shells were set automatically based on director information, speeding up the process a bit (but the fuse settings were still estimates rather than the proximity fuse 'actual'). - The number and location of AA fire control positions - each position can only engage one aircraft, and they can only engage aircraft they can 'see' (be it optically or with their radar(s)). - The number, location and quality of AA weapons. It was usually important to have both good close-in AA (20mm/40mm) and long-range AA (3" to 6"). Long range AA disrupted attacks and thinned out incoming fire, and also was very useful in providing an 'AA umbrella' over neighbouring ships (for example, escorting US DDs would use their 5in DP batteries to protect nearby carriers or BBs). Short-range AA came into its own when attacking aircraft got closer, and the fire control of the long-range AA couldn't keep up (late in the war, once proximity fuses were available in enough numbers, the US had some success transferring control of its 5in guns to the Mk 51 directors for its 40mm AA - but I'd wager without the automatic fuse-setting of the proximity fuses, there wouldn't be much point doing this with hoist or manually-set fuses). Earlier in the war, 40mm and 20mm AA was particularly helpful against dive bombers, whose non-linear approach paths made the long-range fire control solution very difficult to calculate even for the Mk 37, let alone for less capable fire control systems. - Effective air warning - knowing enemy aircraft were coming, and preferably what altitude, meant the ship could be ready, with the right people at the right guns and directors, pointing in the right direction. I'm sure I'll have forgotten something - others should chime in as appropriate . oldpop2000 - Friedman's book is good (I've read it and have it both in Kindle and Hardcopy) and has good US stats, but sadly the US stats aren't as indicative as they could be, as by the time they were keeping good statistics much of the IJN's well-trained squadrons for striking ships had been wiped out. The late-war info effectively pits 'best-in-class' individual AA against 'worst-in-class' pilot training. It also only provides very 'high level' overviews, or limited 'snapshots', neither of which are that useful for getting an idea of what might happen in a particular action. From my reading, the 'feeling' I get is that it's highly, highly variable. A strike of fifty aircraft might achieve nothing, and a strike of ten might disable or sink a major vessel. britishball - in my reading, I think the golden rule is that regardless of the size of the attack there are no guarantees. One aircraft can sneak in and land a torpedo, and thirty aircraft can attack and not hit. A strike of 100 aircraft at once sounds a bit implausible, as ships were only so big, so only so many aircraft could 'line up' at once, and the more aircraft doing this, the more coordination and training required. |
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Post by aeson on Nov 17, 2018 19:29:37 GMT -6
Are we going to be seeing automatic large-calibre dual-purpose guns? Examples include the 90-120rpm 3"/70 guns developed by Britain and the US, and the 66rpm 5"/70 QF Mk N1 that was designed by Britain in the late 1940s and early 1950s. I am generally in agreement with bcoopactual's and hrcak47's responses, but with a caveat: If by 'large-caliber' dual purpose guns you mean guns of high barrel length caliber, as is suggested by your reference to the post-WWII 3"/70 and 5"/70 guns rather than to for example Yamato's nominally dual-purpose main battery, my answer would be that long-barreled dual-purpose guns will probably not be explicitly included within the game, except perhaps as a late-game tech in a manner similar to how heavy/superheavy shells and high-velocity guns are included in Rule the Waves.
Note, however, that this is an assumption; I do not know that this is or will be the case in Rule the Waves 2. I consider it likely - Rule the Waves does not explicitly model barrel length and I have seen no indication that Rule the Waves 2 will do otherwise - but I do not have the information to say one way or the other with absolute certainty.
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Post by dorn on Nov 18, 2018 0:47:11 GMT -6
Great thinking Aeson The impression I have is that things that seem to influence AA effectiveness are: - Number of attacking aircraft, particularly if they can overwhelm the number of fire control positions on the ship. Note, however, as per reply to Britishball below, there are limits on how many aircraft can effectively attack at once. - Whether those aircraft face other aircraft as opposition. It seems that the disruptive effect of defending aircraft is as or more important as their capacity to shoot down attackers. Hitting a ship with a bomb or torpedo is not easy, and ever extra element that makes the job harder makes a hit less likely. Pedestal is a great example of this, where numerous attacking aircraft (400 sorties in all) achieved far less than might have been expected of them (iirc - but this is hazy - one DD and one merchant ship sunk, one CV significantly damaged - but I may have missed other significant damage - compare this with 284 sorties to sink Yamato and about half her escorts in 1945) - AA was part of the story, but the effectiveness of the CAP, even when frequently outnumbered, as probably the single biggest influence. - the quality of the AA fire control. AA fire control, particularly pre-radar, is very, very difficult. Once radar came along, it provided effective ranging (which, iirc, could then be used with multiple observations to calculate a more accurate speed of the attacking aircraft) which improved things greatly (although the US Mk 34/37 directors were better set up to take radar inputs, while British HACS weren't as able to take as much advantage of radar information - although radar still helped). AA fire control also is what determines the fuse setting - and if you can imagine how fast aircraft travel, with the difficulties of getting an accurate range setting in the first place, and then the difficulty in predicting where the aircraft would be when that information had been sent to the particular AA mount, taking into account the time taken to set the fuse, it provides some indication of how hard AA fire control was. Proximity fuses were very important because the effectively cut out the 'fuse setting' loop (so reduced the time between fire control reading and shell arriving on target, simplifying the prediction problem) and were generally far more accurate. As an interim measure, things like the US Mk 38 (I think, going from memory) mount for the 5in/38 Mk 12 had an integrated fuse-setter in the hoist, so shells were set automatically based on director information, speeding up the process a bit (but the fuse settings were still estimates rather than the proximity fuse 'actual'). - The number and location of AA fire control positions - each position can only engage one aircraft, and they can only engage aircraft they can 'see' (be it optically or with their radar(s)). - The number, location and quality of AA weapons. It was usually important to have both good close-in AA (20mm/40mm) and long-range AA (3" to 6"). Long range AA disrupted attacks and thinned out incoming fire, and also was very useful in providing an 'AA umbrella' over neighbouring ships (for example, escorting US DDs would use their 5in DP batteries to protect nearby carriers or BBs). Short-range AA came into its own when attacking aircraft got closer, and the fire control of the long-range AA couldn't keep up (late in the war, once proximity fuses were available in enough numbers, the US had some success transferring control of its 5in guns to the Mk 51 directors for its 40mm AA - but I'd wager without the automatic fuse-setting of the proximity fuses, there wouldn't be much point doing this with hoist or manually-set fuses). Earlier in the war, 40mm and 20mm AA was particularly helpful against dive bombers, whose non-linear approach paths made the long-range fire control solution very difficult to calculate even for the Mk 37, let alone for less capable fire control systems. - Effective air warning - knowing enemy aircraft were coming, and preferably what altitude, meant the ship could be ready, with the right people at the right guns and directors, pointing in the right direction. I'm sure I'll have forgotten something - others should chime in as appropriate . oldpop2000 - Friedman's book is good (I've read it and have it both in Kindle and Hardcopy) and has good US stats, but sadly the US stats aren't as indicative as they could be, as by the time they were keeping good statistics much of the IJN's well-trained squadrons for striking ships had been wiped out. The late-war info effectively pits 'best-in-class' individual AA against 'worst-in-class' pilot training. It also only provides very 'high level' overviews, or limited 'snapshots', neither of which are that useful for getting an idea of what might happen in a particular action. From my reading, the 'feeling' I get is that it's highly, highly variable. A strike of fifty aircraft might achieve nothing, and a strike of ten might disable or sink a major vessel. britishball - in my reading, I think the golden rule is that regardless of the size of the attack there are no guarantees. One aircraft can sneak in and land a torpedo, and thirty aircraft can attack and not hit. A strike of 100 aircraft at once sounds a bit implausible, as ships were only so big, so only so many aircraft could 'line up' at once, and the more aircraft doing this, the more coordination and training required. Great post, I completely agree with your conclusions. I just add that by British experience in Med disripting attacker was vital and even if CAP were out of ammor false attack proved effective way to disrupt attack. |
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Post by britishball on Nov 18, 2018 5:46:15 GMT -6
Great thinking Aeson The impression I have is that things that seem to influence AA effectiveness are: - Number of attacking aircraft, particularly if they can overwhelm the number of fire control positions on the ship. Note, however, as per reply to Britishball below, there are limits on how many aircraft can effectively attack at once. - Whether those aircraft face other aircraft as opposition. It seems that the disruptive effect of defending aircraft is as or more important as their capacity to shoot down attackers. Hitting a ship with a bomb or torpedo is not easy, and ever extra element that makes the job harder makes a hit less likely. Pedestal is a great example of this, where numerous attacking aircraft (400 sorties in all) achieved far less than might have been expected of them (iirc - but this is hazy - one DD and one merchant ship sunk, one CV significantly damaged - but I may have missed other significant damage - compare this with 284 sorties to sink Yamato and about half her escorts in 1945) - AA was part of the story, but the effectiveness of the CAP, even when frequently outnumbered, as probably the single biggest influence. - the quality of the AA fire control. AA fire control, particularly pre-radar, is very, very difficult. Once radar came along, it provided effective ranging (which, iirc, could then be used with multiple observations to calculate a more accurate speed of the attacking aircraft) which improved things greatly (although the US Mk 34/37 directors were better set up to take radar inputs, while British HACS weren't as able to take as much advantage of radar information - although radar still helped). AA fire control also is what determines the fuse setting - and if you can imagine how fast aircraft travel, with the difficulties of getting an accurate range setting in the first place, and then the difficulty in predicting where the aircraft would be when that information had been sent to the particular AA mount, taking into account the time taken to set the fuse, it provides some indication of how hard AA fire control was. Proximity fuses were very important because the effectively cut out the 'fuse setting' loop (so reduced the time between fire control reading and shell arriving on target, simplifying the prediction problem) and were generally far more accurate. As an interim measure, things like the US Mk 38 (I think, going from memory) mount for the 5in/38 Mk 12 had an integrated fuse-setter in the hoist, so shells were set automatically based on director information, speeding up the process a bit (but the fuse settings were still estimates rather than the proximity fuse 'actual'). - The number and location of AA fire control positions - each position can only engage one aircraft, and they can only engage aircraft they can 'see' (be it optically or with their radar(s)). - The number, location and quality of AA weapons. It was usually important to have both good close-in AA (20mm/40mm) and long-range AA (3" to 6"). Long range AA disrupted attacks and thinned out incoming fire, and also was very useful in providing an 'AA umbrella' over neighbouring ships (for example, escorting US DDs would use their 5in DP batteries to protect nearby carriers or BBs). Short-range AA came into its own when attacking aircraft got closer, and the fire control of the long-range AA couldn't keep up (late in the war, once proximity fuses were available in enough numbers, the US had some success transferring control of its 5in guns to the Mk 51 directors for its 40mm AA - but I'd wager without the automatic fuse-setting of the proximity fuses, there wouldn't be much point doing this with hoist or manually-set fuses). Earlier in the war, 40mm and 20mm AA was particularly helpful against dive bombers, whose non-linear approach paths made the long-range fire control solution very difficult to calculate even for the Mk 37, let alone for less capable fire control systems. - Effective air warning - knowing enemy aircraft were coming, and preferably what altitude, meant the ship could be ready, with the right people at the right guns and directors, pointing in the right direction. I'm sure I'll have forgotten something - others should chime in as appropriate . oldpop2000 - Friedman's book is good (I've read it and have it both in Kindle and Hardcopy) and has good US stats, but sadly the US stats aren't as indicative as they could be, as by the time they were keeping good statistics much of the IJN's well-trained squadrons for striking ships had been wiped out. The late-war info effectively pits 'best-in-class' individual AA against 'worst-in-class' pilot training. It also only provides very 'high level' overviews, or limited 'snapshots', neither of which are that useful for getting an idea of what might happen in a particular action. From my reading, the 'feeling' I get is that it's highly, highly variable. A strike of fifty aircraft might achieve nothing, and a strike of ten might disable or sink a major vessel. britishball - in my reading, I think the golden rule is that regardless of the size of the attack there are no guarantees. One aircraft can sneak in and land a torpedo, and thirty aircraft can attack and not hit. A strike of 100 aircraft at once sounds a bit implausible, as ships were only so big, so only so many aircraft could 'line up' at once, and the more aircraft doing this, the more coordination and training required. Yeah I just plucked 100 as a random number, I suppose circling around out of AA range or lining up for 10 waves of 10 wide attacks would be better than 100 planes in a very wide line! Of course by the time the second or third wave goes in the sky will be so filled full of flak and the guns will be far more accurately trained that the last few waves are going to get destroyed on approach. Interesting to note that American efficiency wasn't really 36% though, if that was against late war Japanese pilots, I'm not sure if that number also took into account CAP or just purely ship based AA. It'll be interesting to see how RTW2 handles it but I'm sure they've put a lot of thought into how it works. |
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Post by mycophobia on Nov 19, 2018 13:44:59 GMT -6
On the topic of japanese type-3 shells. It’s issue as an aa weapon seems to be primarily due to the abysmal ability for main battery gun to train on air targets and make relatively accurate fuse settings. Perhaps with proximity fuse+radar guidance it maybe somewhat viable(though I highly doubt it will be effective).
Interestingly it seems a very powerful ground bombardment weapon giving its large area of effect with its incendiary sharpnal. As seen in the shelling of Henderson field. This is pure speculation but it might event be an effective weapon against some of the more lightly armoured warships by potentially dealing heavy damage to its superstructure without needing to actually score a direct or close hit?
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 19, 2018 21:33:13 GMT -6
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Post by hrcak47 on Nov 20, 2018 8:30:12 GMT -6
While we're at it, how about increasing the granularity of the AA weapon calibers available for mounting?
0.3 in machinegun covers general machineguns for everyone.
0.5 in are self explanatory heavy machine guns.
0.8 in (20 mm) are the first entry into cannon territory.
1 in (25 mm) is distinctively Japanese.
1.5 in (37-40-45mm) roughly covers Bofors and variants.
2 in covers 57 mm designs.
2.5 in covers WW1 66 mm designs.
3 in covers 76 mm designs.
3.5 in is needed for the iconic 85-88-90-93 mm guns
4 in covers 100-105-107 mm group
4.5 in is quintessentally British.
5 in covers 127-130 mm group.
5.5 in covers mostly non-AA guns, but it can definitely tag along.
6 in guns are probably the pinnacle of practicality for AA/DP guns
So, will it be possible to get .5 in granularity in AA selection?
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Post by joebob1337 on Nov 20, 2018 10:35:59 GMT -6
All I want is to have completely useless 18in DP guns, then my life will be complete.
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Post by forcea1 on Nov 20, 2018 11:00:03 GMT -6
On the topic of japanese type-3 shells. It’s issue as an aa weapon seems to be primarily due to the abysmal ability for main battery gun to train on air targets and make relatively accurate fuse settings. Perhaps with proximity fuse+radar guidance it maybe somewhat viable(though I highly doubt it will be effective). Interestingly it seems a very powerful ground bombardment weapon giving its large area of effect with its incendiary sharpnal. As seen in the shelling of Henderson field. This is pure speculation but it might event be an effective weapon against some of the more lightly armoured warships by potentially dealing heavy damage to its superstructure without needing to actually score a direct or close hit? Such shells would only be useful at ranges where the slow traverse rate would not be a problem. British Capital ships were fitted with the Auto Barrage Unit, which was used alongside the Type 283 range only radar to fire the main armament (pre-loaded with time-fused ammunition) when the targeted aircraft reached a certain range. |
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Post by forcea1 on Nov 20, 2018 11:05:51 GMT -6
My post above quickly spiraled out of control as ended up creating a list of the fire control systems considered by the Royal Navy from the latter half of the Second World War to the 1950s. This list should provide an idea of the capabilities of the last generation of fire control systems for naval guns.
In June 1943 Staff requirements for a blind-fire system controlling guns between 4in and 8in were drawn up for an MRS (Medium Range System) director capable of picking up targets at 12,000 yards and opening fire at 10,000.This requirement was referred to as MRS II.
MRS I used the Type 263 radar (a modification of the Type 262 blind fire radar used for Bofors) and a modified CRS I director, tri-axially stabilised director with two-man (layer and pointer) control with added fuse prediction and transmitting gear . It was to be capable of acquiring targets at 7000 yards and locking-on at 5000.
Both MRS I and CRS I were abandoned in 1945, with the latter being replaced by CBRFD (Close Range Blind Fire Director) a line of sight stabilised system with one-man (joystick) control.
The original MRS requirement continued post war and led to three different director designs. (Note the post war transition from Roman numerals to Arabic numerals.)
MRS 3 was based on the US Mk56 director with improved Electro-mechanical computer and crew protection.
It was produced in dual purpose (with a Mk10 Force Control Box) and anti-aircraft versions.
MRS 4 used many of the components of LRS 1 (see below) including some radar components and the 20 second time-of-flight computer.
MRS 5 had a digital computer, and had an electrical scanning radar capable of engaging targets at 14,000 yards.
MRS' 6 and 7 were based on the wartime Mk VI Director with the Type 275 radar and fitted aboard ships with that director. The former had 4 inch ballistics and was fitted aboard cruisers, whilst the latter had ballistics for 4.5 inch guns and fitted aboard War-Emergency destroyers, the Battle class destroyers and post war frigates. The MRS 6 had a range of 5000 yards.
MRS 8 was based on the CRBFD and had an improved Type 262Q radar. It was supposed to be used alongside the Bofors L70 that was to be acquired by the Royal Navy in the early 1950s. It was delayed to the point where it was replaced by the Sea Cat missile.
The most capable of the Fire Control systems that were intended to be acquired was the LRS1 fire control system. The 1944 Staff Requirements were to pick up aircraft and ships at 38,000 yards, engage the former at 22,000 yards, and the latter at 28,000 yards. 6 inch shell splashes were to be spotted at the same range, the distance being reduced to 25,000 yards for 5.25 inch guns, 20,000 yards for 4.7 and 4.5 inch guns and to 16,000 yards for 4 inch guns. The director was also required to have automatic searching for targets in range, bearing and elevation if now accurate Target Indication was available.
There were two separate computers, a 0-20 second time-of-flight computer for anti-aircraft fire and a 20-40 second time-of-flight computer optimised for surface fire. Initially the director's Type 901 radar was an X-Band 750 kW set with a 6ft parabolic antenna. The narrow beam produced by the radar required the inclusion of a second radar set for target acquisition and shell-splash spotting.
After 1950, the LRS1 director is abandoned although the Type 901 radar survived and after several design changes became associated with the GWS1 Seaslug missile system.
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Post by director on Nov 20, 2018 11:45:21 GMT -6
What about the unrotated projectile (rocket) barrage AA system? From what I know, it wasn't effective, but it was developed and installed on ships including HMS Hood.
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